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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introductory Remarks  
The term reparation could mean “the act of making amends for a wrong”.1 It is a natural law norm 
that has existed since time immemorial.2 In moral terms, a wrong doer must provide redress to the 
victim for harms resulting from their deeds. Historically, reparation has assumed different 
meanings in the sphere of international law and relations.  
Following World War I, the understanding of reparation was very state-centric in the sense that it 
was taken to mean compensatory payments made by the defeated state to the victorious state for 
losses incurred by the later.3 Post war reparations focused on sanctioning the losers of war and not 
on the needs of individual victims of an armed conflict. At that time, public international law was 
only applicable to the sovereign states as subjects and individuals injured by acts of a foreign state 
could only claim redress against such states through their state of nationality.4  
In classical international law, an individual had no right to demand reparation from the warring 
states. Only states of the injured party could claim reparation from the offending state.  
Nevertheless, the state-centric meaning of reparations changed with the advent of transitional 
justice5 and the prominence of the victim’s justice in the discourse of human rights.6 In the same 
vein, the internationalisation of human rights following World War II freed individuals from the 
 
1 Garner BA (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 7ed (1999) 1301. 
2 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, Judgment of 19 June 2012, International Court of Justice, para 29, available at https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/103/103-20120619-JUD-01-01-EN.pdf (accessed 12 October 2018). 
3 Gomes L German Reparations, 1919-1932: A Historical Survey (2010) 3-45; Powers KL and Proctor K ‘Victim’s 
Justice in the Aftermath of Political Violence: Why Do Countries Award Reparations?’ (2015) 13 Foreign Policy 
Analysis 2; Shelton D Remedies in International Human Rights Law 3ed (2015) 16. 
4 See ‘Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programs’ (2008) at page 5. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ReparationsProgrammes.pdf (Accessed on 29 February 2016). 
5 Transitional Justice is a generic term that has been employed to encompass all judicial and non-judicial approaches 
to providing justice in countries emerging from armed conflicts, dictatorships or entrenched state violation of human 
rights. Such justice and rebuilding approaches could be prosecutions, truth gathering, restructuring of state institutions 
and promotion of rule of law as well as reparations for victims of abuses. 
6 Jochnick C ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights’  (1999) 
21 Human Rights Quarterly  58. 
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conservative structures of state sovereignty by allowing for protection and enforcement of human 
rights beyond national borders.7  
Now reparation is being conceptualised as a justice mechanism that seeks to offer both material 
and symbolic redress for victims of human rights violations in post conflict societies.8 In the past, 
transitional settings on reparations would normally respond to specific individual harms resulting 
from violations of civil and political rights rather than broader human rights issues relating to, for 
example, denial of socio-economic and cultural rights.9 That approach is somehow fading as 
transitional justice actors are beginning to advocate for reparation policies that also respond to 
violations relating to socio-economic and cultural rights.10  
Notwithstanding the traditional understanding of reparation as a justice mechanism that obligates 
a wrongdoer to make good the harm suffered by a victim, De Greiff breaks down the concept of 
reparation into two aspects.11  
He conceptualises the term reparation in juridical and state-policy contexts. In juridical terms, 
reparations mean all measures and strategies, both symbolic and material, which could provide 
relief for the harm suffered by victims of human rights violations. Such legalistic approach to 
defining reparations has been firmly embodied in the United Nations Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law 
 
7 Haller G Human Rights Without Democracy?: Reconciling Freedom with Equality (2012) 90-92; Friedman LM ‘The 
Internationalization of Human Rights by David P. Forsythe’ (1993) 13 Boston College Third World Law Journal 189-
198. 
8 Val-Garijo F ‘Reparation for Victims as Key Element of Transitional Justice in the Middle East Occupied Territories: 
A Legal and Institutional Approach’ (2010) 6 International Studies Journal 39-42; ‘Reparations in Theory and 
Practice’ (2007) International Center for Transitional Justice, Reparative Justice Series, p.2, available at 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Reparations-Practice-2007-English.pdf (accessed on 14th March 
2016). 
9 Roht-Arriaza N and Orlovsky K ‘A Complementarity Relationship: Reparations and Development’ in De Greiff and 
Duthie R (Eds.) Transitional Justice and Development (2009) 172. 
10 Roht-Arriaza N ‘Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (2013) University of California Hastings 
College of the Law Research Paper No.53, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177024 
(accessed on 15th March 2016). 
11 De Greiff P ‘Justice and Reparations’ in De Greiff P (ed) The Handbook of Reparations (2006) 452-453. 
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(Hereinafter “UN Basic Principles on Reparations”).12 The UN Basic Principles on Reparations 
provide that reparations could take the form of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.13  
On the other hand, De Greiff suggests that reparations could also be obtained through state-policy 
reparation programs aimed at providing benefits to victims of particular types of crimes.14 Indeed, 
the concept of reparation programs was prevalent in Latin American countries that established 
state-led reparation programs aimed at alleviating specific harms suffered by individuals or a 
category of individuals as a consequence of dictatorships and atrocity crimes.15  
Likewise, the UN Basic Principles on Reparations enjoin States to establish reparation programs 
to provide redress for victims of human rights violations if those responsible for the violations are 
unable or unwilling to meet their obligations to provide individualised reparations.16  
Therefore, it is crucial to understand that reparations could result from judicial decisions or 
governmental reparative programs that have a basis in law but are not necessarily susceptible to 
court adjudication.17 Relatedly, international law recognises that the right to reparation for victims 
of gross human rights violations could be realised through criminal, civil, administrative, or 
disciplinary proceedings either at the domestic, regional or international level.18  
 
12 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, adopted 
on 21 March 2006. 
13 Principles 18-23, UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
14 State reparations programs are distinct from judicial reparations in that they are not linked to court cases. 
15 Beristain CM ‘Truth, Justice, and Reparation: Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America’ in Beristain et al 
Contribution of Truth, Justice, and Reparation Policies to Latin American Democracies (2011). 
16 Principle 16 of Part IX (Reparation for harm suffered). 
17 As for the distinction between judicial reparations and administrative or state-led reparation programs, see Shelton 
D Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2015) 122-130. Countries have enacted laws to facilitate reparations 
through courts of law. For example, Colombia enacted law number 975/2005 that enabled victims to participate in 
criminal proceedings and apply for reparations. Likewise, numerous transitional Latin American Countries enacted 
laws that regulated administrative reparation programs for victims of a specific category of crimes. 
18 See Principle 32 (Reparation procedures) of ‘Report of Diane Orentlicher, independent expert to update the Set of 
principles to combat impunity - Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity’, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 of  
8 February 2005 available at <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on 29th February 2016). 
4 
 
The right of victims to receive reparations has been affirmed at regional human rights tribunals, 
domestic and international criminal courts, and claims commissions. Importantly, the thesis 
focuses on the reparative justice mandate of the International Criminal Court (The ICC). While all 
human rights violations entail the provision of redress and reparation to the victims,19 the thesis 
dwells on reparative justice in the context of serious violations that constitute crimes under 
international law.   
Under customary international law, the right to reparation was pronounced for the first time in the 
often-cited Chorzow Factory Case between Germany and Poland.20 In the case, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice articulated a principle to the effect that reparations should aim at 
redressing the consequences of a wrongful act and restore a victim to a situation that would have 
existed save for the wrongful act.21  
The reparation principle in the Chorzow Factory Case has been accepted and endorsed by 
numerous judicial pronouncements as the founding legal basis under international law for an 
obligation of wrongdoers to provide redress for the victims of their deeds.22 For example, in the 
Palestinian Wall Case, the International Court of Justice followed Chorzow as a customary source 
for reparative justice by arguing that Israel should provide reparation to individuals who lost their 
 
19 Theo van Boven ‘The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law’ United Nations (2010) at page 2, available at 
http://www.nuhanovicfoundation.org/user/file/van_boven_introductory_note_to_bnasic_principles_and_guidelines.
pdf (accessed 28th February 2016). 
20 Factory and Chorzow Case (Germany v. Poland) Merits, Judgment No 13, 1928, Permanent Court of International 
Justice, Series A, No. 17; See also, Shaw MN International Law 5ed (2003) 715. 
21 Factory and Chorzow Case (Germany v. Poland) Merits at page 47. 
22 A number of judgments have reaffirmed “the obligation to repair harm” principle established in the Factory at 
Chorzow Case. Recent examples include two advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice: Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para 460, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed on 29th February 2016); Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p. 136 , para 




businesses, homes, and agricultural land in consequence of the construction of a wall in the 
occupied territories of Palestine.23 
Although originally articulated in the context of state responsibility claims between states, the 
principle has now been customarily accepted and enforced as a right for individuals against both 
states and individuals involved in human rights violations.24 Today, the right of individuals to 
reparation for violations of human rights has been codified in a number of conventional, regional, 
and declarative human rights instruments that enjoy global recognition and support.25  
Therefore, subject to conventional international law, states are obligated to ensure that their 
citizens can realise the right to reparation both in law and in practice.26 States have a duty to ensure 
the protection of individuals against violation of their rights, whether by state or non-state actors. 
The reparation case of Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras that was determined by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights dictates that states must prevent violations, investigate culprits 
and take them to court, and ensure that victims can receive reparations.27  
 
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion of 9 July 
2004 at paragraph 152. 
24 Letschert R and van Boven T ‘Providing Reparation in Situations of Mass Victimisation: Key Challenges Involved 
(2011) Victimological Approaches to International Crimes, Intersentia 154. 
25 Article 8 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 
A (III) of 10 December 1948; Article 2(3) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171; Article 6 of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195; Article 14(1) of Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85; Article 39 of 
Convention on the Rights of the Child , United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3 ; Article 7 of African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); Article 25 and 63(1) of American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969); Article 5(5) and 13 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power, U.N. G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985), at 214; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc A/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005); Article 
91 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts; and Article 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 
1998 (The ICC Statute). 
26 See a publication by REDRESS entitled ‘Reaching for Justice: The Right to Reparation in the African Human Rights 
System’ (October 2013) at page 13. Available at 
<http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1310Reaching%20For%20JusticeFinal.pdf> (accessed on 1st March 
2016). 
27 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988). 
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In transnational settings, the right to reparation has been interpreted and enforced by regional 
human rights courts28 and the ICC that has jurisdiction over atrocity crimes.29 The ICC is legally 
empowered to order reparations against a convicted person.30 The right to reparation for victims 
of crimes under international law31 is a new development in the field of international criminal 
justice.32  
Before the establishment of the ICC in 2002, there was no international instrument that codified 
the right to reparations for victims of core crimes.33 The ad hoc criminal tribunals34 that had or 
have jurisdiction over atrocity crimes did not have the power to order reparations against convicted 
persons. The tribunals only had powers to order restitution of property that was taken unlawfully 
from the property holder.35  
The legal and moral necessity for reparations for victims of crimes under international law is 
important because such crimes are usually massive both regarding damage and magnitude of 
perpetration.36 It is submitted that the traditional retributive justice model which is perpetrator-
 
28 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is known for handing down pioneer and ground-breaking reparations 
judgments against States responsible for human rights violations in the Americas. Similar courts in Africa and Europe 
have also been doing the same. 
29 The term “atrocity crimes” refers to crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. Such crimes are usually 
perpetrated by states, organised criminal gangs, and state-like organisations on a large scale that creates massive 
damage and innumerable victims; Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes - A Tool for Prevention, United 
Nations, 2014, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/548afd5f4.html (accessed 12 October 2018). 
30 Article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute. 
31 There are four core crimes under international law namely, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and the 
crime of aggression as per Article 5 of the ICC Statute; Cassese A International Criminal Law  2nd Edn. (2008) pp.11-
30; Damgaard C Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (2008), pp.56-85; Werle G 
Principles of International Criminal Law 2nd Edn. (2009), p. 29. 
32 Evans C The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (2012) p. 87. 
33 Core crimes refers to crimes under international law namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. See 
Marchuk I The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International Criminal Law: A Comparative Law Analysis (2014) 
p.70. 
34 By ad hoc tribunals I mean non-permanent criminal tribunals that were established to deal with specific conflicts 
such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. The primary goal of such courts was perpetrator-centred: to prosecute 
persons responsible for the violations and thereby contribute to restoration of peace and security. They preferred 
retributive justice over restorative justice. 
35 See Article 24 (3) and 23 (3) of the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR respectively. 
36 Powers and Proctor (2015) 2-3. 
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centred may not provide sufficient redress for the victims of gross violations unless complemented 
by reparative justice which focuses on the needs of victims.  
Admittedly, conviction-based reparations of a criminal court such as the ICC may not have the 
capacity and resources to fully address needs of, for example, traditionally marginalised categories 
of victims such as women and children. The question of whether ICC reparations can be needs-
based is dealt with extensively in chapter four and five. 
The ICC presents a binary judicial system of punitive and restorative justice models through 
prosecutions and reparations. Since the reparation jurisprudence is at the nascent stage of 
development, the extent to which the ICC will go in providing meaningful redress to the victims 
remains to be seen, given the fact that it takes a strictly individualised approach to reparations that 
ties liability for reparations to a criminal conviction.  
Put differently, can reparations for grave violations be meaningful if their implementation 
parameters are based on the scope of charges and the resultant conviction? This question is 
answered extensively in chapter four and five. 
At the domestic level, states transitioning from armed conflicts and undemocratic regimes have 
responded to past injustices by employing a range of transitional justice mechanisms such as 
criminal prosecutions, reparations, truth commissions, and wide-ranging reforms to state 
institutions, laws, and policies.37  
While it would be impossible to completely repair or undo the harm done to victims of atrocity 
crimes,38 it is argued that reparations occupy a critical position in providing justice for past crimes 
in transitional societies.39 Victims need recognition, truth, acknowledgment of their suffering, and 
legal justice. In whatever form or method they would take, reparations have the potential of 
 
37 Werle (2009) 74-76. 
38 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, Judgment of 19 June 2012, International Court of Justice, para 26. 
39 Tomuschat C ‘Darfur-Compensation for the Victims’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 581; 
Manirabona AM and Wemmers JM ‘It Doesn’t Go Away with Time: Victims Need Reparation Following Crimes 
against Humanity’ in Wemmers JM (ed) Reparation for Victims of Crimes against Humanity: The Healing Role of 
Reparation (2014) 72. 
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according direct benefits (whether material or symbolic) to victims and thereby act as an impetus 
for post-conflict reconciliation and rebuilding of societal relations.40  
Arguably, the success of a reparation program depends on its ability to alleviate effects of a 
violation and to recreate a sustainable legal order that restores human dignity.41 Dignity is an 
essential corollary to the right to reparation as victims need to be treated humanely in an equal and 
compassionate manner.42  
1.2 Contextual Background 
This section covers contextual issues relating to the Congo conflict, transitional justice, and the 
factors that triggered or necessitated the involvement of the ICC in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (the DRC). While the historical dimension of this study provides a synopsis of the 
Congo conflict as it stretches back to Belgian colonialism, the analysis and discussion of factual 
and legal issues relating to the conflict and reparative justice through the ICC are limited to crimes 
under international law, committed between July 2002 and 2013. 
1.2.1 Historical Insights into the Congo Conflict  
Historians agree that the causes of modern day instability of the DRC, the second largest country 
in Africa and a country well-endowed in natural resources, stretches back to pre-independence 
Belgian rule that sowed seeds of corruption, nepotism, embezzlement of public resources, and 
unequal distribution of public wealth.43 Many conflicts have taken place in the DRC since its 
independence in 1960. However, this study concentrates on the Congo wars that took place in the 
last decade of the 20th Century.  
In the 1990s, the DRC descended into a protracted and complex bloody conflict that was triggered 
by an invasion of Rwanda and Uganda which, among other things, culminated into the fall of 
 
40 Tunamsifu SP ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2015) 15 African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution 68. 
41  Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, Judgment of 19 June 2012, International Court of Justice, para 39. 
42 Para XI (10) of The UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
43 Turner T The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (2007); Ikambana P Mobutu’s Totalitarian Political System: 
An Afrocentric Analysis (2007); Lemarchand R ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Failure to Potential 
Reconstruction’ in Rotberg R (ed.) State Failure and State Weakness in Time of Terror (2003). 
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Mobutu’s dictatorial regime.44 Before the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, he had ruled the DRC with 
an iron fist for three decades; in a regime that was characterised by endemic corruption, nepotism, 
blatant disregard for the law, plunder of natural resources, an illegal crackdown on dissidents and 
extra-judicial killings.45  
The First Congo War (1996-1997) was triggered by an invasion of the Rwandan army (the RPF) 
into the DRC to eliminate Hutu refugees and former soldiers of the Rwandan army (ex-
FAR/Interahamwe) who had perpetrated genocide against Rwandan Tutsis in 1994.46 To legitimise 
the invasion and camouflage the real intentions of the war, Rwanda created and extended logistical 
support to an anti-Mobutu rebel movement called ‘Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces’ 
(Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, the AFDL) which 
succeeded in claiming power in May 1997.47 The AFDL was under the leadership of Laurent-
Désiré Kabila.  
The success of AFDL in toppling Mobutu was an easy project as the Congolese population had 
tired of Mobutu’s dictatorial tendencies and the regime had also lost the support of the West 
following the end of cold war.48 The large scale military campaign launched by AFDL with the 
participation of Rwanda and Uganda resulted in the perpetration of atrocity crimes that left 
millions displaced, dead and crippled. Kabila’s takeover of the reins of power in the DRC did not 
spare the DRC from further conflict. His fallout with Rwanda and Uganda led to the outbreak of 
the Second Congo War.   
The Second Congo War, characterised as the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II, was 
also triggered by the invasion of Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC in August 1998.49 The war, 
although it subsequently turned to be a war of partition and plunder,50 was started by Rwanda and 
 
44 Turner (2007) 1. 
45 Ikambana (2007) 54-55. 
46 Turner (2007) 3-5. 
47 Clark JF The African Stakes of the Congo War (2002) 55-56; Stearns J et al The National Army and Armed Groups 
in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity (2013) 20. 
48 Meldon J ‘Long U.S. Dance with Mobutu Ends’ (1997) The Consortium, available at 
http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/story31.html (accessed 23 May 2016). 
49 Nzongola-Ntalaja G ‘The International Dimensions of the Congo Crisis’ (2004) 6 Global Dialogue. 
50 Naidoo S (ed) ‘The War Economy in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2003) IGD Occasional Paper No.37, 




Uganda as an attempt to oust Laurent Kabila who had turned his back on his allies (Rwanda-RPF 
and Uganda-UPDF). The two neighbouring countries participated actively in the rebellion that led 
to the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997. On 28th July 1998, Kabila ordered a complete 
withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC.51  
Among their other reasons for maintaining a continued presence of foreign troops in the DRC, 
Rwanda and Uganda, who share a border with the DRC, had hoped to benefit from the ouster of 
Mobutu by having unfettered access to the DRC’s vast reserve of natural resources.52 Kabila’s 
decision to side-line Rwanda and Uganda would prove costly.  Having started the aggression, 
Rwanda and Uganda actively supported dissident military groups like the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and the Congo Liberation 
Movement (Mouvement de Libération du Congo, MCL).53 Even though the invaders created rebel 
movements in the Eastern part of the DRC to hasten the removal of Kabila, the rebellion against 
Kabila was unsuccessful mainly due to the support he received from some foreign forces.54  
As earlier alluded to, the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda was resisted vigorously by 
neighbouring foreign forces who fought alongside government forces. A total of eight countries 
participated in the military confrontation during the deadly Second Congo War.55 Foreign forces 
of Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Sudan backed Kabila while Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Uganda supported rebel movements. The engagement of such military forces in the DRC resulted 
in the commission of egregious human rights violations which could be characterised as crimes 
under international law. In particular, mass rapes were committed on a large scale in the Eastern 
 
51 Mbikavu EM ‘An Analysis of the Implication of the ICC Mandate on the Consolidation of Democracy in the DRC’, 
M.A. Dissertation (2012), University of Witwatersrand, at page 26, available at 
http://mobile.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/11738 (accessed 12 October 2018). 
 (2012) 26. 
52 See UN Security Council Report entitled ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2002), S/2002/1146, available at 
<http://www.srwolf.com/reports/UNCONGO.pdf> (accessed on 9 April 2016). 
53 Lemarchand (2003) 30. 
54 ‘Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, Impact and Implications for the Great Lakes Region’ 
(2015) United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 14, available at  
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/conflits_in_drc_eng_25sept_rev1.pdf (accessed 12 
October 2018); Turner (2007) 5. 
55 Williams C ‘Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis’ (2013) 
37 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 89. 
11 
 
part of the DRC.56  The war fed on deep-rooted historical ethnic conflicts and the scramble for 
mineral-rich Eastern DRC.  
War crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated against defenceless civilian population 
especially in the Eastern region of the DRC (Kivu, Goma, Ituri, and Bunia). The crimes were 
committed by both state forces and rebel militia groups. Thus, some states were highly complicit 
in the perpetration of atrocity crimes in the DRC.57 Uganda’s participation in the DRC conflict 
focused on Ituri, a region close to its border with the DRC. The 2005 Judgment of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda) confirms that Uganda was the occupying power in Ituri during the 
relevant period of the conflict.58 The ICJ made a finding that Ugandan troops committed crimes 
under international law.59 Factually, there is also a decision handed down by the African 
Commission for Human Rights to the effect that the military intervention of Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Burundi in the DRC was a violation of international law.60  
In the same vein, the African Commission held that, such countries, as the occupying powers of 
the eastern provinces of the DRC during the conflict, violated international law by not protecting 
civilians from egregious violations of human rights.61 The said countries were also involved in a 
large scale plunder of resources of the DRC.62 Relatedly, in the bloody fighting in the Eastern DRC 
that ended in late 2013, Rwanda has been confirmed as the creator and supporter of the rebel group 
 
56 ‘The War Within the War Sexual: Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo’ (2002) Human Rights 
Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602.pdf (accessed 12 October 2018). 
57 Hüls V ‘State Responsibility for Crimes under International Law: Filling the Justice Gap in the Congo’ (2004) Law 
and Development 21, available at http://lawanddevelopment.org/docs/justicegapcongo.pdf (accessed 12 October 
2018). 
58 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2005, p. 168, para 178. 
59 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, ICJ Judgment (2005), para 211. 
60 Communication 227/99 - D. R. Congo / Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, 33rd Session of the African Commission, 
May 2003. 
61 African Commission Communication 227/99, para.79. 
62 African Commission Communication 227/99, para.94. 
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M2363 which was under the leadership of Rwandan-born Congolese General Bosco Ntaganda who 
is currently on trial at the ICC for charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.64 
1.2.2 Post Conflict Accountability and Transitional Justice 
The preceding section has attempted to provide a clear general picture on the two Congo Wars of 
the 90s as well as war-related rebellions that continued until late 2013. Aptly, the Congo conflict 
has been the most complex and deadly in recent history. The conflict was exacerbated, among 
other things, by the involvement of foreign forces with varying and competing interests as well as 
the unscrupulous scramble for Congo’s mineral wealth.  
Contextually, the wars also fed on deep-rooted ethnic and political antagonism. The second Congo 
War inflicted unthinkable damage on the people of Congo. The country was quickly slipping into 
systemic anarchy and there was an urgent need for action essentially on three fronts: restoration of 
peace and security; restructuring the institutions of governance to return the country to rule of law 
and constitutionalism; and provision of justice for victims of gross violations.  
The demand for post-conflict accountability and reconstruction gained support from both internal 
and external actors like the United Nations and the African Union.65 In line with international law, 
the DRC is obligated to ensure that crimes perpetrated during the conflict are investigated and 
prosecuted properly, including the provision of reparation to victims.  
The section below covers transitional justice issues, starting with the ceasefire agreements that 
aimed at stopping the Second Congo War.  
 
63 Rebel Group created mainly by Congolese [Tutsi] soldiers on 6 May 2012. This was a new version to the then 
defunct rebel group called CNDP that was commanded by General Laurent Nkunda. On 23 March 2009, Nkunda’s 
CNDP signed a peace deal with the Government of Congo, agreeing to, among other things, cessation of the violence 
on the condition that there would amnesty for the fighters and that they would be incorporated into the DRC National 
Army. Three years later, CNDP decided that the peace deal wasn’t being implemented by the government hence the 
formation of new rebellion called M23; named after the date of truce in 2009. 
64 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06. 
65 Hellmüller S, ‘Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Efforts in DR Congo’ in 
Langer A and Brown G (eds) Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of  Peacebuilding Efforts and 
Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries (2016) pp.243-261. 
13 
 
The DRC’s transitional justice efforts gained momentum under President Joseph Kabila who 
became President after the assassination of his father in 2001.66 By the time Kabila assumed 
leadership of the country, the DRC was a deeply divided country and war-ravaged. Kabila had no 
choice but to talk to the dissidents to chart out ways for dealing with the past. As a country 
transitioning from violent conflict to peace and democracy, the DRC was legally and economically 
constrained to deal with its past.67 It had innumerable perpetrators and victims who should go 
through a transitional justice process that is just and fair as well as not susceptible to re-
victimisation and creation of a new social conflict.  
The DRC had to grapple with an extremely huge question of justice for the victims of atrocity 
crimes. Justice during a transition could take numerous forms depending on the contextual realities 
of the conflict. In the past, some Latin American countries employed a range of transitional justice 
measures essentially focused on redressing victims. Such measures could be prosecutions 
(domestic, internationalised or hybrid prosecutions), conditional or unconditional amnesty, 
reparations, reforms of state structures, and truth-seeking commissions.68 
The DRC’s road towards transitional justice started with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement on 10th July 1999 by the representatives from the governments of the DRC, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia.69 Crucial to the agreement was a pledge to end 
belligerent operations in Congo and to withdraw foreign troops so that the people of Congo could 
start an inclusive discussion on how to deal with the conflict.70  
The ceasefire agreement did not stop the aggression of foreign forces in the DRC. In particular, 
the Rwandan and Ugandan forces continued to deploy in the DRC until after the signing of the 
 
66 Reyntjens F The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006 (2009) 252. 
67 ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Confronting Impunity’, Human Rights Watch, available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf> (accessed on 10th April 2016). 
68 Ambos K ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of 
the ICC’ in Ambos et al (eds) Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace, and 
Development (2009) 19. 
69 ‘Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes’, International Center for Transitional Justice, at page 47, 
available at <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_TruthCommPeace_English_2016.pdf> (accessed on 9th 
April 2016). 
70 See chapter 4 and 5 of the Lusaka Peace Agreement (1999), available at 




Pretoria and Luanda Peace Accords in 2002.71 The departure of foreign troops from the DRC 
allowed for a global discussion among Congolese on how to restore peace and security. The Inter-
Congolese dialogue that took place in South Africa culminated into the signing of the Sun City 
Agreement on 19th April 2002.72  
The agreement was the result of a dialogue that involved negotiators from the warring and non-
warring parties; the DRC government under Joseph Kabila, the RCD, the MLC, the Mai Mai, and 
Unarmed Opposition.  Among other things, the Sun City Peace Agreement resolved that the DRC 
should invoke some transitional justice measures to return to democracy and rule of law.  
The proposed measures included: establishment of an international criminal court for Congo,73 the 
creation of a truth commission,74 establishment of a national human rights commission,75 removal 
of special jurisdictions accorded to military courts,76 and restitution of property unlawfully 
acquired.77 For the negotiators, it was crucial to initiate a transitional justice process with a masala 
of mechanisms to deal effectively with the bloodiest conflict on earth since World War II.  
However, it is crucial to concede that resource constraints and nepotistic internal wrangling in the 
DRC made it impossible for the State to introduce a working transitional justice policy. One 
specific challenge for transitional justice in the DRC was the unusually high number of both 
victims and perpetrators (Congolese citizens and foreign soldiers) who committed crimes reaching 
the threshold of core crimes under international law.  
As a principle, impunity for crimes under international law is unacceptable and sovereign states 
are legally obligated to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of 
such crimes,78 and to ensure that victims receive reparations. The demand for accountability 
 
71 Report of the Interim Chairperson of the Commission of The African Union on The Situation in The Democratic 
Republic of The Congo (DRC), Central Organ/MEC/AMB/2 (LXXXVI), 29 October 2002, available at 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/86drc.pdf (accessed 12 October 2018). 
72 See ‘The Final Act of Inter Congolese Political Negotiations - Sun City Agreement’ available at 
<https://www.issafrica.org/cdDRCReader/bin/8final.pdf> (accessed on 9th April 2016). 
73 Resolution No: ICD/CPR/05. 
74 Resolution No: ICD/CPR/04. 
75 Resolution No: ICD/CPR/08. 
76 Resolution No: ICD/CPR/06. 
77 Resolution No: ICD/CPR/02. 
78 Pasch J, ‘State Obligation to Punish Core International Crimes and the Proposed Crimes Against Humanity 
Convention’, in Bergsmo M and Tianying S (eds), On the Proposed Crimes Against Humanity Convention (2014) 
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presented overwhelming challenges to the actors of the peace process in Congo given the fact that 
the judiciary was legally and operationally incapable of dealing with such massive demand for 
justice.79 The whole justice sector in the DRC had been incapacitated in all aspects.80 
One critical aspect of the DRC transitional justice process was the creation of a truth commission. 
Members of the truth commission were appointed by parties to the Global and Inclusive 
Agreement on Transition in the DRC.81 The commission lasted between 2003 and 2007. Its main 
mandate was to investigate socio-economic and societal conflicts in Congo since 1960 through to 
2003 and to recommend reconciliatory measures including measures for victim’s redress.82 
However, the commission failed to live to the expectations of the people of Congo who thought 
that the truth-seeking body would establish a clear historical picture of the conflict and recommend 
unifying and reparative remedial measures for the victims.  
Instead, the commission closed its operations with the submission of its report to Parliament in 
2007 without carrying out any meaningful truth-seeking investigations.83 The dismal performance 
of the truth commission could be attributed to issues like: lack of objectivity on the part of 
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commissioners due to political sycophancy, poor capacity of its commissioners due to weak 
professionalism, and lack of material resources.84 
The failure of the truth commission was a huge blow to the victims who were in dire need of truth 
and justice. Truth recovery is an important dimension to anti-impunity efforts in a society emerging 
from conflict.85 Contemporary literature indicates that truth is best obtainable by a truth 
commission86 and then supplemented by criminal prosecutions and reparations.  
Courts of law alone are not expected to provide a clear and broad picture of the violent past because 
courts concentrate on the perpetrator.87 For courts, the aim is to establish specific facts relating to 
the commission of crimes by particular individuals and therefore criminal trials tend to produce 
microscopic truth as opposed to macroscopic truth that results from restorative justice 
approaches.88 Additionally, the strict nature with which criminal charges need to be proved may 
not provide room for the consideration of broader issues that do not relate to the charges.  
In the wake of the conflict, the DRC needed a viable prosecutorial strategy that would target 
individuals who masterminded, carried out, and ordered the commission of crimes whether they 
were members of the military, belligerent foreign forces, political authorities, or local militia 
groups.89 However, owing to an entrenched culture of impunity, corruption, limited investigative 
capacity, lack of material resources, and infrastructural defects; the DRC justice machinery could 
not deal with the perpetrators of atrocity crimes properly.90 
Dealing with such an organised and large-scale criminality in a vast country like the DRC 
necessitated the presence of a strong and fully independent justice authority that would prosecute 
those bearing the hugest responsibility for the perpetration of crimes under international law.91 
 
84 ‘Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes’ (2014) , at pages 51-53, International Center for Transitional 
Justice. 
85 Smyth MB Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Past (2007) 12. 
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87 Robinson D ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court’ 
(2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 484. 
88 Drumbl MA Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (2007) 176. 
89 UN Mapping Report on Congo, para 1014. 
90 UN Mapping Report on Congo, at pages 456 – 458. 
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against humanity, and war crimes. Such crimes are usually perpetrated in the context of a protracted armed conflict or 
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Unfortunately, this was not the case.92 Characteristically, Congo’s conflict had a very complex 
perpetration terrain with perpetrators from state and non-state actors as well as foreign forces 
supporting both sides to the conflict.93 That presented a critical challenge to the transitional 
prosecutions carried out by the military courts which have had jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law.  
The courts suffered from all forms of interference from the government with the result that 
prosecutions were highly selective.94 Moreover, investigations carried out by the DRC authorities 
were generally skewed and highly biased as they only targeted small fish and the opposition.95 The 
government made sure that its allies and operatives were shielded from prosecutions and therefore 
only a few individuals were prosecuted.96 It follows that, post-conflict prosecutions carried out by 
the military courts were largely unsuccessful in providing justice for the victims. Until today, 
judgments of the military courts suffer from a weak enforcement regime.  
According to credible reports, victims have not been able to enforce reparation judgments handed 
down by the court.97 Non-enforcement of court judgments constitute a violation of international 
human rights law.98 Another blow to the victim’s need for reparation in the DRC is the fact that 
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the law limits reparations to compensation,99 leaving out other broad issues like restitution, 
rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
The failure of domestic justice had the effect of raising support for the intervention of the ICC in 
the DRC.100 People felt that the ICC would deal with the perpetrators in an equal manner as 
opposed to the biased military courts.  
1.2.3 The Congo Situation at the ICC: The Focus on Ituri 
The intervention of the ICC in the DRC became a reality in March 2004 when President Kabila 
triggered a self-referral mechanism under the ICC Statute.101 That happened two years after the 
DRC had become a member of the ICC Statute. In a letter to the ICC, Kabila admitted that the 
DRC was legally and operationally incapable of providing justice for victims of crimes under 
international law.102 The self-referral effectively invited the ICC into the DRC to carry out 
investigations and prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of crimes under 
international law.103  
However, it must be understood that the ICC intervention in the DRC is limited to crimes 
committed after the 1st of July 2002. As noted earlier, Congo’s conflict dates from 1961 to 2003; 
a period characterised by the perpetration of atrocious human rights violations. The jurisdictional 
limitations of the ICC as regards crimes committed before 2002 underscores the importance of 
domestic prosecutions to close down the impunity gap. 
The ICC opened its investigations of the Congo situation in June 2004 and the investigations 
focused on Ituri, a region in the Orientale province of Eastern Congo DRC.104 The Second Congo 
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War was largely concentrated on the Ituri region in which several regular armies of states and local 
rebel movements fought for its control.105 Ituri is rich in mineral resources and due to that many 
internal and external antagonistic groups fought for its control.106 The Ituri region is home to more 
than 18 ethnic groups but the devastating conflict that spanned from 1999 to 2003 saw three major 
tribes of Hema, Ngiti, and Lendu pitted against each other.107  
Among other things, the international dimension of the Ituri conflict stems from the fact that the 
region shares borders with Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan.108 As explained earlier, the 
devastating Ituri armed conflict broke out following the decision by Laurent-Désiré Kabila to 
remove Rwandans and Ugandans from the DRC.109 That decision sparked the formation of rebel 
movements backed by Rwanda and Uganda, leading to a protracted and deadly armed conflict in 
the Eastern part of Congo DRC.110 
In the Lubanga Judgment, it has been determined that the political vacuum that existed in Ituri was 
capitalised by foreign forces from Rwanda and Uganda who then fueled tribal antagonism between 
different ethnic groups.111 In particular, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), who 
camped in Bunia,112 further fueled ethnic tensions by siding with the Hemas.113 
The ethnic incitement by the Ugandans was manifested through military support to Hemas who in 
turn used the support to seize land from the Lendus.114 The final straw to the Lendus political 
interests came into being when General Kazini of the UPDF appointed Adèle Lotsove Mugisa, a 
Hema, to govern Ituri under the immediate supervision of the Ugandans.115 It is believed that the 
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armed conflict in Ituri was largely stirred up by the overtly divisive decision to place the region 
under Hemas and supporting them against other tribes.116 
The strategic friendship between Hemas and foreign forces fighting for the control of Ituri was 
particularly detrimental to the interests of Lendus. Having settled in Ituri long before the arrival of 
Hemas from Uganda, Lendus were also side-lined by the Belgian colonialists who allowed Hemas 
to expand their influence through business control, easier access to education, and land 
ownership.117 The confrontations between Hemas and Lendus led to the creation of tribal-based 
defence forces,118 which would later be involved in the perpetration of egregious violations in Ituri. 
At the ICC, it has been established that the ethnic militia groups that existed in Ituri between 2002 
and 2003 waged indiscriminate attacks on defenceless civilians and, in the process, atrocious 
violations such as rape, murder, pillaging, looting, and destruction of property were committed.119 
Although it would generally be inconceivable to view the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism 
for Congo, the manner and timing of its intervention rightly place the court as a strong alternative 
to weaker domestic prosecutions.120 Despite a likelihood of fewer prosecutions as the Court only 
goes after those bearing the greatest responsibility for the commission of atrocity crimes,121 its 
prosecutorial and investigative machinery is relatively stronger and friendlier towards the victims 
compared to some domestic courts. Likewise, the ICC Statute has an elaborate legal regime that 
ensures the victim’s participation in all stages of the ICC proceedings.122 The right of victims to 
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participate is firmly embodied in the ICC Statute.123 The victim participation framework is 
extensively dealt with in chapter three. 
Although criticised for targeting small fish and for seeking to create conditions of impunity for 
government officials who had a less but critical connection to the Ituri conflict,124 the ICC 
prosecutor decided to focus on Ituri, a region that was, at that time, subjected to all kinds of 
atrocities by the warring parties.125 The section below offers some brief remarks on the Ituri cases 
at the ICC. 
1.2.4 Congolese Cases at the ICC: Some Remarks on Investigations and Charges 
The Congo situation is the first to be investigated by the ICC.126 As stated earlier, the investigations 
focused on Ituri and especially on Lubanga’s UPC (Union des Patriotes Congolais) and FPLC 
(Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo) that fought against Katanga’s FNI (Front des 
Nationalistes Intégrationnistes) and FRPI (Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri).127 The former 
military group represented Hemas while the latter stood for Lendu-Ngiti group. The goal of the 
UPC/FPLC under the leadership of Lubanga was to achieve political and military control over 
Ituri.128 
Succinctly, the ethnic-based military groups were created to protect and foster antagonistic 
political and economic interests in Ituri and that triggered a devastating armed conflict.129 For 
example, the Lendu-Ngiti coalition under the FRPI was specifically created to counter the 
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aggression of Lubanga’s UPC in Ituri.130 Explaining the interethnic dimension of the Ituri conflict 
in Katanga, the court noted that:  
…The Lendu and the Ngiti saw all Hema as enemies and that they were generally driven by a desire for 
vengeance fuelled by ethnic hatred. In this regard, it submitted that the hatred of the Hema had developed 
within the Lendu and Ngiti communities, spread among the combatants and taken the form of acts of 
vengeance.131 
Until now, ICC investigations into the Congo situation have yielded charges against four 
individuals. All the charges, including the individuals indicted, focused on the UPC and the 
FNI/FRPI, the two militia groups that existed in Ituri in the early 2000s.132 
First, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was charged as a co-perpetrator and convicted of the crime of 
recruiting children under the age of fifteen into the UPC/FPLC and using them as bodyguards and 
soldiers in an armed conflict in Ituri.133 On the basis of evidence adduced before the court, Lubanga 
was found guilty on 14th March 2012.134  
Lubanga’s UPC/FPLC was responsible for a great deal of violence in that region. The FPLC (a 
militia group) was responsible for unleashing monstrous violence on defenceless women and 
children of Ituri and thereby occasioning deaths, loss of property through looting, destruction of 
properties, and violation of human dignity through the perpetration of sexual crimes on a large 
scale.135  
The ICC determined that Lubanga, as a leader and commander of the UPC and FPLC respectively, 
co-perpetrated war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children under the age of 15 to 
participate actively in hostilities from 1st September 2002 to 13th August 2003. He received a jail 
term of 14 years on the 10th of July 2012.136  
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Secondly, Germain Katanga, whose mode of liability was recharacterised by the court from 
indirect perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) to contribution to a group crime through ‘other means’ 
under Article 25(3)(d),137 was convicted of the crimes of murder (both as a war crime and a crime 
against humanity), destruction of property, pillaging, and attacks against civilians.138 
Thirdly, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a Congolese of Lendu ethnicity, was arraigned before the ICC 
on 24th November 2009 to answer to war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed 
through other persons (indirect co-perpetration) during the attack on Bogoro village on 24th 
February 2003.139 On 18th December 2012, the ICC delivered its Article 74 judgment acquitting 
Chui of all the charges.140 
Fourthly, Bosco Ntanganda is another UPC/FPLC commander to face charges at the ICC about 
crimes perpetrated in Ituri against non-Hema people in late 2002. As his trial nears conclusion at 
the time of writing, Ntaganda has been charged with numerous counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity allegedly committed through multiple modes of liability under Article 25(3) of 
the ICC Statute, including direct perpetration, indirect co-perpetration, ordering, inducing, and 
perpetration by other means.141  
Amongst the four cases mentioned above, the Court has partly succeeded in only two cases 
(Lubanga and Katanga), and failed in the Chui case. Even though the administration of 
international criminal justice is not the sole responsibility of the ICC, the success of this global 
Criminal Court can only be measured by its work in eradicating impunity in conflict states. 
Eradication of impunity surely calls for prosecution of the right individuals (most responsible) and 
going for the right charges that represent the largest category of victimisation in a situation under 
investigation. That may not be the case for the Congo situation before the ICC.  
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While anecdotal evidence indicates that the UPC/FPLC committed sexual and gender based 
crimes, the Prosecutor has been criticised for the exclusion of sexual violence charges in 
Lubanga.142 In the Chui case, as noted above, the Prosecutor was unable to prove all the charges 
due to insufficient evidence. What does this entail for the victims? Successful criminal 
prosecutions at the ICC may have a beneficial impact on the victims regarding reparative justice 
as it solely depends on convictions. Acquittals or successful prosecutions that are not 
representative of the victimisation typologies suffered by the victims scuttles reparative justice. As 
expounded in chapter four, the scope and extent of reparations under Article 75 of the ICC Statute 
depend on the nature and breadth of charges preferred by the Prosecutor. 
Therefore, it is critical for the Prosecutor to conduct effective investigations143 of country 
situations before the ICC. It is for the Prosecutor to initiate such investigations.144 Investigations 
must focus on obtaining evidence that is relevant in proving facts contained in an indictment.145 
Some cases fail on account of ineffective investigations by the Prosecutor. For example, in the 
Chui acquittal decision, the Court, while accepting that security fragility in a war-ravaged Congo 
DRC may have affected investigations,146 poked holes into the Prosecutor’s mediocre 
investigations that overlooked critical pieces of evidence. 
In its measured criticism of the Prosecutor’s work, the Court stated that the presence of forensic 
evidence could have helped its work in identifying the victims.147 The Court also observed that 
testimonies from military commanders may have been critical for a good understanding of how 
the Bogoro attack was operationalised.148 Similarly, the Chui acquittal decision noted that the trial 
could have been more effective if the Prosecutor visited places where the accused lived and 
prepared for the attack.149 In the opinion of the Court, that could have ensured a better 
understanding of factual statements made before the Court. Also, the Prosecutor did not record a 
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statement of the accused at the time of investigations which could have been correlated to other 
testimonies recorded during the trial to determine their probative value.150 Succinctly, it has been 
suggested by the Trial Chamber II that the lack of thorough investigations resulted in its acquittal 
verdict.151 
The section below provides some preliminary insights into the reparation regime of the ICC to 
alert readers to some substantive issues that feature more extensively in the later chapters. 
1.2.5 Reparation Decisions on the Congo Situation: An Interim Discussion 
Regarding reparative justice, on the 7th August 2012, the ICC Trial Chamber I issued the Court’s 
first decision on reparation principles applicable in the Lubanga case.152 The Court has since issued 
two other reparation decisions in Katanga and Al Mahdi.153 To set the scene in this introductory 
section and considering that the other two reparation decisions closely follow Lubanga, an interim 
ground setting discussion below focuses on the Lubanga reparation decision. In a nutshell, it raises 
some substantive issues that have featured in Lubanga to pick them up for a more detailed 
discussion in the coming chapters. 
The Lubanga reparation judgment was appealed to the Appeals Chamber of the ICC by the victims 
and the convicted person. In March 2015, the Appeals Chamber handed down its determination on 
the whole question of the convicted person’s liability for reparations.154 Among other things, the 
Appeals Chamber issued an amended order for reparations under which it stressed that the 
convicted person is legally obligated to remedy the harm caused by the crimes for which he was 
convicted.155  
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Departing from the findings of the Trial Chamber, the Court insists that the order must be directed 
at the convicted person even when they are indigent.156 Furthermore, the Court stresses that 
reparative justice is extremely crucial for victims of atrocity crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Court and that the success of the ICC would arguably be judged on the basis of the success of its 
reparation regime.157 
Irrespective of the individualised nature of reparation claims before the ICC, the reparation 
decision in Lubanga favours collective reparations over individual reparations.158 While that 
preference is legally tenable under the ICC Statute,159 it would be conceivably correct to hold that 
the Court arrived at this decision due to the convicted person’s indigence and the limited resource 
base of the Trust Fund for Victims (Hereinafter “the Trust Fund or the TFV”).  
In the absence of the convicted person’s resources, the Court requests the Trust Fund to advance 
its other resources to implement the reparations order.160 The Court reminds the Trust Fund that it 
would still be legally tenable for it to claim the advanced resources from the convicted person;161 
that is, if the court will be able, in the future, to trace, seize, and confiscate assets belonging to 
Lubanga.162 The question here is whether the TFV can sustainably be able to fund ICC reparations 
on behalf of indigent defendants in all the cases. Absent that, it is predictably impossible for the 
ICC to enforce its reparation orders through the TFV meaningfully. 
About the modality of reparations, the Court holds that reparations should not be limited to 
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation but they may also include transformative, 
preventative, or symbolic forms of redress.163 To what extent can conviction-focused international 
crime reparations be transformative? Chapter four addresses this matter. 
The Lubanga reparation judgment presents a pioneering opportunity for the ICC to test the viability 
of its reparations policy in a developing country such as the DRC that still grapples with a violent 
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past. Contemporary literature rightly praises the ICC for being a Criminal Court that offers an 
unprecedented opportunity for victim participation in its proceedings. Arguably, the ICC is the 
first permanent Criminal Court that is fully empowered to provide reparative justice for victims of 
gross human rights violations.  
Despite having such unprecedented legal powers under the ICC Statute, it remains to be seen in 
practical terms the extent to which the Court will go in assisting victims of atrocity crimes to return 
to normal lives. The impending implementation of the Lubanga and Katanga reparation programs, 
through the Trust Fund, in the DRC will allow assessing the practical side (the utility aspect) of 
ICC reparations.  
However, the Lubanga case and the Congo situation in general present specific and complex 
challenges for the ICC. Succinctly, three challenges are discussed below. 
First, the DRC conflict has produced a large pool of victims and perpetrators, as well as dual-
identity victims such as former child soldiers.164 This legal problem is exacerbated by a lacuna in 
the Lubanga reparation judgment as regards dual or mixed-identity victims.165 The judgment does 
not effectively address the critical issue of mixed-identity victims. The legal controversy 
surrounding child soldiers is exacerbated by the fact that, in the DRC, some communities do not 
comprehend child conscription as a crime. For example, as submitted by the TFV in Lubanga 
reparations case, many communities in the Eastern DRC regard child soldiers as heroes and 
therefore they do not perceive them as victims in the strictest meaning of the term.166  
For example, in Lubanga, former child soldiers have been singled out as direct victims of the war 
crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers as fighters, bodyguards, cooks, and sex slaves in the 
Ituri conflict.167 The child soldiers were largely drawn from one ethnic community in Ituri (Hema 
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people) and therefore there is a potential of recreating a highly polarised society in Ituri if collective 
reparations are only granted to former child soldiers belonging to one community.168 Likewise, 
many Iturians have been discontented with the Lubanga verdict169 at the ICC and because of this, 
some victims, for fear of reprisals from their communities, may not accept ICC reparations.170  
Admittedly, there is no dispute especially in legal terms as regards the victim status of child 
soldiers. However, as the Court admits, reparation programmes need to take into account non-
victimising cultural and social practices of a particular society when designing and planning for 
such programs.171 In the Ituri conflict, the military confrontation was resorted to by the two 
competing communities (Hema and Lendu) to safeguard their political and economic interests. 
Consequently, members of the two communities felt the necessity to tolerate child conscription for 
the alleged wider good of their respective communities.  
Thus, in the Lubanga reparation case, the mixed-identity problem of child soldiers needs to be 
contextualised through the historical, social, and cultural lens peculiar to the region of Ituri during 
and after the conflict to determine their place in the dispensation of reparative justice by the ICC. 
Unfortunately, the Court does not provide guidance on how to deal with mixed-identity victims in 
the Lubanga case. And since the reparations judgment excludes indirect victims who suffered from 
crimes committed by child soldiers, society may perceive ICC reparations as a reward for the 
perpetrators.172 It follows that, advancing [collective] reparations to mixed-identity victims without 
first articulating their position in their respective communities may potentially lead to re-
victimisation and creation of a new social conflict.173  
Secondly, another challenge would relate to victim identification in the wake of, for example, the 
Lubanga trial that lasted nine years could be susceptible to a situation where many victims have 
relocated.174 Some victims may have died, moved or relocated to distant regions in the DRC or 
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abroad. Victim identification is crucial to the completeness of a reparations program. A reparation 
scheme becomes complete when meaningful reparations are provided to all the right victims who 
are eligible.175 
Therefore, it is crucial that drivers of a reparation programme can identify and verify victim status 
through credible sources of information. Owing to the lengthy nature of ICC proceedings and the 
potential obstacles to obtaining evidence in a war-torn country such as the DRC,176 there would be 
a huge challenge regarding the victims being able to produce sufficient evidence to prove their 
victimhood as required by the ICC.177 Exemplary, the Trust Fund for victims has also admitted 
that the exact number of children recruited by Lubanga is not known.178 Therefore, nailing down 
the whole issue of victim identification may go down to the methodology procedure adopted by 
the Trust Fund.  
Thirdly, victim eligibility issues may affect the success of ICC reparations. As a matter of 
principle, only direct and indirect victims who suffered harm relating to, for example, the 
recruitment of child soldiers in the Ituri conflict would qualify for reparation in the Lubanga 
case.179 Requiring a nexus between the victim, the harm, and the charges established may 
potentially lead to the creation of new victims by exclusion in reparation programmes. Arguably, 
since only child soldiers have been regarded as direct victims of Lubanga crimes, it follows that 
those who suffered from crimes perpetrated by child soldiers are excluded.180  
The Registry of the ICC has also alluded to the possibility of the creation of excluded victims in 
the Lubanga reparation programme at the ICC.181 Certainly, the looming creation of a new category 
of victims in the implementation of  ICC reparations is linked to prosecutorial choices. The 
Prosecutor narrowly limited charges in Lubanga to the war crime of using child soldiers despite 
 
175 ‘Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programs’ (2008), at page 15, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ReparationsProgrammes.pdf (accessed on 29 February 2016). 
176 Wiersing A ‘Lubanga and Its Implications for Victims Seeking Reparations under the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) 4 Amsterdam Law Forum 25. 
177 On challenges to identifying victims; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Redaction of Filing on Reparations 
and Draft Implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-Red, 03 November 2015, paras 40 – 42  ; Manirabona and 
Wemmers (2013) 999. 
178 Lubanga TFV Observations on Reparations (2012), para.106. 
179 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment (2015), paras 196-198. 
180 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment (2015), para 52. 
181 Lubanga Second Report of the Registry on Reparations (2011), ICC-01/04-01/06-2806, para 5. 
30 
 
the fact that rebel soldiers from Lubanga’s FPLC committed other heinous violations including 
sexual crimes on a large scale.182  
The ICC has held that victims of sexual and gender-based crimes could not benefit from an order 
for reparations against Lubanga as such crimes, apart from not being charged, were not considered 
as part of the gravity of the crime of child recruitment during sentencing.183 The Court indirectly 
admits that other victims may be left out and that is why it ‘wrongly’ requests the Trust Fund to 
use its assistance mandate to extend reparations to those left out.184 The term ‘assistance mandate’ 
refers to a role of the Trust Fund for Victims in using voluntary contributions and donations (other 
resources) to provide rehabilitative justice for victims under the jurisdiction of the ICC.185 
Unlike the reparations mandate, the assistance mandate is not linked to a criminal conviction and 
thus, it was legally untenable for the Court to ask the Trust Fund to use its resources to “redress 
gaps in the eligibility for reparations that stem from the persecutor’s strategic choices and narrow 
charging”.186 In light of the preceding, this study seeks to address the following critical issues and 
questions: 
First, is the ICC legal regime adequately capable of providing meaningful reparations to the victims 
of crimes under international law?  
Secondly, is the DRC legal system and post conflict justice supportive of reparative 
complementarity? 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The overriding focus of the study is to investigate the role of the ICC in the provision of reparations 
to victims of core crimes in the DRC through criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators. Intrinsic 
to this objective is the desire to examine the potential impact of judicial reparations as a response 
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to atrocity crimes in conflict or transitional states such as the DRC. Thus, the study has the 
following specific objectives: 
First, to briefly provide a historical synopsis of the Congo conflict to create an understanding of 
the nature and magnitude of the violence that resulted in an intervention by the ICC in 2004. 
Secondly, to critically analyse specific legal and factual issues relating to reparation principles 
applicable to Congolese cases at the ICC and to determine the potential contribution of the cases 
to the development of the future reparations jurisprudence at the ICC. 
Thirdly, to briefly examine the DRC’s domestic response to the conflict, in particular, its 
responsibility to repair (reparative complementarity) to determine its compatibility with 
international human rights law. 
1.4 Literature Survey  
There is an extremely large body of literature devoted to the Congo conflict. Sources of this 
literature emanate from books, journal articles, conference papers, media reports, reports by human 
rights NGO’s, UN and government official reports, as well as court judgments. Many authors have 
invariably tried to offer a critical understanding of the reasons for the conflict ranging from a 
scramble over natural resources and protection of ethnic interests, to corruption, dictatorship, and 
proxy wars supported by foreign forces.187 In an attempt to define the conflict, many commentators 
have rightly characterised the conflict as the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II for 
claiming more than 5 million lives owing to murder, famine, and war-related diseases.  
One critical characteristic of the DRC conflict that is shared by many authors is the perpetration 
of sexual and gender-based crimes on a large scale.188 Likewise, commentators agree that crimes 
under international law were perpetrated. 
 
187 Turner T (2007); Ikambana P (2007); Reyntjens F (2009); Gondola D The History of Congo (2002); Nzongola-
Ntalaja G The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (2002); Renton D, Seddon D, and Zeilig L (eds) 
The Congo: Plunder and Resistance (2007); Clark (2002); Gerard E and Kuklick B Death in the Congo: Murdering 
Patrice Lumumba (2015); ‘The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo’, Human Rights Watch (2005), 
available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0505_0.pdf (accessed 13 October 2018). 
188 ‘The War Within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo’, Human Rights Watch 
(2002); ‘Soldiers  Who  Rape,  Commanders  Who  Condone:  Sexual  Violence  and  Military   Reform in the 
Democratic Republic  of  Congo’, Human Rights Watch (2009). 
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The other bunch of literature on the DRC conflict relates to national and international responses to 
the conflict. During the transitional phase, there were calls for justice through a judicial mechanism 
of an international character and for truth-seeking through a truth commission. At the time, 
Congolese scholars and civil society campaigned for an international intervention in the provision 
of justice for past crimes in that they believed the local justice machinery was too corrupt and 
operationally incapacitated to carry out meaningful investigations and prosecutions.189  
The view regarding the inability of the domestic courts to handle the aftermath of the violence was 
vindicated, at a later stage, by President Kabila’s self-referral of the Congo situation to the ICC. 
Despite the intervention of the ICC, domestic prosecutions continued through military courts. 
However, as stated earlier, there is a substantial contribution of literature in this regard that point 
to a failure of the domestic justice system.  
Impunity is still a problem in the DRC. The available literature has documented the failure of 
reparative justice through the courts in the DRC due to corruption, lack of political will, scarcity 
of government resources, access-limiting legal fees, the indigence of the convicted persons, weak 
laws, and lack of grassroots’ awareness of reparative justice.190 
With the promulgation of the UN Basic Principles on Reparations a decade ago, a body of literature 
has emerged covering broad issues relating to victims’ rights to truth and reparations in the context 
of international human rights law and international criminal justice. Six years after the ICC handed 
down its first reparations judgment in the Lubanga case in 2012, a stream of literature has also 
 
189 Musila (2009) 33-49. 
190 Report of the Panel on  Remedies and Reparations  for Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d708ae32.html (accessed 13 October 2018); ‘Protection and Reparation under 
Congolese Law for Survivors of Sexual and Gender-based violence: Situational Analysis and Prospects for Reform’, 
ACORD DRC (2010), available at <http://www.acordinternational.org/silo/files/drc--protection-and-reparation-for-
survivors-of-sexual-and-genderbased-violence.pdf> (accessed on 4th May 2016); ‘Judgment Denied: The Failure to 
Fulfil Court Ordered Reparations for Victims of Serious Crimes in the DRC’ ICTJ (2012), available at 
<https://www.ictj.org/publication/judgement-denied-failure-fulfill-court-ordered-reparations-victims-serious-
crimes> (accessed on 13th April 2016); ‘Rebuilding Courts and Trust: An Assessment of the Needs of the Justice 
System in the DRC’, International Bar Association (2009); ‘Barriers to Justice: Implementing Reparations for Victims 
of Sexual Violence in the DRC’, Columbia School of International Public Affairs (2013), available at 
https://phr.org/resources/barriers-to-justice-for-survivors-of-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/ (accessed 13 October 2018). 
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developed regarding the viability of reparation principles pronounced by the Court and the 
implications of the judgment for the victims of core crimes in the DRC.191  
Since the work of the ICC in the DRC is still in progress, its corresponding literature on reparations 
is also still fragmented and developing gradually. Aptly put, a substantial part of the literature 
revolves around the prominence of victim’s rights at the ICC that essentially glorifies the court for 
being victim-friendly and for being able to award reparations for the victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court.192  
However, one controversial issue that stems from some sections of the prevailing literature is the 
preference for collective and transformative reparations. Generally, proponents of collective and 
transformative reparations have argued that the ICC must address victims’ needs through 
reparation programs or measures that are capable restructuring a society’s socio-political and 
economic conditions that prevailed before or during the conflict.193  
 
191 Wiersing (2012); Durbach A and Chappell L ‘Leaving Behind the Age of Impunity: Victims of Gender Violence 
and the Promise of Reparations’ 16 (2014) International Feminist Journal of Politics; Dixon PJ ‘Reparations, 
Assistance and the Experience of Justice: Lessons from Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 10 
(2016) International Journal of Transitional Justice; Stahn C ‘Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeal Judgment: 
New Prospects for Expressivism and Participatory Justice or ‘Juridified Victimhood’ by Other Means?’ 13 (2015) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice; Mégret F ‘The Case for Collective Reparations before the ICC’ in 
Wemmers JM Reparation for Victims of Crimes against Humanity: The Healing Role of Reparation (2014); Capone 
F An ‘Appraisal of the Al Mahdi Order on Reparations and Its Innovative Elements: Redress for Victims of Crimes 
against Cultural Heritage’ (2018) Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
192 De Brower ‘Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the International Criminal Court and at the 
Trust Fund and their Families’ (2007) Leiden Journal of International Law 207-237; Stahn (2015); Amezcua-Noriega 
O ‘Reparation Principles under International Law and their Possible Application by the International Criminal Court: 
Some Reflections’ (2011) Transitional Justice Network, University of Essex; Evans C ‘Right to reparations in 
international law for victims of armed conflict: Convergence of law and practice?’ (2010) PhD Thesis, London School 
of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom); Travis H ‘Reparations for Mass Atrocities as a Path to Peace: 
After Kiobel V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Can Victims Seek Relief at the International Criminal Court?’ (2015) 40 
Brook Journal of International Law ; Mégret F ‘The International Criminal Court and the Failure to Mention Symbolic 
Reparations’ (2008) SSRN Papers, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275087> 
(accessed on 21 April 2016); Contreras-Garduño D and Fraser J ‘The Identification Of Victims Before The Inter-
American Court Of Human Rights And The International Criminal Court And Its Impact On Participation And 
Reparation: A Domino Effect?’ (2015) Intersentia; Aubry S and Henao-Trip MI (Eds.) ‘Collective Reparations and 
the International Criminal Court’ (2011) Transitional Justice Network, University of Essex. 
193 Hoyle C and Ullrich L ‘New Court, New Justice? The Evolution of Justice for Victims at Domestic Courts and at 
the International Criminal Court’ (2014)12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 692-693; Aubry and Henao-Trip  
(2011); Moffett L ‘Reparations for Victims at the International Criminal Court: a new way forward?’ (2017) 21 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 1204 – 1222. 
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However, some commentators have either neglected or overlooked some legal and factual 
difficulties which may arise from transformative and collective reparations within the ICC Statute 
framework. Collective reparations may pose some challenges stemming from, for example, 
substantive jurisdictional limitations of ICC reparations.194 Such limitations include the following. 
First, the ICC Statute requires a nexus between the convicted person’s charges and the harm 
suffered by victims and the obligation to repair harm goes to the convicted person. As the 
prosecutorial policy of the ICC indicates that charges will always be narrow in scope, leaving out 
a large number of crimes; it means that the scope of reparations will be limited to the charges 
established and therefore a large section of victims will be left out of the court process.  
Secondly, the conviction-focused reparation system of the ICC is susceptible to creating a pyramid 
of victims with unequal status as regards reparations; for example, qualified and non-qualified 
victims owing to acquittals (Ngudjolo Chui and Bemba cases), non-prosecution and termination 
of proceedings (Al-Bashir and Kenyatta cases), and narrow charging (Lubanga case).195The 
consequence of ‘excluded victims’, for example, will be to render collective reparations ineffective 
and potentially discriminatory.  
The most critical question which this thesis attempts to answer is whether it would be prudent and 
possible for a criminal court to pursue reparations geared at solving societal inequalities with the 
resulting danger of confusing such reparations for development programmes to be implemented 
by governments.196  
 
194 Aubry and Henao-Trip (2011), para 22 at page 9. 
195 On the distinction between victims of the case and victims of the situation, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2,VPRS 3,VPRS 
4,VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Public Redacted Version) ICC-01/04-101, 22 March 2006; Mégret F ‘Reparations before the 
ICC: The Need for Pragmatism and Creativity’ in Steinberg RH (ed) Contemporary Issues Facing the International 
Criminal Court (2016) 256 – 257. 
 
 
196 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Queen's University Belfast's Human Rights Centre (HRC) and University of 
Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) Submission on Reparations Issues pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 14/05/2015, para 6; Trust Fund for Victims Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to 
victims, Submitted to the Amended Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, para 70. 
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Thirdly, there is an enforcement problem that relates to the indigence of convicted persons as in 
the Lubanga case.197 In Lubanga, the ICC has attempted to diffuse the problem by vicariously 
transferring the burden of enforcing collective reparations to the Trust Fund.198 Among other 
things, that solution could potentially lead to a violation of legal rights of the convicted person as 
the court has suggested, for example, that defence has no right to scrutinise individual applications 
for reparations when a collective approach to reparations is preferred.199 That may create a legal 
problem as, technically, the convicted person is still liable for reparations even though the 
implementer is the Trust Fund. 
In an article that exposes critical limitations of the ICC reparation system, Moffett makes a case 
for the invocation of state responsibility through the doctrine of reparative complementarity under 
Article 75 of the ICC Statute.200 He argues that reparative complementarity could be a solution to 
‘limited reparations’ of the ICC.201 Despite being a good proposal, the author does not offer 
substantive procedural avenues on how to operationalise state responsibility within the ICC 
Statute. This thesis deals with such an issue in a more detailed manner in chapter five. 
The study seeks to enlarge the discussion on different and competing concepts of victim’s right to 
reparation in the context of international criminal law through the lens of international human 
rights law     
1.5 Research Methodology 
The study is a desktop and library research conducted at Freie Universität Berlin and the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. It involves a documentary review and analysis of the relevant primary 
and secondary sources of information available electronically and in hard print. 
1.6 Limitation of the Study 
The core theme of the study concerns the implementation of the right to reparation within the ICC 
Statute framework. The study focuses on the current Congolese cases under the jurisdiction of the 
 
197 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 269. 
198 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) para 62; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 273. 
199 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment (2015), para.151. 
200 Moffet L ‘Reparative complementarity: ensuring an effective remedy for victims in the reparation regime of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2013) 17 The International Journal of Human Rights 368-390. 
201 Moffett (2013) page 383; Moffett (2017) 1214-1215. 
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ICC, especially the reparation judgments in Lubanga and Katanga cases. While it is expected that 
the ICC will deliver a reparation judgment in the Ntaganda case shortly, the conceptual issues that 
have been identified and discussed in the thesis pertain to reparation judgments in Lubanga, 
Katanga, and Al Mahdi.  
It is crucial to state that the approach and line of argument adopted in this study relate to ICC 
reparation decisions handed down until November 2018.  Since there are a number of cases 
pending at the ICC, it is expected that the ICC jurisprudence on reparative justice will keep 
changing in the future and therefore it would be proper to concede at the outset that facts analysed 
as well as opinions and conclusions developed under this study relate to developments at the ICC 
not beyond November 2018. 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
The study has six chapters. The introductory chapter opens with a presentation of the evolution of 
the right to reparation under international law. Then, it offers a historical account of the conflict in 
the DRC with the ultimate aim of pointing to the reader that events that led to the intervention of 
the ICC in 2004 had their origin in the DRC’s oppressive regimes and antagonistic societal 
relations right from the time of Belgian colonists to Mobutu’s Zaire and beyond. 
Chapter two discusses post conflict justice in the DRC with a focus on reparative complementarity 
(the responsibility to repair). On domestic reparations, the chapter covers the aspect of guarantees 
of non-repetition by looking at the structural and institutional reforms implemented by the DRC 
government in securing the protection of human rights and the promotion of accountability.  
Chapter three provides a descriptive and critical analysis of the legal regime applicable to the 
participation of victims in the proceedings at the ICC. Central to the discussion is the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute that grants a qualified right for the participation 
of victims in the proceedings. 
Chapter four, the core, covers reparation judgments of the ICC that have been handed down until 
November 2018. The chapter provides a critical and measured analysis of the reparation principles 
adjudicated at the ICC to determine how they reflect on victim’s right to receive adequate, 
effective, and prompt reparation as required under international law. 
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Chapter five presents ‘state-defendant reparative co-responsibility’ as a solution to the two 
identified shortcomings of the ICC reparation system; one, impecunious defendants, and two, 
resource constraints.  
Chapter six closes the curtain to the thesis by offering conclusive recommendations on what should 

















RESPONSIBILITY TO REPAIR: REPARATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE IN THE DRC 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
The chapter gauges the extent to which the DRC has gone in complementing the ICC by closing 
down the impunity gap through prosecutions and reparations.202 It is my submission that, in the 
fullness of time, the success of international criminal justice with respect to (the DRC) cases before 
the ICC will heavily depend on complementary justice efforts undertaken at the domestic level.203 
The chapter provides a reasoned account of reparative justice measures taken in the DRC about 
atrocity crimes perpetrated during the Congo Wars.  
However, the chapter does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the DRC justice system. It 
rather provides a general overview of the domestic response to the ICC crimes and the provision 
of reparations to the victims. The DRC reparations regime is assessed to determine its readiness, 
accessibility, and viability in providing redress to the victims.  
While a larger portion of the chapter is devoted to the concept of reparative complementarity as 
an offshoot of the state’s responsibility to repair, some sections indulge in a discussion of 
transitional justice issues, such as the truth commission and amnesties. Mindful of the necessarily 
limited reparations regime of the ICC, the chapter covers the aspect of ‘reparative 
complementarity’–meaning national justice efforts geared at providing reparative justice to the 
victims of international crimes in the DRC. Aptly put, the reparative responsibility of the DRC can 
be traced to the government’s human rights obligations under the 2006 Constitution. The 
government is obligated to protect people against human rights violations and to ensure that there 
is an enforceable legal mechanism for the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of rights.204  
 
202 Squeezing the impunity gap is a major objective of the doctrine of complementarity in the ICC; see Bekou O ‘The 
ICC and Capacity Building at the National Level’ in Stahn C (ed) The Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court (2015) 1248. 
203 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 321. 
204 Article 16 and 52 of the 2006 Constitution of the DRC. 
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Also, public authorities have a positive obligation to ensuring that people’s rights are promoted 
and protected.205 The obligation to protect and ensure the enjoyment of rights is coupled with the 
obligation to investigate violations, prosecute perpetrators, and afford a remedy for the victims. 
Such an obligation, as per customary international human rights law, exists irrespective of whether 
the territorial state is the perpetrator of violations or not.206  
Additionally, the UN Basic Principles on the Right to Reparations provides that ‘victimhood’ is 
independent of the identification and prosecution of perpetrators,207 and territorial states are 
obligated to redress the victims upon the inability or unwillingness of the perpetrator to do so.208 
 Therefore, as stated in the UN report on the inquiry on Darfur, “states have the obligation to act 
not only against the perpetrators but also on behalf of victims”.209 In atrocity crime situations, 
acting for the victims would mean indiscriminate prosecutions of the perpetrators, setting up an 
impartial truth commission to provide an objective historical account of the violations, and the 
provision of effective redress to the victims.210 The mentioned justice modalities need not be 
implemented simultaneously. 
2.2 Post Conflict Justice: Has the Congolese State Acted on Behalf of the Victims? 
The aftermath of grave breaches of human rights would usually be a painful experience for any 
country. Given the gravity and intensity of the perpetration of past crimes in the DRC, the demands 
for justice are myriad and enormous, often unparalleled with the readiness and capability of the 
justice regime.211 Since transitional justice principles are not universal to all conflict situations, 
adjustments around such principles to flexibly respond to particular conflict scenarios could be 
warranted.  
 
205 Article 66 of the Constitution of the DRC. 
206 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (Geneva, 25 
January 2005), para 598 at page 151; UN Mapping Report on Congo, paras 1086-1087. 
207 UN Basic Principles on Reparations (2005), para 9. 
208 UN Basic Principles on Reparations (2005), para 16. 
209 UN Inquiry on Darfur (2005), para 590 at page 150; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, Report of the UN Secretary General, S/2011/634, 12 October 2011, at para 26. 
210 The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, 
S/2004/616, 12 August 2004, para 54 at page 18. 
211 Roht-Arriaza N ‘Measures of Non-Repetition in Transitional Justice: The Missing Link?’ 2016, University of 
California Hastings Research Paper No.171, at page 2; available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746055 (accessed 20the November 2017). 
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Consequently, conflict states tend to find themselves in a delicate situation when trying to find a 
balance between different competing interests, for example, peace versus justice, to produce a 
working transitional justice policy.212 As it will be demonstrated later, the ‘peace-building rhetoric’ 
advocated by the international community has ultimately failed to deliver substantive justice 
outcomes for the victims in the DRC.  
While some mechanisms could be utilised to achieve the basic goals of transitional justice 
(reconciliation, truth, and justice for the victims), it is argued that a human rights compliant 
transitional justice regime must incorporate at least four international human rights law precepts. 
Such precepts include a state’s obligation to investigate breaches and pursue criminal justice for 
core crimes; objective truth-seeking regarding the violations; providing effective redress to the 
victims; and an introduction of preventative measures to ensure non-recurrence of atrocities.213 
Furthermore, active victim participation in transitional justice processes is essential for a 
successful transitional justice policy. 214 
Until now, the DRC has not had a holistic national transitional justice policy that provides for 
coherent measures for dealing with a very long and painful history of atrocity crimes. 215 
Nevertheless, one could posit that the post-conflict internationally negotiated pact, namely the 
Global and All Inclusive Agreement of December 2002216 and the Sun City Agreements of April 
2003, constitute the ‘transitional justice content’ for the DRC. 217  
Being an end product of the protracted Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the Sun City Agreements 
embody resolutions on multi-dimensional post-atrocity justice mechanisms that include: the 
 
212 Sriram CL and Pillay S (eds) Peace versus Justice?: the Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa (2009); Van 
Der M and Lykes MB ‘Transitional Justice Processes as Teachable Moments’ (2016) 10 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 361-365. 
213 Transitional Justice and Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (Geneva 2014), UN Publication HR/PUB/13/5, at 
page 5, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-13-05.pdf (accessed 19th November 
2017). 
214 Méndez JE ‘Victims as Protagonists in Transitional Justice’ (2016) 10 The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 1-5. 
215 UN Mapping Report on Congo, para 1005. 
216 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations 
on the peace process and on transition in the DRC (16 December 2002). 
217 The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (The Sun City Agreement) is available at 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf (accessed 20th 
November 2017); UN Mapping Report on Congo, paras 980-981. 
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creation of a truth commission to create a historical record on the violations; 218 establishment of 
an international criminal court to prosecute atrocity crimes;219 restoring the rule of law and 
democratic governance;220 disarmament of the rebel forces;221 creation of a new national army;222 
war reparations;223 restitution of pillaged and plundered properties; 224 creation of a human rights 
observatory;225 measures for cultural integration and peaceful coexistence;226 reconstruction of 
destroyed towns; 227 reforming military justice;228 demobilisation and reintegration of child 
soldiers;229 and rebuilding of social service institutions.230 
Such transitional justice solutions as embodied in the Sun City Agreements were expected to be 
implemented by the transitional government under President Joseph Kabila. The transitional 
period officially ended after the 2006 elections.231 The transition agreement specifically stated that 
the transition period shall end with the election of a new President.232 Looking back on the 
achievements of the transitional government during that period (2002–2006), one can safely 
conclude that there have not been any meaningful gains for the victims. A 2007 UN Security 
Council Report concluded that transitional justice had not been implemented as prescribed by the 
transition agreement.233 
 
218 Resolution No: DIC/COR/04. 
219 Resolution No: DIC/CPR/05. 
220 Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/03. 
221 Resolution No: DIC/CDS/02. 
222 Resolution No: DIC/CDS/04. 
223 Resolution No: DIC/CEF/01. 
224 Resolutions No: DIC/CPR/01 and DIC/CEF/02. 
225 Resolution No: DIC/CHSC/08. 
226 Resolution No: DIC/CHSC/06. 
227 Resolution No: DIC/CHSC/04. 
228 Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/06. 
229 Resolution No: DIC/DCS/03. 
230 Resolution No: DIC/CHSC/01. 
231  Klosterboer B and Hartmann-Mahmud L ‘Difficult to Repair: Applying African Models for Transitional Justice 
to Peace and Restoration Prospects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2013) 3 African Conflict and 
Peacebuilding Review 59; Autesserre S The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Building (2010) 232. 
232 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations 
on the peace process and on transition in the DRC at para IV. 
233 Twenty-third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, S/2007/156, para 23. 
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It is submitted that the failure of transitional justice in the DRC hinges on the typology of conflict 
resolution model adopted during the peace talks at the behest of the international community. The 
dominant narrative was that the DRC was a ‘failed state’ and therefore the transition model adopted 
was meant to rebuild the state through ending belligerents, disarming rebel groups, sharing state 
power, introducing democratic elections and a new constitutional dispensation.234 Clearly, victim’s 
justice was not a priority. Thus, with the help of international intervention, the transitional 
government somewhat succeeded in ending major belligerents and introducing constitutional 
democracy in Congo.235  
Despite those gains, there has been little success in peace-building and transitional justice.236 
Arguably, the major undoing in Congo’s transition is the minimal attention to victims’ justice 
coupled with the insignificant strengthening of rule of law institutions, most of which have failed 
to make war lords and political elites account for their atrocities. That echoes Stearns who argues 
that “the Congolese peace process has actually been remarkably successful at reuniting the country 
and forging a political settlement among belligerents. But it has been much less successful at 
reforming state institutions and holding political elites accountable for their behavior”.237 
Of the transitional justice solutions embodied in the Sun City Accord, only a truth commission, 
selective prosecutions, and amnesties were pursued by the government, with little or no success in 
ending impunity. The Global and All Inclusive Agreement provided for the creation of a Truth 
Commission (TRC) for “re-establishing the truth, and promoting peace, justice, forgiveness and 
national reconciliation”.238 Through Organic Law No. 04/17 of 30 July 2004, the TRC had a 
lengthy mandate of undertaking its truth-seeking investigative task about crimes committed 
between 1960 and 2003.  
Nevertheless, contrary to its mandate and legitimate expectations of the Congolese people, the 
TRC failed to yield any substantive results in terms of conducting objective and results-oriented 
investigations regarding the grave crimes that have been committed in the DRC since 
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independence.239 Consequently, many scholars have slammed the work of Congo’s truth 
commission as merely ‘cosmetic’.240  
Aptly put, the TRC failed because it had a highly politicized membership incorporating people 
who were hugely complicity in atrocity crimes,241 in addition to a lengthy investigative mandate 
involving crimes spanning over a period of 43 years. As a result of political partiality in the way 
the truth commission was constituted, atrocities perpetrated by the powerful warlords were largely 
overlooked during the investigations.242 
Amnesties have also been cited as an important component of the transition in the DRC, without 
which there could have been no ceasefire. The transition agreement provided that “to achieve 
national reconciliation, amnesty shall be granted for acts of war, political and opinion breaches of 
the law, with the exception of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity”.243  
Accordingly, a law was enacted in 2005 that allowed amnesty for belligerency and political crimes 
but not for atrocity crimes.244 A similar law was also enacted in 2009 to pardon perpetrators of the 
insurgency in the Kivus.245 It is crucial to note that the amnesty laws were in line with international 
law for not allowing amnesty for crimes under international law. Being violations of jus cogens 
norms, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity must be prosecuted.246 
In as much as the amnesty regime was meant to make war lords lay down their arms and reconcile 
with their opponents, there were little gains in accountability. The government’s policy of granting 
amnesty and co-opting rebel commanders into the regular national army did not help matters but 
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only deepen the culture of impunity in Congo. For example, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel 
commander and now a defendant at the ICC, abused his amnesty by leaving the regular army and 
forming the M-23 that unleashed monstrous attacks on civilians in the Eastern part of the DRC.247 
He is now at the ICC facing charges relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity.248 
It is argued that the non-inclusion of core crimes in the amnesty laws does not in itself enhance 
accountability for violations and justice for the victims.249 To end impunity and ensure a rule of 
law, the transitional government should have discharged its obligations under international law by 
robustly investigating and prosecuting persons who were the most responsible for the egregious 
violations.  
As many commentators and reports argue, such an obligation has not been discharged satisfactorily 
by the DRC.250 Admittedly, some prosecutions have been carried out but they are few, 
inconsequential, and disproportionate to the scale and intensity of violations perpetrated during the 
conflict.251 For example, most of the perpetrators of the war crime of rape, which has been 
extensively committed in the DRC, have not been investigated and charged.252 This miscarriage 
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of justice could be attributed to the fact that the transition agreement lacked effective accountability 
mechanisms for prosecutions of the violations.253 
As for reparations to the victims, much of the scholarship and reports seem to agree that the DRC 
has failed to discharge her reparative obligation toward the victims.254 Congolese law allows for 
the state to be held liable for reparations on account of wrongdoing of its agents. Despite that, 
credible reports indicate that the government has been unwilling to enforce court judgments on 
reparations.255 The non-enforcement of such judgments and the inability or unwillingness of the 
DRC to redress the victims is an assault on the victim’s right to an effective remedy. Such a 
situation causes re-traumatisation, in addition to what the victims have already undergone or 
suffered from the violations. 
It is submitted that post-conflict justice in the DRC did not result in anything significant for the 
victims. Transitional justice was not a priority for the local and international actors. That could be 
attributed to the conflicting transitional justice dynamics that defined the transition in the DRC. 
Believing that state failure was a major reason for the instability in the DRC,256 the international 
community preferred ‘state reconstruction or rebuilding’ as a guiding principle for transitional 
justice initiatives.257  
The state reconstruction model revolved around issues like democratic governance, power sharing, 
and state security, with very little direct impact on justice for the victims. That is why the 
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international actors did not support any transitional justice mechanism that seemed a threat to their 
stabilisation objectives and also resource intensive.  
That explains the failure to establish an ad hoc tribunal as the international community feared that 
it could destabilise the country. However, it is posited that international geopolitical factors could 
have considerably influenced the non-preference of strong judicial mechanisms for the DRC, 
which was not the case for Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s Special Court was established and 
supported by the international community, including major powers such as the US and the UK.258 
So, why were calls for an ad hoc tribunal for the DRC ignored by the international community? 
The DRC conflict involved many domestic and international actors with differing interests and 
complicity levels. It is believed that the US and UK secretly supported the invasion of the DRC 
by Rwanda and Uganda.259  
While that assertion would in itself be insufficient to pin the blame solely on such global powers, 
it could still be a distant reason for the go-slow attitude of the international community on the 
establishment of a special court for the Congo conflict. Likewise, it would be fair to note here that 
many international (western) companies have been implicated in a UN Report on illegal 
exploitation of natural resources during the Congo conflict.260 The exploitation provided money 
for the war. 
 
258 Perriello T and Wierda M ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny’ (2006), International Center for 
Transitional Justice 12, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/Case-studies-ICTJ.pdf (accessed 11 
December 2017). 
259 Turner (2007) 12; French HW ‘Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo’ (2009), The New York Review of Books, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/09/24/kagames-hidden-war-in-the-congo/ (accessed 10 December 
2017); Ismi A ‘The Congo Still Ravaged by U.S.-Funded Conflict and Plunder’ (2014), Global Research, available at 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-congo-still-ravaged-by-u-s-funded-conflict-and-plunder/5375098 (accessed 11 
December 2017); The Shameless Vacuity of Susan Rice’s Black Boosters (2012), Black Agenda Report, available at 
https://www.blackagendareport.com/content/shameless-vacuity-susan-rices-black-boosters (accessed 11 December 
2017); Report: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War, World Policy Institute - Research Project, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm (accessed 11 December 2017); Ray E ‘US Military and 
Corporate Recolonization of the Congo’ (2000), Covert Action Quarterly, available at 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/US_Recolonization_Congo.html (accessed 11 December 2017). 
260 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2002), S/2002/1146; Kern K ‘Corporate Complicity in Congo’s War’ 
(2006), Tikkun Magazine, available at https://www.cpt.org/work/africa_great_lakes/corporate_complicity (accessed 
10 December 2017). 
47 
 
A strong judicial mechanism backed by the international community such as Sierra Leone’s 
Special Court would have implicated complicity neighbouring countries and international 
corporations, given that there is massive evidence on the role of the US backed Rwanda and 
Uganda in the perpetration of international crimes in the DRC.261 Being a strategic nation in the 
Great Lakes region and with enormous natural reserves of minerals like Coltan, the superpowers 
might have feared that robust prosecutions could either reignite the conflict and or harm their 
strategic trade and political interests in the DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole. 
Presumably, robust criminal prosecutions could have exposed the complicity of Western powers 
in the Congo conflict. 
Meanwhile, the DRC government was not on the same page with the international community on 
the approach to transitional justice. The government perceived transitional justice as a tool for 
conflict management, thereby employing a chameleon-style approach to justice and accountability 
for political expediency.262  
Explaining the conflict management approach to transitional justice, Arnould states that:  
The Congolese government has thus acted as a transitional justice promoter at one level (advocacy for 
international prosecutions) while simultaneously resisting other transitional justice measures through acts of 
non-cooperation (TRC), neglect (domestic courts), and the adoption of measures curtailing justice efforts 
(amnesties and rebel co-optation policy).263  
Therefore, lack of a coherent transitional justice framework in the DRC resulted in promoters and 
resisters of certain transitional justice processes, both pursuing distinct transitional justice goals.264 
DRC’s transition could have produced substantive justice outcomes if the ‘state reconstruction 
model’ succeeded in building credible public institutions. 
However, Lake argues that the institution-building policy supported strongly by the international 
community failed to produce independent public institutions due to the subversive tendencies of 
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the war elites for their “strategic or conflict-related ends”.265 A recent study that focused on the 
war-torn Eastern region of the DRC indicates that the failure or success of accountability programs 
hinged on their impact on strategic conflict-related interests of the war lords.266 Therefore, rule of 
law programmes that threatened the interests of warlords were not supported by the elite, resulting 
in unsuccessful implementation.   
In a nutshell, it is posited that transitional justice in the DRC did not produce successful 
accountability measures on account of the following reasons. First, there was weak support from 
the international community. Due to geopolitics and strategic interests of major powers, the 
international community was mostly interested in creating a functioning government in the DRC 
with little emphasis on justice for the victims.267  
For example, it was feared that an emphasis on prosecutions would upset the warring factions and 
trigger another conflict that would make the DRC unpalatable to foreign investment in the mining 
sector. That explains why calls for the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal for the DRC were not 
taken seriously as the case was,  for example, for Rwanda and Sierra Leone. 
Secondly, the transitional justice process in Congo had a very minimal participation of the affected 
local population as it was dominated by domestic and international elites.268 That points to the lack 
of preference for effective accountability measures due to the weak representation of the victims 
in the planning of transitional justice. Peace talks that eventually resulted in a transition agreement 
had little or no meaningful input from the victims and civil society. This is inconsistent with the 
fact that local consultations are crucial for a working transitional justice policy.269 
Thirdly, the transition agreement had weak justice and accountability mechanisms.270 For example, 
the truth commission in the DRC was only established as an institution for “supporting 
democracy”271, and supposedly not as a quasi-judicial investigative body. That may explain why 
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the truth commission never investigated a single case. In fact, as per the transition agreement, 
accountability was not one of the objectives of the commission.272 The commission had only four 
objectives, namely: rebuilding the country; reconciliation; creating a new national army; holding 
democratic elections, and establishing structures for a new political order.273 
In conclusion, this section does not seek to overstate the significance of justice over peace. Peace 
and justice are mutually reinforcing and complementary, with justice providing accountability and 
return to the rule of law. Without being oblivious to the fact that war fatigue could have influenced 
the prioritisation of peace-building over justice, it is submitted here that the embedment of 
impunity-friendly provisions in the transition agreement has had a catastrophic impact on post-
conflict accountability. That situation does not help the victims. The provision of justice for the 
past atrocity crimes in the DRC has not been proportionate to the gravity of the conflict.  
Many crimes remain unpunished and few victims, if any, have been redressed. Therefore, the 
inability and unwillingness of the government to act signify its indifference towards the plight of 
millions of victims, some of whom have already died.  Clearly, the government has not acted on 
behalf of the victims and there is a need for the DRC to strengthen its reparative obligation to 
complement international criminal justice.274 
2.3 Theoretical Justifications for Reparative Complementarity 
This section presents theoretical considerations for reparative complementarity from the 
standpoint of human rights law as contextualised in state responsibility parameters. Reparation is 
a needs-based right that requires an enormous amount of resources, especially in post-conflict 
situations. With large numbers of victims in atrocity crime contexts, the ICC may not be able to 
provide meaningful reparation to the victims unless such redress efforts are complemented by 
states and non-state actors.275  
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In support of the doctrine of reparative complementarity, I posit social-political and economic 
reasons as well as human rights concepts to justify the necessity of involving states in the ICC 
reparations system. 
States, compared to other actors, have a higher threshold of responsibility for the supply side of 
human rights. They are the ultimate protector and giver of human rights.276 States have the means 
to prevent violations and to ensure the enjoyment of the rights.277  
By contrast, individuals have an obligation to respect human rights but they may lack the means 
and capacity to prevent violations and to ensure the enjoyment of rights on a macro-level scale 
(conflict situations). Thus, while the international law provides for reparative responsibility on the 
part of violators, whether states or individuals, it is argued that states bear the ultimate reparative 
obligation to redress macro-level violations of human rights in conflict countries.278  
Placing the ultimate reparative obligation on states in conflict circumstances, does not obscure the 
reparative responsibility of the defendants towards the victims of international crimes. Arguably, 
the defendant-based reparation regime at the ICC that places an obligation on individual 
perpetrators to provide reparations to millions of victims may never work if the reparative liability 
is not shared with territorial states.279 It is under such circumstances that a UN report proposed the 
establishment of a compensation commission to provide redress to millions of atrocity crime 
victims in Darfur, as a complementary measure to the ICC.280 
Post-conflict reparations should not be viewed as ordinary reparation (compensation) claims in 
regular national criminal or civil proceedings. Reparations in response to gross violations are 
usually massive. They are extremely multi-faceted and resource-intensive, covering numerous 
areas ranging from restoration of property rights, healing societal relations, rebuilding social 
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infrastructures, reforming public institutions of governance, to repairing individual harms and 
remedying lost opportunities of the victims.  
As observed in the Duch case at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the 
ECCC), such redress undertakings may never be implemented effectively under defendant-based 
judicial settings.281 For them to succeed, they must be supported by state reparation programmes 
that have a wider implementation base covering many victims at a go and dealing with numerous 
types of victimisations demands.  
In the absence of state-led reparative interventions, the ICC’s individualistic and defendant-
focused approach to reparations may result in a huge gap between entitlements and realities for the 
victims. For the ICC to be able to deliver meaningful reparations for the victims, the court must 
disentangle itself strategically from the restrictive operational and legal shackles of its reparation 
formula that pins responsibility on indigent defendants by encouraging domestic reparations 
programs in conflict states. State administrative reparation projects are important since judicial 
reparations per se have been proven to be insufficient in some conflict countries.282 
Besides the economic side of reparations, the necessity of reparative complementarity would come 
up in the context of non-economic reparations such as reconciliation. Arguably, reparations should 
also look beyond the victim (the micro side of redress) by healing relations in a society (the macro 
dimension of reparations).283 That argument is supported by the ICC Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
reparations order in which the court held that one of the objectives of reparations is to pacify 
societal relations through reconciliation amongst the victims, perpetrators, and the effected 
communities.284 Healing community relations after protracted conflicts may not be accomplished 
by a Criminal Court like the ICC in the absence of cooperation from governments. 
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In any case, criminal trials and proceedings are very confrontational and adversarial. Thus, 
although such proceedings could have reparation measures linked to them, as the case is with the 
ICC, they do not primarily aim at promoting reconciliation; their outcomes are more inclined to 
achieve, among other aims, retribution and deterrence. 
The success of ICC reparations will depend on the extent to which conflict states could be able 
and willing to initiate domestic redress projects to complement those of the ICC.285 With the first 
three reparation judgments in Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mhadi, the court has largely opted for 
collective reparations,286 with minimal symbolic compensatory individual reparations in Katanga 
and Al Mahdi.287  
The preference for collective reparations has been largely motivated by resource-related reasons 
than victim-cantered issues, entailing that active participation of states in the implementation of 
reparations is foreseeable and needed although the Court avoids mentioning that explicitly in the 
judgments. Given that only a minimum number of victims apply for reparations, and due to the 
scarcity of resources, the ICC has rightly held that collective reparations have a greater utility 
impact as compared to individual awards.288  
Furthermore, considering the difficulty with identifying victims in atrocity crimes situations and 
the fact that in some cases only hundreds out of millions did apply for reparations,289 collective 
reparations could extend to the unidentified group of victims and afford redress to myriad 
categories of victimisation.290 In Al Mahdi, for example, the court noted that it had received only 
139 reparation applications (0.19%) out of possible 70,000 victims from Timbuktu in Mali.291 
However, collective reparations are hard to implement. They require enormous economic 
resources, accurate and timely demographic identification of the victims, and extensive 
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consultations with the victims at the grassroot level. That can hardly be accomplished by the ICC 
alone, governments must do their part to support the court. Thus, a successful implementation of 
the preferred collective reparations calls for an extensive involvement of territorial states, the 
modality of which has not been set out by the ICC in its judgments. 
The section below unpacks the doctrine of reparative complementarity in the context of the ICC 
Statute system and international human rights law. 
2.4 The Notion of Reparative Complementarity under the ICC Statute 
Criminal prosecutions at the ICC as well as the issuance of reparation orders against convicted 
persons under Article 75 of the ICC Statute do not obviate the responsibility of states under 
international law regarding the conduct of investigations, prosecutions, and punishment of the 
perpetrators, and the provision of reparation to the victims of core crimes.292 Thus, criminal 
convictions of the DRC nationals such as Lubanga and Katanga and orders for reparations against 
them by the ICC do not absolve the DRC of its reparative responsibility towards the victims under 
international law.293 Furthermore, the DRC as a state of commission concerning the crimes is fully 
responsible for providing redress for all the persons in its territory who were affected by the gross 
violations of human rights.294 
A state’s international responsibility for reparations could arise in three scenarios. The first 
scenario is under state responsibility rules whereby violations perpetrated by government agents 
could give rise to claims for reparation by individuals and states.295 The second scenario is under 
customary international criminal law whereby jus cogens violations (core crimes) must be 
investigated and prosecuted, and the territorial state must provide reparations to victims.296 The 
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third scenario is under international human rights law whereby people must be protected by 
governments against human rights violations, failure of which gives rise to an obligation to repair 
(reparations).297  
Generally, the principle of non-impunity for international crimes (jus cogens violations)298 and the 
political responsibility of governments to promote and secure ‘human security’ place the ultimate 
responsibility for reparations on sovereign states.299  
It is now widely accepted among scholars and supported by international legal instruments and 
jurisprudence that the traditional goal posts of the doctrine of state responsibility applicable to 
inter-state claims have been shifted by the universality of victim’s human right to redress, enabling 
victims to claim reparations against both individuals and states.300  
That legal proposition is further energised by the UN Human Rights Committee interpretation of 
the obligation of states in enforcing the right to a remedy under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights (ICCPR). In its general comment number 31, the Committee argues that the 
victim’s right to an effective remedy would be undischarged in the absence of reparations.301  
Thus, the State’s obligation towards the victims under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR cannot be 
discharged through investigations and prosecutions alone. There must be reparations for the 
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victims. And that is why the current international criminal justice, unlike Nuremberg trials, has 
recognised the insufficiency of prosecutions (retributive justice) by also embracing reparative 
justice.302 
Approaching the notion of ‘reparative complementarity’ from the discourse of political 
sovereignty and human rights, one could also argue that conflict states bear the non-derogable 
responsibility for restoring and ensuring ‘human security’ in their territories through, for example, 
the provision justice (reparations) to the victims. In particular, crimes under international law pose 
a grave danger to human security due to their devastating macro-level impact on society as a whole.  
The scars and losses from ‘macro-level destruction’ of ICC crimes cannot possibly be repaired 
through streamlined prosecutions at the ICC that only deal with specific incidents and a limited 
number of individuals and charges. For example, in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber could not 
consider harm emanating from sexual violence for reparations as sexual crimes were not charged 
or even considered as part of gravity of the proved crimes during sentencing.303 The defendant-
based reparation regime carried out by the ICC must be complemented by domestic reparative 
justice mechanisms.304 
While most of the international criminal justice literature has obsessively associated the doctrine 
of complementarity with prosecutorial obligations of states about ICC crimes,305 it is argued that 
‘reparative complementarity’ is also explicitly provided for under the ICC Statute.  
It is submitted that the legal basis for reparative complementarity is captured through the double 
application of Articles 25(4) and 75(6) of the ICC Statute to mean that: a convicted person’s 
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responsibility for reparations  and an award of reparation to victims by the ICC do not obviate 
State’s reparative obligation to the victims or scuttle rights of victims under the domestic or 
international law.306 That has also been affirmed in the Court’s reparation jurisprudence.307  
However, it is submitted that the prosecution-based principle of complementarity under the ICC 
Statute is asymmetrical to reparative complementarity as the latter is not subjected to the 
admissibility principles espoused under Article 17 of the ICC Statute. A case will be inadmissible 
at the ICC if there are active domestic proceedings that deal with the same defendant and 
substantially the same incident forming the basis of charges.308  
As opposed to criminal proceedings, a victim’s reparation claim will still be admitted and 
determined by the court even when such a victim has already received some reparations 
domestically.309 However, in awarding reparations at the ICC, as noted in Lubanga and Katanga, 
the Court may consider reparation benefits already granted to victims in other jurisdictions to 
ensure fairness and guard against discrimination.310 
To minimize overlaps and clashes between ICC prosecutions and domestic prosecutions, a case is 
not admissible at the ICC if the same is under active and genuine investigations or prosecutions at 
the domestic level (the complementarity threshold).311 However, the same rule would not apply to 
reparations as the provision of reparation to victims under the ICC reparation regime does not 
affect the rights of victims under national laws.312  
Thus, reparative justice undertakings at the national level may run parallel to reparation 
proceedings at the ICC regarding the same conduct, same perpetrator, and same category victims.  
That said, the ICC reparative complementarity is sui generis for having a horizontal and 
 
306 Moffet (2013) 380-382; Article 25(4) of the ICC Statute says: “No provision in this Statute relating to individual 
criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law”, and Article 75(6) provides: 
“Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law”. 
307 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012) para 257; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) para 4; Katanga Reparations 
Judgment (2017) para 323; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017) para 36. 
308 ICC Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (2016) paras 30 – 31. 
309 Lubanga Reparations Order (2012), para 181. 
310 Lubanga Reparations Order (2012), para 201; Katanga Reparations Order (2017) paras 319 – 320. 
311 Article 17(1) ICC Statute. 
312 Article 75(6) ICC Statute. 
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supplemental relationship with domestic jurisdictions which would not be the case for 
prosecutions. 
Similarly, the doctrine of reparative complementarity is also manifested through a multi-level 
involvement of states in the ICC reparation framework. The ICC reparations system is composed 
of a five-pronged potential participatory arrangement that seeks to strategically involve 
governments in enforcing reparation orders issued by the court.  
While a general reading of the ICC statute would reveal a limited role of states in reparation 
proceedings, a closer observation of the whole ICC legal regime indicates that governments are 
indeed central to the successful implementation of reparation judgments. According to the Statute 
and Rules of the Court, states could participate in effectuating reparations under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) By commenting on expert reports on reparations.313 The Court is obligated to hear states and 
consider their submissions in its reparation decision.314 
(b) In the implementation of reparation decisions. The ICC is legally empowered to order an 
implementation of reparations orders through national authorities or inter-governmental 
organisations such as the AU, UN, or EU.315 This approach has not been preferred yet with the 
first three reparations decisions (Lubanga, Katanga, and Al-Mahdi) as implementation duties 
have been assigned to the Trust Fund for Victims.316 However, in Al Mahdi, the voluntary 
involvement of UNESCO (a multilateral organization) in rebuilding Timbuktu historical sites 
in Mali was appreciated and recognized by the court.317 
(c) Enforcement of reparation decisions. States have a critical role in facilitating the execution of 
reparation orders at the domestic level.318 That includes monitoring of the defendant’s 
economic situation for forfeiture.319 
 
313 Rule 97(2) of REP. 
314 Article 75(3) ICC Statute. 
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Order (2017) para 138. 
317 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017) para 63. 
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(d) Informational reparations, publicity of reparation proceedings and decisions. The ICC depends 
on national authorities to facilitate outreach activities on reparations sponsored by the ICC320, 
as well as deterrent educational measures regarding the negative implications of past crimes 
for the society.321  
(e) Provision of reparation resources. The first three reparation orders issued by the court will be 
implemented through the TFV that garners its financial resources mainly from states by way 
of voluntary contributions.322 Interestingly, by 2016, the TFV recorded five Western European 
States as major contributors, with zero contribution from conflict states.323 So far, no reparation 
resources have been obtained from the convicted defendants as both have been adjudged 
indigent. 
While reparations judgments have doctrinally held that reparations are conviction-based and 
liability attaches to the perpetrator,324 the state’s participatory regime for reparations explained 
above places the ultimate responsibility for reparations on governments. That buttresses an 
international human rights law precept that states should provide redress for victims when 
defendants are unable or otherwise unwilling to do so.325   
Notwithstanding that convicted persons such as Lubanga, Katanga, and Al-Mahdi have been held 
responsible for reparations for victims of their crimes, the most pragmatic side of reparative justice 
at the ICC indicates that resources will always come from states. That has been the case so far with 
resources of the Trust Fund being expended on redress for victims in situation countries, with little 
or no contribution from the conflict states.  
 
320 Rule 96 of ICC REP; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) paras 51 and 52; Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 
345. 
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2016_ENG_September_Online.pdf (accessed 29th November 2017). 
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324 Al Mahdi Reparation Order (2017) para 50. 
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Thus, the utility impact of ICC sponsored reparation projects on the DRC victims can only be 
maximized if the Court works with the government and civil society organisations in implementing 
reparations, both economic and non-economic redress measures.326 
2.5 Why is Reparative Complementarity Critical for the (DRC) Victims? 
The previous section has provided theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine of reparative 
complementary. This part presents factors that show the need for state-run redress measures for 
the victims by looking at specific legal and factual issues that limit the victims’ participatory base 
and accessibility to redress under the ICC reparation regime. It, thus, advances pragmatic 
justifications as to why domestic reparations are crucial for the victims of atrocious crimes in 
conflict states. It will be shown that reparative complementarity is necessary, since the ICC 
reparation system is limited both regarding the scope and its capacity to deliver. 
2.5.1 Effects of Prosecutorial Discretion in Preferring Charges  
The defendant-centered reparation responsibility under the ICC system means that the scope of 
reparations regarding victims covered will always depend on the scope of charges preferred by the 
Prosecutor.327 The narrower the scope of the preferred charges, the more limited the scope of 
reparations that can be claimed by the victims. Hence, a wider scope of charges representative of 
the largest category of victimization will surely result in a wider category of eligible victims. For 
example, in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber held that the convicted person would not be held 
accountable for reparations to victims of sexual crimes because such crimes were not charged and 
that no sexual harm was proved to stem from the crimes of Lubanga.328  
That trend of placing victims into the eligible and non-eligible divide when it comes to reparations 
will continue since the ICC may never be able to prosecute all the perpetrators of core crimes due 
to jurisdictional principles, resource constraints, and investigative huddles.  
 
326 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Defence Observations on Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/07, 14 May 2015, para 
105; Civil Parties’ Co-Lawyers’ Joint Submissions, Extra Ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 
No.001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, para 44. 
327 Article 75(2) ICC Statute; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) paras 20 and 21; McCarthy C ‘The International 
Criminal Court’s Regime of Victim Redress: Non-punitive Responses to Crimes under the Rome Statute’ in Mulgrew 
R (ed) Research Handbook on the International Penal System (2016) 418. 
328 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment (2015) para 198. 
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Thus, apart from the fact that prosecutorial choices are necessary and understandable on account 
of scarce resources and limited operational and legal capacity of the ICC, the Prosecutorial 
discretion of the Prosecutor will continue to affect victim’s accessibility to redress given that 
victims have no say in the framing of charges.329 Such unintentional discrimination of victims 
stemming from selective charging may re-traumatise the victims, thereby going against the 
principle of ‘do no further harm’ on the part of the ICC.330 
Also, the primary focus (interest) of the Prosecutor is never on the victims but the accused person. 
And neither the ICC nor the victims’ representative has the mandate to dictate the scope of the 
charges preferred by the Prosecutor. 
In a bid to avoid ‘double victimization’ of the victims, the ICC has come up with a solution whose 
implementation is uncertain and therefore unreliable. Considering that sexual crimes were 
committed extensively but they could not be linked to Lubanga charges, and the ensuing conviction 
to warrant reparations by him, the Court has attempted to cure the injustice occasioned to the 
ineligible victims by requesting the Trust Fund to provide some reparations to them by invoking 
its ‘assistance mandate’ powers under Regulation 50(a) of the Trust Fund Regulations.331 
However, such a solution may still not be able to cure the overall injustice experienced by victims 
whose victimisation was not covered by the indictment and judgment.  
The assistance extended to the victims by the Trust Fund is not reparation per se as it is not done 
in response to a court order. The Lubanga case is a painful example of how prosecutorial 
selectivity, whether warranted or unwarranted, can scuttle the victim’s right to a remedy especially 
when the non-litigated ICC crimes represent the largest portion of victimisations in a given 
conflict.332 Sexual crimes were extensively perpetrated in the DRC (Ituri) by both militia groups 
controlled by Lubanga and government forces. 
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2.5.2 Certain Right’s Violations Not Redressable Under ICC Reparations  
Apart from the fact that it would be practically impossible for the ICC to prosecute for all the 
violations in a given situation,333 there are violations of a certain category of rights that, even when 
prosecuted, could not be redressed effectively through conviction-based reparations. For example, 
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights can hardly be remedied under criminal 
prosecution settings through reparation orders against defendants.  
A classic example to this point is the Duch case whereby, in response to the victims’ request for 
reparations relating the provision of social services (education and healthcare), the ECCC held 
that, while it does not have the mandate to grant reparations against the state of Cambodia,334 such 
redress measures would be practically unenforceable against the convicted person.335  
In particular, the court stated that: “although victim needs in these areas are undisputed, they are 
inherently incapable of satisfaction through an order against the Accused, and the requests in their 
current form cannot provide the basis of enforceable orders against KAING Guek Eav”.336 
Furthermore, international criminal justice and even post conflict justice in most transitions have 
paid little or no attention to war crimes relating to socio-economic and cultural rights.337 For 
example, until now, Al Mahdi is the only conviction for destruction of cultural property at the 
ICC.338 That may not necessarily entail that crimes against cultural properties have not been 
committed in other situation under investigation at the ICC. 
The empirical evidence from the ICC’s work proves that crimes against property are less 
prosecuted compared to crimes against persons.339 While crimes against people are graver than 
those perpetrated against property,340 the non-prosecution of the latter for whatever reasons 
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presents a disadvantage to the victims at the time of reparation claims. For example, until now, 
Katanga is the only case at the ICC with a conviction for the war crime of pillaging.341  
As for Al Mahdi, which is also at the reparations stage, the Malian government has joined forces 
with UNESCO to rebuild the Timbuktu mausoleums and historic monuments that were destroyed 
during the war.342 The reparative actions of the government of Mali reflect the essence of reparative 
complementarity, domestic redress activities that should be undertaken in advance of, or in parallel 
with, the ICC justice efforts. 
2.5.3 State’s Guarantees of Non-Repetition Impossible Under Criminal Reparations 
Some categories of reparations, as understood under international human rights law, such as 
‘guarantees of non-repetition’,343 may not be available from the Court orders of a Criminal Court 
such as the ICC. None of the existing or past international criminal tribunals has had the mandate 
of granting reparations against states.  
Guarantees of non-recurrence are preventative and forward looking post-violation measures that 
seek to reform institutions of governance, security forces, and oppressive laws to clamp down 
avenues for continued or repetitive violations. The UN Human Rights Committee has held that the 
state’s obligation to institute preventative reparation measures against repetitive violations of 
rights is central to the victim’s right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR.344 
Unlike the ICC reparations that are essentially victim-centered, post-conflict interventionist 
reparation measures in the form of ‘guarantees of non-repetition’ are not necessarily victim-
specific or injury-responsive but focus on the society as a whole.345 Legislative reforms are one 
dimension of such reparations. Human rights courts like the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and human rights observatory bodies like the UN Human Rights Committee have, on 
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several occasions, directed states to enact laws to ensure effective redress for violations and to 
prevent further abuse of people’s rights.346 However, the ICC has no jurisdiction over states on 
matters reparation and therefore it may not be legally tenable for it to order such measures against 
states.  
Thus, it is submitted that, under domestic reparation schemes, states could be able to complement 
victim-focused reparations ordered by the ICC through institutional and legal reforms that focus 
on the community as a whole. Even in the absence of violations reaching the level of ICC crimes, 
governments have an obligation under human rights law to ensure that there is a clear and an 
enforceable legal framework for the people to enjoy human rights.  
In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that:  
The second obligation of the States Parties is to ‘ensure’ the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by 
the Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties 
to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.347  
However, such an obligation becomes more critical in post-conflict times when there is an urgent 
need for redress for the victims. Victims in conflict societies place significant importance on both 
economic and non-economic reparations, with the latter encompassing operational, legal, and 
structural changes to public institutions to make them friendly to human rights. One good example 
for such a proposition is the Kenyan Truth Commission in which a significant majority of victims 
who recorded statements with the Commission opined that “legal and institutional reforms” be part 
of reparations at the national level.348 
 2.5.4 Certain Reparations Require State Intervention for Successful Implementation 
There are certain types of reparations that, given their nature and implementation requirements, 
could not be operationalised through court orders against defendants. Such redress measures 
include ‘satisfaction’, a blanket term for non-economic reparations such as public memorials, 
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searches for the disappeared, exhumations, commemorations for the victims, as well as state 
apologies.349  
Despite being symbolic and non-compensatory, such redress undertakings may require significant 
financing and administrative logistics that may never be met by indigent defendants and, in 
consequence of that, courts may not grant them for lack of enforceability.350  
Exemplary to this scenario is the Duch case in which victims asked for a public commemoration 
day and an official state apology as reparations. Despite acknowledging that the requested 
reparations would relieve the moral harm collectively suffered by the victims, the ECCC did not 
grant them for being unenforceable against the defendant and for being within ‘state 
prerogatives’.351 
That exemplifies the fact that many reparation requests of the victims could be rejected by 
international criminal tribunals not because of being unimportant, but for lack of enforceability.352 
As noted by the ECCC, courts are keen to avoid unenforceable orders as they would undermine 
judicial authoritativeness and frustrate the victims.353 
Therefore, victim’s reparations request that, although valid and appropriate, seek to bind 
governments will always be rejected by international criminal courts or tribunals for lack of 
jurisdiction, as we have seen with the ECCC.354  
For example, in response to a request for state apology, the Supreme Court Chamber of the Extra 
Ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia held that, “while government apology or 
acknowledgment of responsibility is an internationally practiced form of reparation, it cannot be 
ordered within the ECCC legal framework”.355 However, when victims’ redress requests do not 
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seek to bind governments directly, courts could be prepared to issue non-binding reparation orders 
encouraging governments and other third-parties to participate in their enforcement.356 
2.5.5 Conviction-Based Reparations Limit Benefits for the Victims 
Acquittals are bad news for the victims as they would be unable to claim reparations from the 
defendants. There will not be ICC reparations for victims of Ngudjolo Chui crimes as he was 
acquitted by the court,357 even though egregious crimes were perpetrated in Bogoro (Ituri-DRC).358 
A crucial legal point here is that when an individual is acquitted of particular charges, it only means 
that the Prosecutor has failed to prove charges in accordance with the required evidentiary 
threshold, i.e. ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.359 Factually, it does not necessarily imply that crimes 
were not committed.360  
That is why, in Ngudjolo’s acquittal decision and Katanga’s conviction decision, the Court 
reasoned that, “…finding an accused person not guilty does not necessarily mean that the Chamber 
considers him or her to be innocent. Such a finding merely demonstrates that the evidence 
presented in support of the accused’s guilt has not satisfied the Chamber “beyond reasonable 
doubt”.”361 
Owing to the distinctive nature of penal and reparation proceedings at the ICC,362 an argument has 
been fronted that an acquittal should not be used as a roadblock to victim’s reparation claims since 
a completely different standard of proof and mode of liability applies to reparation claims.363 
Although the ICC Statute does not provide for the standard of proof for reparations, the 
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jurisprudence of the court is unanimous that a standard lesser to that of criminal trials should be 
used.364 Going by the required nexus between the harm suffered and crimes proved in court, it 
becomes clear that some victims who participated in the trial may not participate in reparation 
cases if their claims relate to an injury or loss caused by unproved crimes.365 That is a limitation 
of the ICC reparation system. 
However, victim’s ineligibility for reparations on account of acquittals could be a great injustice 
to a certain category of victims considering that the unproved crimes may at times represent the 
largest category of victimisation in a given situation. In the Congo situation, sexual and gender-
based crimes were extensively perpetrated366 and millions of victims have not been redressed until 
now.  
However, due to the Prosecutor’s failure to meet the evidentiary standards and legal technicalities, 
both Lubanga and Katanga were acquitted of such egregious crimes.367 In Katanga, the court only 
convicted him of murder, pillaging, and destruction of property as crimes against humanity and 
war crimes despite there being massive evidence of sexual violence committed by his Ngiti militia 
group.368  
The court could not criminally impute such crimes on Katanga, who was held responsible for 
accessoryship perpetration under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute.369 While it is factually 
undisputed that sexual crimes were committed, the court could not legally establish that Katanga 
had operational control over the group (Ngiti militia) that perpetrated such crimes370 and the 
‘common purpose’ element could not be established on the part of the perpetrator soldiers.371 
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2.5.6 Impossible to Identify All Eligible Victims at the ICC 
Owing to procedural technicalities and the distance between situation victims and the ICC, it may 
not be feasible to promptly identify all the eligible victims for reparation purposes. That is why 
only a few hundreds have managed to formally participate in the ICC proceedings and eventually 
apply for reparations despite the fact that the Congo situation has produced millions of victims.  
In Al Mahdi, the court noted that: “the number of applications received in the present case pales in 
comparison to the number of persons who were in fact harmed”.372 Thus, in atrocity crime 
prosecutions, it is virtually impossible to identify the actual number of victims successfully.373 
That underscores the significance of reparative complementarity as it would be possible to identify 
potential victims through less bureaucratic and non-judicial state administrative reparation 
programmes. 
2.5.7 Longevity of Prosecutions Necessitates Prompt Interventions for the Victims  
The longevity of ICC prosecutions negatively affects a timely delivery of reparations to the victims 
as required under international human rights law.374 As reparations should await convictions, 
empirical evidence indicates that victims will have to wait for many years to receive redress from 
the ICC. Apart from protracted criminal proceedings, ICC reparation proceedings have also been 
lengthy. For example, in Lubanga and Katanga, victims obtained final reparation orders five and 
three years respectively after the conviction decision.375 That runs counter to the insistence of 
prompt reparations in the Court’s reparation judgments.376 Trials of Lubanga, Katanga, Chui, and 
Bemba have lasted eight, seven, four, and eight years respectively.377  
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Specifically, Lubanga was arraigned on 26 January 2009, convicted on 14 March 2012, and a final 
reparations order against him was handed down on 3 March 2015 (9 years after his arrest).378 At 
the time of writing, victims of Lubanga crimes are yet to receive court-ordered reparations for 
crimes committed fifteen years ago. The same applies to Bemba who was convicted on 21 March 
2016, six years after the trial began on 22 November 2010.379 However, on 8th June 2018, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC acquitted Bemba of all the charges.380 
Al Mahdi is the only case at the ICC that lasted two years. He was surrendered to the ICC on 26 
September 2015, his trial began on 22 August 2016, and a reparation decision against him was 
handed down on 17 August 2017.381 And that could be attributed to the fact that, for the first time 
in the history of the ICC,382 Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the ‘war crime of attacking protected 
objects’,383 thereby enabling a speedier conclusion of the case.384  
Therefore, international trials may never be shorter due to the complex nature of their 
investigations and prosecutions. That justifies the need for pro-active redress measures by conflict 
states to ensure that reparations are delivered to the victims in good time.385  
2.5.8 Temporal Limitations of Defendant-Focused Reparations  
The ICC’s temporal jurisdiction is limited to post 2002 crimes386, since the ICC Statute became 
operational on 1st July 2002.387 Consequently, in the absence of state reparations, millions of 
victims of pre 2002 atrocity crimes may not be eligible for ICC reparations on account of 
 
378 Lubanga Case Information Sheet. 
379 Bemba Case Information Sheet. 
380 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against 
Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, at page 4. 
381 Al Mahdi Case Information Sheet available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/Al-MahdiEng.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2017). 
382 Al Mahdi Sentence Decision (2016), para 21. 
383 Al Mahdi Sentence Decision (2016), para 7. 
384 Al Mahdi Sentence Decision (2016), para 28. 
385 Puttick M and Sandoval C ‘Reparations for the Victims of the Conflict in Iraq: Lessons Learned from Comparative 
Practice’ (2017) , pages 15-16, available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a1812b44.pdf (accessed 5 December 
2017). 
386 Article 11(1) ICC Statute. 
387 Katanga Article 74 Judgment (2014) para 14. 
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jurisdictional limitations.388 Furthermore, even for the post 2002 international crimes, the ICC may 
never be able to prosecute for all the egregious violations in a given situation as that would 
contradict its complementarity regime.389 The ICC is supposed to function, not as a first instance 
Court for core crimes prosecutions, but as a complementary mechanism to domestic 
prosecutions.390 
2.6 Chapter Conclusion 
The chapter has provided a synopsis of transitional justice in the DRC to determine where the 
country stands as regards reparative justice for the victims. As demonstrated, reparative 
complementarity is desirable to seal the gaps, both legal and factual, of the ICC reparation regime. 
Post conflict justice in the DRC has been unsuccessful in providing substantive justice to the 
victims. Prosecutions have been fewer, inconsequential, and unproportionate to the gravity of 
crimes. Furthermore, the domestic reparations regime is not up to the standards recognised under 
international law. Reparations judgments have been unenforceable in the DRC and that trend is 
unlikely to change in the near future. 
Human rights standards demand that victims receive effective and prompt reparations. There is an 
urgent need for the DRC to act for the victims effectively as required under international law. 
Victim’s wounds and losses have remained un-redressed for nearly thirty years now. That is a 
violation of an internationally recognised right to a remedy, inclusive of which is a right to prompt 
reparations.  
Noting the potentially chronic limitations of the ICC reparation system described hereinabove, it 
is submitted that ICC reparations judgments must be fully implemented by states under the guise 
of ‘reparative complementarity’. Implementation of human rights (reparations) is not satisfied 
through laws and judgments alone. Human rights are fully implemented through laws as well as 
 
388  The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga , Queen's University Belfast's Human Rights Centre (HRC) and University 
of Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) Submission on Reparations Issues pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 14/05/2015, para 72. 
389 Article 17 of the ICC Statute; ICC Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (2016) at para 5; Kemp G 
‘The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Africa’ in Werle G et al Africa and the International Criminal Court 
(2014) 62; Novak A The International Criminal Court: An Introduction (2015) 54. 
390 Bassiouni MC ‘The Permanent International Criminal Court’ in Lattimer M and Sands P (eds) Justice for Crimes 
against Humanity (2003) 181. 
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an operational delivery of particular rights. It is now time for states to operationalise the right to 
reparations by delivering meaningful reparations to the victims. 
As noted, both the ICC and the ECCC have rejected victim’s redress demands, not for being 
inappropriate or unjustified, but because they are incapable of being enforced against defendants. 
In addition, owing to jurisdictional demands, international criminal courts and tribunals are unable 
to shift the enforcement obligation of reparation orders from convicted defendants to governments.  
It is therefore argued that the only viable solution to such huddles could be state-led administrative 
reparations or reparations by the international community and NGOs. The ECCC has come to a 
similar conclusion. In the Duch case, the Supreme Court Chamber noted that: 
The Supreme Court Chamber recognises the suffering of the victims as well as their right to obtain effective 
forms of reparation under internationally established standards. It further notes that the Civil Party 
Appellants, and CPG2 in particular, have advanced numerous requests that represent, in general terms, 
appropriate forms of reparation for the harm suffered (for instance, the provision of medical and 
psychological treatment for direct and indirect victims, naming public buildings after victims and installation 
of informative plaques, holding commemorative ceremonies, and erection of memorials such as pagodas, 
pagoda fences and monuments). Nevertheless, due to the constraints stemming from the ECCC reparation 
framework as outlined above, these specific requests cannot be granted. Considering that several requests 
have been rejected also on the basis of KAING Guek Eav’s indigence, and while appreciating that some of 
them have been adequately specified, the Supreme Court Chamber encourages national authorities, the 
international community, and other potential donors to provide financial and other forms of support to 
develop and implement these appropriate forms of reparation.391 
Why should victims bear the burden of the defendants’ indigence? It appears that indigence is 
becoming a chronic disease for the international criminal court’s reparations. The impact of 
indigence is already felt by the victims as most of their reparations requests are rejected by the 
Courts for being prone to unenforceability. 
As a consequence, the prevailing reparations discourse at the ICC and the ECCC are dominated 
by the language of possibilities and not entitlements. When solving the reparations puzzle, the 
courts do not look at ‘what is needed’ for the victims as their only concern is ‘what is possible’ for 
the victims. For example, in assessing reparations awards to victims, the ICC has been using words 
like “to the extent achievable”.392 The indigence of defendants tends to scuttle victims reparative 
‘entitlements’ by opting for what can possibly be done resource wise. 
 
391 Duch Appeal Judgment, Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC, para 717. 
392 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017) para 28; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) paras 68 and 71. 
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To ensure an effective operationalisation of reparations for atrocity crime victims, there is a need 
for the courts and other justice actors to move from ‘what is possible’ to ‘what is needed’. That 
can only be done through effective reparative justice mechanisms at the domestic level. 
Importantly, for a country like DRC where crimes took place decades ago, prosecutions may not 
be feasible at this juncture.  
Truth and reparative justice could serve the victims better. Therefore, it is proposed that the DRC 
should establish a new truth commission to provide a clear and credible record of past crimes. 
Additionally, the government should establish administrative reparation programmes covering as 
many victims as possible and representative of the largest category of victimisation such as sexual 














LEGAL MECHANICS OF VICTIM’S ROLE IN THE ICC: TOKENISTIC OR 
SUBSTANTIVE PARTICIPATION? 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The chapter seeks to provide a descriptive and critical analysis of the legal regime applicable to 
the participation of victims in the proceedings at the ICC. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals created in 
the 1990s to prosecute and punish perpetrators of core crimes under international law, 393 the ICC 
offers an unprecedented394 opportunity for victims to participate in its proceedings.395  
The ICC legal framework seeks to transform victims from mere trial witnesses to participants 
capable of tendering evidence, questioning witnesses, and making submissions on factual and legal 
issues arising in a case. Securing such a unique position for the involvement of victims in the 
administration of international criminal justice has been lauded as a major development of public 
international law.396  
The ICC Statute captures the aspirations and wishes of the international community by committing 
to providing justice to victims of atrocity crimes by ensuring that their voices are heard in the 
proceedings. Article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute requires that victims should be allowed to state their 
 
393 Pena and Carayon (2013) 519; Garkawe S ‘Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues’ 
(2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 345–46; ‘Victims’ Rights before the ICC: The Evolution of Victim’s 
Access to Justice’ (2005) FIDH, at page 2 and 24, available at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/4-CH-I_Background.pdf 
(accessed 16 January 2017). 
394 Gillett M ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 16 Australian Law Journal 30. 
395 ‘Victim Participation before the International Criminal Court’, War Crimes Research Office (American University 
Washington College of Law) 2007, pages 8 - 14. Available at 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/documents/12-2007_Victim_Participation_Before_the_ICC.pdf (accessed 
12 January 2017). 
396 Haslam E ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?’ in 
McGoldrick et al (eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (2004) 315; Pena M et 
al (2013) 519 and 521; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Public Redacted Version Prosecution's 
Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0106/06 to a/0110/06, a/0128/06 to 
a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to 
a/0250/06, para 6, ICC-01/04, 25 June 2007. 
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‘views and concerns’ at various stages of Court proceedings whenever their ‘personal interests’ 
are at stake.  
Thus, victims of atrocity crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC have a legal right to participate 
in the proceedings.397 Judge Blattmann has rightly stated that “victim’s participation is not a 
concession of the Bench, but rather a right accorded to victims by the Statute”.398 According to the 
jurisprudence of the ICC, there are some specific procedural rights accorded to victims by law (ex 
lege rights),399 in addition to rights which could be granted to them by the court either proprio 
motu or upon an application through legal representatives for victims.400 Thus, one could aptly 
opine that there are two categories of victim’s participatory rights at the ICC: first, ex lege rights, 
and secondly, court-granted rights under Article 68 (3). 
However, despite the mandatory language under Article 68(3) that victims shall be allowed to 
participate in court proceedings whenever their interests are affected, the law is silent on the 
modalities of such participation. The said provision reads:  
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to 
be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a 
manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court 
considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
It is left to the Judges of the ICC to determine the time, manner, and extent of the victim’s 
participatory rights at various stages of court proceedings.401  
In 16 years since the Court became operational in 2002, various Judges have interpreted Article 
68 (3) differently, giving rise to inconsistent and unpredictable legal framework on victim’s 
participation at the ICC. The Assembly of States Parties (the ASP) has rightly opined that the ICC 
 
397 Article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute:  
398 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rene Blattman, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1119, 18 January 2008, para 13. 
399 Such rights could be found under Articles: 15 (3), 19(3), 75(3), and 82 (4) ICC Statute; See also Rules 72(2) and 
119(3) of ICC REP. 
400 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and 
in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06, 15 January 2014, para 81; The Prosecutor V. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta And Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of 
Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/09-02/11, 26 August 2011, paras 98 – 99.  
401 Haslam (2004) 323; Pena M et al ‘Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation’ (2013) 520. 
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victim’s participation regime needs to be harmonised to become predictable and efficient.402 
Currently, the ICC is seized with 26 cases which are on different stages and ten situations.403  
Until now, the Court has generally granted the victims various participatory rights including the 
right to: make oral and written submissions; access case records; tender evidence; challenge 
relevance or admissibility of evidence; present views and concerns; participate in appeals; examine 
witnesses and attend public and private hearings.  
Although victim’s participatory rights are somehow homogenous in various cases at the ICC, there 
are substantive and procedural variations regarding the scope and manner of exercise of such rights 
in different cases. As we shall see at a later stage, some Judges have unreasonably limited victim’s 
participatory rights while others have been liberal enough to interpret the law in light of Article 21 
(3) of the ICC Statute that requires consideration of human rights.  
While both schools of thought could be right in their interpretation approaches, Judges are 
required, under Article 68(3), to ensure that qualified victims are given the chance to participate 
and that such participation must not affect fair trial principles (impartiality and expeditiousness) 
as well as rights of the accused. It could happen that balancing the two conflicting but important 
requirements under Article 68 (3) may affect both the accused and the victims either positively or 
negatively. More to that, some Judges have called for strict adherence to fair trial principles in 
determining the scope of participation rights accorded to victims. For example, Judge Blattmann 
has argued that the ICC should not allow victim’s participatory rights to overshadow accused’s 
right to a fair and an impartial trial.404 
 Ultimately, the level of victim’s participation at the ICC will depend on a Judge’s interpretation 
of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence considering the need to strike a balance 
between victim’s right to participate and accused’s right to fair trial. In my opinion, the test to be 
applicable in granting or refusing to grant certain participatory rights to victims should be that 
 
402 Report of the Bureau on Victims and Affected Communities, Trust Fund for Victims and Reparations (2014), ICC-
ASP/13/32, page 5. Available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-32-ENG.pdf (accessed 
13 January 2017). 
403 See information on ICC cases and Situations available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx  (accessed 10 
October 2018). 
404 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rene Blattman, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1119, 18 January 2008, para 30 at page 59. 
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participatory rights could be restricted or refused only when the restrictions or refusals are 
imperatively justified by:  
(a) The need to prevent prejudice to or inconsistency with, the rights of accused persons; and 
(b) The need to guard against the unfair and impartial trial. 
 
Most importantly, Article 68(3) and other provisions of the ICC Statute must neither be interpreted 
to favour victims nor curtail rights of both the victims and the accused person. The said article 
should be interpreted and applied in accordance with human rights norms recognised under 
international law.405 That is the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC.406  
To be on the safe side, the ICC must not employ restrictive interpretative methods that are likely 
to render Article 68(3) less useful to the victims in their quest for truth, justice, and reparations. 
As stated by Judge Wyngaert, the ICC must always and in all circumstances whether normal, 
exceptional or unprecedented, apply and interpret the law according to international human rights 
norms.407 Applying human rights norms to the victims would likely result in real, meaningful and 
results-oriented participation. Victims should be capable of achieving substantive judicial results 
as opposed to merely symbolic achievements. 
Admittedly, the ICC has a noble but arduous task of ensuring that victims of atrocity crimes are 
accorded meaningful and effective participatory rights as opposed to tokenistic participation that 
does not promote and secure their internationally recognised human rights to truth, justice, and 
reparation. For participation to be substantive and not tokenistic, it is submitted that the victim’s 
participation policy at the ICC needs to embrace the following human rights norms (referred to as 
principles of substantive participation): 
 
405 Article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute; Bemba Article 74 Judgment, para 82; The Prosecutor V. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 
December 2006, para 36. 
406 The Prosecutor V. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled "Decision on application for interim release, ICC-01/05-01/08 OA, 16 
December 2008, para 28. 
407 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Dissenting opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3405-Anx, 01 October 2013, para 20 at page 12. 
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(a) The principle of non-revictimisation of victims in the course of legal and administrative 
procedures designed to provide relief to victims.408 
(b) The principle of equal and effective access to justice.409 
(c) The principle of access to information enabling victims to pursue justice in the Court 
effectively.410    
Therefore, this chapter provides a critical analysis of the ICC legal regime for victims to determine 
its compatibility with the principles above. It focuses on the victim’s role in the investigation, pre-
trial confirmation hearings, trial, sentencing, and the reparation’s stage. An opinion as to whether 
the ICC policy on victim’s participation is tokenistic or substantive is made considering an analysis 
of the court’s jurisprudence and legal texts against ‘the principles of substantive participation’ and 
the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts. 
3.2 Article 68 (3): Requirements for Participation and Related Issues 
Article 68(3) provides a legal basis for participation of victims at various stages of proceedings at 
the ICC. Apart from stating that participation should be granted upon fulfilment of certain 
conditions, the article is not a substantive provision in the sense of conferring specific rights on 
victims. It is just an enabling provision allowing ICC Judges to create or prescribe participation 
rights for the victims.  
As earlier alluded to, the scale of involvement of victims at the ICC depends on the discretion of 
Judges. It is for the Judges to determine the extent to which victims can go in their quest for justice. 
Since participation rights are not pre-determined by the law, there is a need for taking a liberal 
approach to interpreting Article 68(3) to make it responsive to the aspirations of victims. As stated 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Situation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, victim’s 
participation is crucial in the fight against impunity.411 
 
408 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para 10. For the purpose of this chapter, I refer to them as “principles of 
substantive participation”. 
409 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, A/RES/60/147, para 11 (a). 
410 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, A/RES/60/147, para 11 (c). 
411 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings 
of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6; ICC – 01/04, 17 January 2006. 
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The law on victim participation at the ICC requires that victims whose personal interests are likely 
to be affected should be allowed to intervene by presenting their views and concerns in court 
proceedings if such involvement doesn’t scupper rights of the accused and fair trial principles. 
Since core crimes tend to produce millions of victims, the ICC Statute envisages that participation 
of victims could be effected through legal representatives.412 As victim participation hinges upon 
a judicial decision, let us now turn to a discussion on the ICC jurisprudence on the acquisition of 
victim status. 
 3.2.1 Acquisition of a Victim Status at the ICC: Who is a Victim? 
The ICC Statute does not contain a definition of the term ‘victim’.413 However, Rule 85 of the 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure provides:  
(a) “Victims” means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;  
(b) Victims may include organisations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any 
of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable 
purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
For a person to qualify and participate as a victim at the ICC, their application must be assessed in 
light of the provisions of Article 68(3), Rule 85 (defining a victim), and Rule 89 (procedure for 
submission and handling of victim’s applications).   
Reading Article 68(3), one must prove that there are personal interests at stake in certain 
proceedings at the ICC and the Court, once satisfied of that, must ensure that participation is 
appropriate in accordance with fair trial principles and respect for rights of the accused. Therefore, 
victim participation process at the ICC begins at Rule 89(1) whereby a person who wishes to 
participate in the proceedings must hand in a written application to Registrar.414  
 
412 Article 68(3) ICC Statute. 
413 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, 13 June 2007, para 13. 
414 Rule 89(1) of the ICC REP; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims Participation in Trial 
Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para 22; Lubanga Article 74 Judgment, para 14(iii) at page 16. 
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Two mandatory conditions must be fulfilled before a person can be admitted as a victim at the 
ICC. First, proof of victimhood as per Rule 85415 and secondly, the presence of personal interests 
that are affected or likely to be affected by certain proceedings.416 The court may, either proprio 
motu or upon being moved by the parties, reject a person’s application to participate in the 
proceedings if the criteria under Article 68(3) and Rule 85 have not been met.417 
Generally, all chambers of the ICC have been unanimous as to the basic criteria for participation 
of victims at the ICC. Persons who seek participation in the trial have been required to show that:418 
(a) They are natural or legal persons (institutions or organisations); 
(b) They have suffered harm stemming from a crime under the ICC Statute; 
(c) The harm suffered relates to an incident that is part of the charges; and 
(d) There is a nexus between the harm suffered and crimes charged. 
 
For the purpose of proving identity, victims have been allowed to file both official and unofficial 
documents ranging from passports, marriage and birth certificates, driver’s licence, voter cards, to 
political membership cards, school records, baptism certificates, letters from local authorities, 
health records, and testimonies signed by two credible persons.419  
The ICC has been flexible enough in allowing victims to file whatever document they could find 
to prove their identity because obtaining official papers could be difficult if not impossible in 
conflict countries.420 The court will then assess the information supplied by victims to determine 
whether they have met conditions enumerated above. As the ICC Statute is silent on the standard 
 
415 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, 
para 42. 
416 The Prosecutor V. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 61; 
Lubanga Article 74 Judgment, para 14(v) at page 17. 
417 Rule 89(2) of the ICC REP. 
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of proof applicable to victim applications,421 the chambers of the court have unanimously decided 
that such an assessment is only to be done based on the prima facie evidentiary standard.422 
3.2.2 The Requirement of Nexus Between Harm and Charges 
‘Harm’ is not defined in the ICC Statute. The earliest decision on victim participation at the ICC 
in the Lubanga case made use of Article 21(3) by invoking the UN Basic Principles on Reparations 
to define the term harm.423 The Trial Chamber I used principle 8 of the UN Basic Principles on 
Reparations to hold that: … “a victim may suffer, either individually or collectively, from harm in 
a variety of different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss 
or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights”. 
Furthermore, since Rule 85(a) does not require individuals to suffer direct harm from crimes as 
opposed to legal persons, the Trial Chamber I ruled that victims could be both direct or indirect 
victims.424  
On nexus between harm and charges, the Court stated that the involvement of victims in 
proceedings at the ICC should not be restricted to the charges since no such limitation is harboured 
under Rule 85(a).425 The reasoning behind that finding of the Court was that Rule 85 only requires 
that harm suffered be a result of a crime under the ICC Statute which is to be conceptualised based 
on jurisdictional and legal limitations under Articles 5, 11, and 12.426 However, in deciding on the 
participation of victims in the Lubanga trial, the Trial Chamber I reasoned that it would not be 
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‘meaningful participation’ or ‘in the interests of justice’ if victims whose harm and interests are 
unrelated to charges facing Lubanga were allowed to participate.427  
Since the production of evidence and examination of factual and legal issues in Court depend on 
the scope of charges, interests of victims whose harm is unrelated to the charges may not be 
relevant to the case, rendering participation meaningless. Two issues may arise from the reasoning 
and determination of the Court regarding participation.  
First, the general participation of victims at the situation stage could happen without one having 
to prove a connection between harm and charges.428 Secondly, when investigations of a situation 
result in formal charges for individuals most responsible for the commission of crimes, the case 
narrows down to particular individuals, events, and incidents which in turn affects a wider 
participatory base for victims otherwise available at the situation stage. Thus, the participation of 
‘situation victims’ becomes limited and necessarily aligned to charges which have a side-effect of 
locking out victims whose harm and interests are irrelevant to such charges.   
Judge Blattmann dissents from the majority, believing that participation of victims at the ICC 
should always be aligned to cases since the Court’s jurisdiction is to be found based on cases 
brought before it as per Article 19.429 The Judge rejects the general scope employed by the majority 
in extending the status of victim to persons who can prove that they suffered harm from a crime 
under international law. For him, competency of the Court (jurisdictional scope) should serve as a 
founding criterion in deciding on the status of persons seeking participation as victims at the 
ICC.430 That, if jurisdictional limits under Article 19 are not adhered to, then there is a danger of 
extending the status of victim to persons unrelated to the situation or case.431  
 
427 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, ICC‐01/04‐01/06‐1119 para 95 at 
page 30. 
428 At the situation stage, the prosecutor conducts investigations in a particular country and makes decisions on who 
are most responsible for the perpetration of ICC crimes. Thus, assuming that victims could be allowed to participate 
at the investigation stage, there would be no need to require that their harms should have nexus to specific crimes 
since the charges are yet to be framed. 
429 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge René Blattmann, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 7 at page 51. 
430 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge René Blattmann, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 8 at page 52. 
431 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge René Blattmann, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 9 at page 52. 
81 
 
It is submitted that Judge Blattmann’s dissenting opinion is overly critical of the majority decision. 
While it is crucial to note here that the Trial Chamber did not allow participation of victims 
unrelated to situation or charges, it nonetheless argued that the ICC statute does not have a 
provision that restricts participation to charges only. As Judge Pikis stated, the meaning of victims 
under Rule 85 covers all persons who suffer harm from a crime under the ICC Statute.432  However, 
in the interests of justice and for the purpose of achieving efficiency on the part of victims seeking 
to participate, only those who suffered harm related to charges could participate. 
The Decision of the Trial Chamber was appealed to the Appeals Chamber of the ICC by the 
Prosecutor and Defence. One of the issues that came up in the appeal was whether the ICC Statute 
and Rule 85 restrict the participation of victims to charges only. The Appeals Chamber, siding 
with the Trial Chamber, acknowledged that neither the statute nor Rule 85 restrict the participation 
of victims to crimes charged.433  
However, the Appeals Chamber indicated that Rule 85 should be interpreted by contextualising 
other provisions that operationalise the involvement of victims at the ICC. Using Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, in particular,  “the object and purpose principle” 
of interpretation, the chamber reasoned that the combined effect of Article 68(3) and Rule 89(1) is 
to restrict participation to charges.434 As participation under Article 68(3) is dependent upon the 
existence of personal interests on top of proving victimhood, an application to participate in a trial 
under Rule 89(1) may require demonstration of personal interests touching on charges under 
consideration.435  
The purpose of a trial is to assess the evidence and apply the law to determine culpability. How 
can one be able to objectively show that their interests are affected by a certain criminal trial if 
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harm suffered is unrelated to charges? And for sake of judicial economy and protection of victims, 
those with irrelevant interests should not be allowed to participate.  
One may be inclined to subscribe to the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber on the necessity of 
proving a nexus between harm and charges for participating victims. The Trial Chamber strictly 
interpreted Rule 85 in neglect of other provisions of the statute and the rules. Rule 85 is not a 
rights-giving provision, it only defines the term ‘victim’. For operationalisation of Article 68(3), a 
rights-giving provision, one should submit an application under Rule 89(1) which requires a 
connection between harm, personal interests, and charges. 
3.2.3 Personal Interests – What are They? 
As stated above, the ICC Statute places a special emphasis on proof of personal interests for 
victims seeking participation at various stages of Court proceedings. Arguably, it is a requirement 
aimed at weeding out potential victims who may have interests that are foreign to cases before it. 
However, neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for a definition of 
the term ‘personal interests’. 
 One may have to look through the Court’s jurisprudence to determine what those interests could 
be. Victims of crimes under international law may not have homogenous interests as their needs 
and concerns could be different. Core crimes tend to cause devastating destructions of all kinds 
ranging from personal, social, cultural, economic, institutional, and political harm. Thus, given 
that various interests of people could be ruined by gross violations of human rights and considering 
that human needs differ on account of age, gender, and culture, it is natural that a vast majority of 
those interests may not be protected by a court of law, especially a criminal court.  
The ICC, being an international criminal court with limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction, 
may not be able to afford juridical protection for ‘all the interests’ which could be important to the 
victims. The court’s primary duty is to determine the culpability of persons alleged to be 
responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. The legal 
formalities applicable to a criminal trial and the unavoidable focus on relevant evidence and facts 
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may not create a room for protection of a wider category of interests that are unrelated to the 
evidence and facts under consideration.436  
Ideally, most of the interests related to the social, economic, and cultural life of victims may not 
be amenable to protections envisaged under Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute. For victim’s interests 
to be afforded protection under Article 68(3), it must be a specific interest related to issues before 
the Court in a particular case.437 The Court has rejected as ‘general and insufficient’ for one to ask 
for participation just because they have an interest in the outcome of trial or proceedings.438 
According to Judge Pikis, the legitimacy of victim participation is derived from having personal 
interests that are affected in a particular stage of the proceedings.439 
Haslam argues that victims need to prove the existence of “judicially recognisable personal 
interest” to participate.440 The Prosecutor of the ICC, echoing Haslam, has also argued that the 
involvement of victims at the ICC cannot be based on blanket personal interests that have no 
bearing on issues under consideration by the court.441 Expectedly, the Prosecutor does not 
specifically provide information on what those interests could be. One may not be able to provide 
a conclusive definition of what constitutes ‘personal interests’ given that victims have multiple 
interests dependent on their social, political, cultural, economic, and psychological status, as well 
as the nature of victimisation.  
Similarly, victim’s interests could necessarily hinge on a particular stage of proceedings and 
factual or legal issues under consideration. Aptly, it could be stated that there is no ‘one size fits 
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Pikis, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 17 at page 42. 
440 Haslam (2004) 326. 
441 Situation in Uganda, Prosecution’s Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants 
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to a/0250/06, ICC-01/04, 25 June 2007, para 19. 
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all’ definition of a victim’s interests. As the ICC is mandatorily required to base its judgment on 
the evidence adduced before it,442 one could argue that victim’s interests (whatever they are) must 
relate to the evidence or issues under scrutiny by the Court.443 One crucial point must be 
underscored here. For victim’s views and concerns to be judicially considered, they must get to 
the Judges in the form of evidence.     
So, what could constitute personal interests under the ICC Statute? From the discussion above, the 
victim’s personal interests must be those which could be justiciable under the ICC Statute or 
international human rights law. Such interests can only be amenable to judicial protection if they 
are recognised by the Statute or international (human rights) law.  
In a decision of the Appeals Chamber concerning a victim’s application to participate in an appeal, 
Judge Sang-Hyun Song has suggested that victim’s personal interests may qualify for protection 
by the ICC only if such interests are recognised by the ICC Statute or international human rights 
jurisprudence.444  Similarly, Judge Pikis, in his dissenting opinion over a decision by the Appeals 
Chamber on victims in the Kony case, has stated that “interests are defined by reference to the 
rights and obligations of a victim”.445  
As neither the ICC Statute nor international law contains an exhaustive and conclusive description 
of such interests, it is left to judicial adjudication to determine what those interests are. From 
various decisions of the ICC, the following ‘interests’ have been discerned to be relevant for the 
victims: 
(a) An interest in having charges that are reflective of the harm suffered by victims;446 
 
442 Article 74(2) of the ICC Statute. 
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85 
 
(b) An interest in being protected and supported in exercising their role in the proceedings;447 
(c)  An interest in receiving reparations;448 
(d) An interest in achieving justice by the prosecution of perpetrators;449 
(e) An interest in asserting their dignity and seeking recognition as victims;450 
(f) An interest in the determination of the truth regarding violations and harm suffered;451 and 
(g) An interest in ensuring that evidence on their harm is not neglected.452 
It must be clearly stated that the right to reparation is a statutory right for the victims under the 
ICC statute.453 Victim’s road to receiving reparations is dependent on a guilty verdict for the 
accused. 
Consequently, an interest in reparations should not obscure the importance of other broader 
interests of the victims.454 Judge Pikis has opined that, “participation of a victim at the trial is not 
a pre-requisite for claiming reparations”.455 It is particularly so as victims not participating in a 
trial may still be able to participate in reparation proceedings and obtain reparations. 
In conclusion, for victims to be able to participate in any proceedings at the ICC, they must 
demonstrate that they have legally protected personal interests that are affected or likely to be 
affected in certain proceedings. In addition, such interests must be relevant to the evidence and 
factual or legal issues under interrogation by the Court. The question of ‘relevance’ cuts across all 
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stages of the proceedings before the Court irrespective of whether it is pre-trial, trial, sentencing, 
or reparations stage.  
More importantly, for involvement in trial proceedings, the Appeals Chamber has held that victims 
must establish a concrete nexus between harm suffered, personal interests, and charges.456 Since 
the Court is explicit on the requirement of a nexus between harm, personal interests, and charges 
in the trial stage, one can safely argue that such nexus may not be required for pre-trial 
proceedings.457 Due to the unpredictability of charges during pre-trial stages, it may be ridiculous 
to demand that victims establish such nexus. 
3.2.4 Appropriateness: At Which Stage Can Views and Concerns Be Presented by 
Victims? 
Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute demands that victims with proven personal interests be allowed 
by the Judges to present their ‘views and concerns’ at a stage of proceedings deemed to be 
appropriate and in a manner not repugnant to the rights of the accused and fair trial principles.458 
The law does not create a procedure for the Judges to follow in determining the appropriateness of 
involvement of victims in the proceedings. As discussed, the ICC Statute does not define the term 
‘personal interests’. The court has a very broad discretion in deciding about when and in what 
manner to allow victims to participate.459  
The only caveat for the involvement of victims in the proceedings, whatever stage it may be, is 
that such participation must not trump rights of the accused and fair trial rights under Article 66 
and 67 of the ICC Statute.460 According to the Appeals Chamber, even when the victim’s personal 
interests are proved and found to be relevant, Judges must still determine whether their 
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involvement will result in a miscarriage of justice.461 Clearly, Judges have a far-reaching latitude 
in deciding when and how to let the victims access proceedings of the ICC. 
The language used in Article 68(3) insinuates that victims should be allowed to speak in Court 
whenever their interests are at stake. However, it looks like participation could only be allowed if 
it complies, and not at variance, with the rights of the accused.  
According to the ICC Statute, the accused person has a right: to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; to be informed of the charges and tried fairly and publicly; to be accorded ample time and 
the necessary facilities to prepare his defence, and to be tried impartially and without undue 
delay.462 Such are the minimum guarantees of a fair trial that must be observed for the accused 
person at the ICC.463  
While Article 68(3) requires the Court to heed to fair trial guarantees when deciding about the 
involvement of the victims, the jurisprudence of the ICC indicates that Judges have been mostly 
concerned with extra-legal factors. For example, in the Bemba case, Judges, without valid legal or 
factual reasons, trimmed down the number of victims seeking to personally present evidence and 
views from seventeen to eight on the account that proceedings would be lengthy.464 That was not 
withstanding the fact that thousands of victims were authorised to participate in the Bemba case.   
As we shall see at a later stage, factors which are not purely legal have been invoked to limit 
interventions by the victims at the ICC. In some decisions, Judges have emphasised that any 
interventions by the victims must not be ultra vires the case of the Prosecutor. They must not 
present views and evidence beyond the confines of the case.465  
However, in most of the decisions on the participation of victims, Judges seem to be extremely 
concerned about resource-based reasons instead of legal conditions under Article 68(3). The speed 
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of proceedings appears to be a major concern for most of the Judges at the ICC. In numerous 
decisions, victim’s participatory rights have been limited for the sake of expediting proceedings.466  
It is submitted that Article 68(3) must be interpreted meaningfully to ensure that victims have an 
independent voice at the ICC. Victim’s right to be heard is firmly enshrined in international human 
rights law. Article 68(3) is meant to provide agency for victims at the ICC given the history of 
marginalisation of victims in past international criminal proceedings. The requirement for 
observation of fair trial rights of the accused must not be used as a pretext for scuttling victim’s 
interventions at the ICC based on utilitarian considerations. 
In many decisions, Judges have underscored the need to ensure that proceedings are not derailed 
by lengthy interventions by the victims.467 Yes, accused persons are entitled to speedy proceedings 
and Judges are required to ensure that trials are not unduly delayed.468 Since the law is against 
undue delays, it follows that reasonable delays caused by the victims were foreseen by the drafters 
of the Statute and therefore legal.  
However, in 2009 in Katanga, Judge Bruno Cotte misapplied the requirement for “expeditious 
proceedings” by introducing extra-statutory factors in assessing victim’s applications to present 
evidence or views in court.469 In 2012, the Trial Chamber III in Bemba also decided to unduly 
restrict victim’s right to present views and testify in court by imposing strict criteria that victim’s 
testimony must bring up ‘new information’ and substantially contribute to the ascertainment of 
truth.470  
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As a result, a few victims were unlawfully denied the chance to testify or speak in court as the 
court ruled that their testimony was of negligible effect and was likely to be repetitive.471 Similarly, 
other victims were not allowed to testify on account that the harm suffered was not representative 
of the harm suffered by the majority of victims.472  
In the Bemba case, the Court instructed the legal representative of victims to select victims whose 
testimony and views were representative of personal interests affecting a greater majority of 
victims.473 Interestingly, in some instances, the Court allowed victims who had applied for 
tendering evidence to instead give their views as the evidence which they had sought to give was 
deemed either repetitive or insignificant.474 
In the Ntaganda case, the Trial Chamber V has adopted the approach of the Bemba and Katanga 
cases in dealing with victim’s applications to tender evidence or present views and concerns. In a 
2017 decision, the chamber denied some victims a chance to present evidence because the evidence 
sought to be presented deemed to be cumulative of the Prosecutor’s evidence and it could not 
supply new information to the court.475  
Despite the fact that the “cumulative evidence” threshold has been invoked in numerous court 
decisions to block victims from testifying, one victim in the Ntaganda case was allowed to testify 
because his evidence, despite being repetitive to the Prosecutor’s evidence, offered “unique 
information” on the conduct of Ntaganda in the perpetration of mass killings.476 Similarly, a victim 
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whose evidence was partly repetitive was allowed to testify as his evidence was representative of 
a larger group of victims because it touched on a range of crimes perpetrated by the UPC 
fighters.477  
3.2.5 Critique of the Victim Participation Regime on the Tendering of Evidence  
Whenever victims sought to give evidence or views, the Judges have demanded that such evidence 
and views must be “representative of a larger group of victims”,  “make a genuine contribution to 
the ascertainment of the truth” and “bring to light substantial new information” which is relevant 
to issues before the court.478 Such criteria invented by the Court have no legal force under the ICC 
Statute.479  
The Statute does not require that victim’s evidence must be new and of high probative value for it 
to be admissible. The only requirement is for the Court to satisfy itself that he applicant is a victim 
whose personal interests have been affected and to determine an appropriate stage for them to give 
evidence or views. Also, the victim’s testimony and views should only be rejected when there are 
genuine legal and or factual reasons to believe that their presentation will violate fair trial standards 
or rights of the accused.480   
Arguably, it is wrong for the Court to invoke extraneous considerations in limiting the use of 
Article 68(3) by the victims. The decisions rendered by the Judges in the Bemba and Katanga 
cases are unjustified under the ICC Statute. In agreement with Judge Steiner, I reason that the 
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Court is not empowered to alter the victim’s right to participate but to satisfy itself of the conditions 
set out under Article 68(3) and to determine modalities of participation.481  
The requirement for expeditiousness under Article 64(2) should not be used to justify road blocks 
to victim’s path to the courtroom.482 Any impediments to victims’ rights under Article 68(3) must 
have a finding under the law. In cases discussed, the Court wrongly invented some qualifying 
criteria for victim’s participation in the proceedings, in addition to statutory conditions under 
Article 68(3).483 
In some situations, victim’s testimony which is otherwise cumulative with evidence already 
adduced can still help the Court understand better the pattern of victimisation and the gravity of 
perpetration of crimes.  
For example, victim a/0555/08 in the Bemba case was denied the chance to give evidence on 
account that her evidence was ineffectual to the determination of truth and irrelevant to the 
charges.484 The victim was abducted and raped by MLC soldiers (Bemba forces) in the Central 
African Republic and was later relocated to the DRC with the soldiers. She claimed to have 
suffered physical and psychological harm from the rape and abduction. The evidence of that victim 
could have been crucial in explaining the typology of perpetration of rape, pillage, and abduction 
crimes by the troops and about the general pattern of criminality.485 More importantly, the victim 
came from a locality from which no live evidence was produced by the Prosecutor. 
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Likewise, victim a/0542/08 in Bemba wanted to testify about rape. Her evidence was also rejected 
for being repetitive of evidence already adduced by Prosecution.486 However, her evidence was 
important in highlighting the widespread nature of the perpetration of such crimes by MLC troops 
as she was from a locality from which no evidence was produced by the Prosecutor.487  
Interestingly, the Court allowed the victim to give “views and concerns” as the harm suffered was 
representative of a greater part of the victims.488 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Steiner faults the 
ruling of the majority for being unreasonable as the victim’s evidence was of good probative value 
and should have been allowed.489 In denying victims the chance to testify and instead directing 
them to present views, the Court effectively reduces the victim’s chance of influencing Court 
decisions as views are not part of the trial evidence and cannot be relied on by the Judges.490 
What comes out clearly from the decisions cited above is that some Judges are more concerned 
with the utilitarian value of victim’s evidence and views than ensuring that victim’s independence 
is upheld. In international criminal trials where you have large numbers of victims seeking 
participation, it may sound pragmatic for the Judges to look for “usefulness and genuineness” 
when it comes to victim’s testimony.  
Truly, time and resources may not be enough for the ICC to allow all the victims to testify or 
present views in person. Limiting personal testimonies of victims could be ideal for the sake of 
 
486 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal 
Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, para 
38. 
487 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and 
Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, paras 32-34. 
488 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal 
Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, para 
39. 
489 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and 
Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, para 35. 
490 Article 74(2) of the ICC Statute; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Request by Victims 
a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express their Views and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence During 
the Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 26 June 2009, para 25. 
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judicial economy and avoidance of protracted proceedings.491 Owing to the victim’s inalienable 
right to be heard, the Court must not lock out victims whose evidence or views appear unhelpful 
to them in the adjudication of cases. 
Critical to the decision of the majority in blocking some victims from personal appearance in Court 
for tendering evidence and presenting views, Judge Steiner held that:  
In my view, the strict limitations imposed by the Majority to the presentation of evidence by victims and the 
"case-by-case" analysis of the victims' right to present their views and concerns reflect a utilitarian approach 
towards the role of victims before the Court, which has no legal basis and appears to unreasonably restrict 
the rights recognised for victims by the drafters of the Statute.492 
I agree with Judge Steiner that the Court should not be obsessed with judicial consequentialism of 
the victim’s evidence and or views.493 It is a duty of the Court to look for ‘usefulness’ of the 
evidence when assessing the whole body of evidence after it has been adduced and not to prevent 
certain evidence from being presented simply because it may not help it arrive at its decisions. 
 Although Article 68(3) does not create fair trial rights for the victims, the Court is required, under 
Article 68(1), to treat victims fairly and with dignity. Denying them an independent voice in the 
Court because utilitarian considerations may blunt their participation in the proceedings. 
Participation should able to achieve substantive outcomes for the victims as opposed to merely 
symbolic gains that have no impact on them.  
In the Bemba case, more than 5000 victims participated in the Trial. One would ask, what would 
be the justification of allowing only seven victims out of thousands of victims to personally present 
opinions and tender evidence in Court? Allowing fifty victims out of five thousand to testify and 
 
491 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and 
Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, para 20. 
492 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
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Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140 , para 11. 
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present views cannot lead to undue delay contemplated under the law.494 The seven victims who 
wanted to testify in the Bemba case would, if they had been allowed, have spent eighteen hearing 
days comparable to one hundred and seventy seven days spent by the Prosecution.495 
Lastly, trials which are unduly prolonged may occasion an injustice for the defendants. A trial 
becomes unfair if it is not expeditious and it could also be unfair even when it is expeditious.496 At 
the ICC, there is no empirical evidence that victim’s interventions have prolonged trials. For 
example, the Lubanga trial lasted nine years mainly due to prosecutorial reasons. Thus, ‘fairness’ 
remains an essential element of fair trial requirements under international law.  
For both sides to a criminal case, the Court must strike a delicate balance to ensure that proceedings 
are fair and expeditions to all including the victims who are slowly creating a third force in criminal 
trials at the ICC. An international criminal trial should not be an exercise that marginalises the 
victims by extending unsubstantiated rights to the Prosecutor and the defendant. In his separate 
opinion in the Appeals Chamber decision on victims, Judge Song stated that: “The jurisprudence 
of the ECHR indicates that criminal proceedings may well be considered fair and consistent with 
the rights of the accused even if the participation of victims is relatively far-reaching”.497 
3.2.6 Victim’s Evidence and Article 66(2) Obligation of the Prosecutor 
In the previous section, we have seen that victims participating in the proceedings at the ICC could 
be allowed to tender evidence.  This part seeks to examine the legal dynamics relating to the 
adduction of evidence by the victims in relation to prosecutorial obligations under the ICC Statute.  
Of interest in this discussion is Article 66(2) of the ICC Statute that says: “The onus is on the 
Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused”. Now, if victims can lead evidence, would it amount 
 
494 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and 
Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, para 21. 
495 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision 
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496 Robinson PL ‘Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 583. 
497 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims 
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to a duplication of prosecutorial tasks? Another issue that may come up is whether the submission 
of evidence by the victims presents a danger to fair trial safeguards available to the accused under 
the ICC Statute. 
The ICC’s first determination of the victim’s role in the production of trial evidence was the 2008 
Lubanga decision on the participation of victims. The Trial Chamber I held that the right to present 
evidence is not a preserve of the parties as the Court can exercise its powers under Article 69(3)498 
to request the submission of evidence that would enable it to establish the truth.499  
Furthermore, the Court decided that victims may put questions to witnesses if “their personal 
interests are engaged by the evidence under consideration”.500 On admissibility matters, the Court 
implied that victims could be allowed to challenge the admissibility of evidence through the 
provisions of Article 68(3) and 69(4) of the ICC Statute.501 However, the decision fell short of 
addressing the legal implications of allowing victims to tender evidence, in particular, about the 
disclosure and burden of proof issues. 
The Trial Chamber decision was appealed by the Defence and the Prosecutor. One of the issues in 
the appeal was whether it would be legally justified for the participating victims to submit evidence 
on the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility of evidence.502 In the 
Appeal, the Prosecutor charged that it was legally wrong for the Trial Chamber I to allow victims 
to tender evidence because they are not parties to the proceedings and the right to lead evidence 
on guilt or innocence rests with the parties (Defence and Prosecution).503  
In addition, the Prosecutor observed that allowing victims to tender evidence on guilt or innocence 
would result in shifting the burden of proof which is exclusively the province of the Prosecutor 
 
498 Article 69(3) of the ICC Statute says: “The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, in accordance with 
article 64. The Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for 
the determination of the truth”. 
499 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victims' Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 108. 
500 The Court relied on Rule 93(1); The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victims' Participation, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 108. 
501 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victims' Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 109. 
502 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 66. 
503 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 




under Article 66(2).504 In agreement with the Prosecutor, the Defence also argued that the victims, 
not being parties, had no right to lead evidence on guilt or innocence and it would amount to double 
prosecution if they were allowed to do so.505  
Specifically, the Defence opined that the said double prosecution506 would trump the principle of 
equality of arms, an essential component of fair trial guarantees. Additionally, the Defence 
submitted that the absence of disclosure obligations for the victims under the ICC Statute justified 
that victims had no right to lead evidence on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.507 
In response to appeal arguments raised by the Prosecution and the Defence, the Legal 
Representative of the victims argued that victims have an indirect avenue under Article 68(3) and 
Rule 91(3) for them to submit evidence touching on the guilt or innocence of the accused.508 
Similarly, the victim’s lawyer opined that issues of guilt or innocence affect the victims and 
therefore they should be allowed to make interventions that do not affect the specific roles of the 
parties.509 
From the arguments of the appellants, the thrust of the appeal was whether victims as participants 
in criminal proceedings are equal to the parties in the sense of having a right to lead evidence on 
guilt or innocence of the accused person. In disposing of the main ground of appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber reiterated that, considering some provisions of the ICC Statute,510 it emerges that the 
right to lead evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility 
of evidence belongs to the Parties.511  
 
504 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 71. 
505 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 78. 
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507 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 78. 
508 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
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509 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and The Defence against 
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511 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, para 93. 
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Despite affirming the existence of such a right for the parties, the Appeals Chamber added that 
there was no provision in the ICC Statute that prevents victims from adducing evidence directed 
at the guilt or innocence of the accused person, and to challenge the admissibility of evidence.512  
The reasoning of the Court revolves around its powers under Article 69(3) with respect to which 
the Court can request the production of additional evidence that may assist it in the determination 
of the truth. Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that the responsibility of the Prosecutor under Article 
66(2) could not be used to flout its statutory authority to allow the submission of evidence by the 
victims since it is the Court which must be convinced that the guilt of the accused has been 
established beyond reasonable doubt.513  
Most importantly, the Appeals Chamber underscored the fact that Article 68(3) must be interpreted 
to enable meaningful participation by the victims and, therefore, if victims were restricted to 
producing evidence unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the accused then such evidence would 
be inadmissible for irrelevance and that would render their participation ineffectual.514  
Similarly, another crucial factor that was raised in the Katanga and Chui cases is that restricting 
victims to presenting “views and concerns” will not result in substantive gains for them as such 
views, not being evidence, “cannot be taken into account in the final judgment”.515  
In essence, the Appeals Chamber held that the “possibility” of victims to tender evidence 
pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused person could arise from the triangular 
application of Articles 68(3) and 69(3) as well as Rule 91(3) that empowers Legal Representatives 
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of Victims to put questions to witnesses.516 Thus, victims with proven personal interests that are 
affected by issues touching on evidentiary matters may “move the court” under Article 69(3) to be 
allowed to present evidence.517  
What comes out clearly from the decision of the Appeals Chamber is that victims have no statutory 
right to lead evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused person. In the words of the 
Prosecutor in the Ntaganda case, victims have “a right to petition the Chamber to call evidence 
under the authority afforded to it under Article 69(3)”.518 The concept of a “right to petition” was 
also endorsed by the Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and Chui case.519 When the trial court accepts 
the petition, it must determine the appropriate stage for the presentation of such evidence and 
ensure that it is disclosed to the defence before being presented to the Judges.520 
On the question of victim’s right to challenge the relevance or admissibility of evidence, the 
Appeals Chamber held that the Court could allow victims to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence owing to its statutory powers to rule on the admissibility and relevance of evidence.521 
Such an approach could be discerned from the aggregate effect of Articles 68(3), 69(4),522 64(9)523 
of the ICC Statute as well as Rules 89 and 91 of the ICC REP. Similarly, the questioning of 
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witnesses by the Legal Representative of Victims under Rule 91(3) could bring up issues directed 
at the admissibility and relevance of evidence that affect the personal interests of the victims.524  
In another scenario, the Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Chui opined that victims may as well 
challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence through presentation of “views and concerns” 
as nothing under the Statute prevented them from relaying information to the Court on the 
probative value of evidence and thereby assist the Court to discharge its mandate.  
The Court stated that: “…it must permit a victim who has information clearly indicating the 
admissibility of disputed evidence, or, on the contrary, establishing that such evidence cannot be 
admitted or is irrelevant, to transmit that information to the Chamber. Such information may 
prevent the Chamber from being misled by relying on inadmissible or irrelevant evidence – or 
dismissing evidence that is in fact admissible and relevant – in order to establish the facts”.525 
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case also held that victims have a right to 
petition the court to be permitted to lead evidence on the guilt and innocence of the accused and 
to make submissions on the relevance or admissibility of evidence. To do so, the Trial Chamber 
must determine an appropriate moment for the exercise of such a right by ensuring that the petition 
by victims indicate how their interests are affected, and that the rights of the accused are 
observed.526 
The decision of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga regarding the position of victims in tendering 
evidence on the innocence or guilt of the accused person and in challenging the admissibility and 
relevance of evidence was wholly upheld by the Appeals Chamber in the Katanga and Chui 
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cases.527 The Appeals Chamber reiterated that, for the victims to be allowed to tender evidence, 
they must satisfy a two-pronged procedure.  
First, the conditions under Article 68(3) must be met and secondly, they must trigger the exercise 
of powers of the Court under Article 69(3).528 Likewise, the Court upheld the finding in Lubanga 
that victims could adduce evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused person. The Appeals 
Chamber in Katanga and Chui emphasises that it could not rule out the victim’s evidence on the 
role of the accused in the perpetration of crimes if such evidence is necessary for the establishment 
of the truth.529 
One of the issues that came up in the Appeal and which was not fully covered by the decision of 
the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga was “whether it is possible, under the Rome Statute, for evidence 
to be adduced at trial, which had not been disclosed prior to the commencement of the trial”.530  
In other words, where does the victim’s evidence stand in relation to disclosure obligation under 
the ICC Statute531 and whether disclosure during trial violates fair trial rights of the accused person. 
In dealing with that issue, the Appeals Chamber underscored that, in exercising its statutory powers 
pursuant to Articles 69(3) and 64(6)(d), the Court may receive evidence from the victims during 
the trial and such evidence cannot be amenable to disclosure obligations applicable to the 
Prosecutor since the Court may not know in advance of the trial if it would need additional 
evidence to enable it to ascertain the truth until after it has received evidence from the parties.532  
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In summary, the production of evidence under Article 69(3) of the ICC Statute is sui generis and 
therefore not amenable to the pre-trial disclosure regime applicable to the parties. Since Article 
69(3) evidence is not susceptible to statutory disclosure obligations, the Appeals Chamber has 
established a principle (court-ordered disclosure) to the effect that such evidence must be disclosed 
to the parties before its presentation in the Court.533 
Even though there are two decisions of the Appeals Chamber (Lubanga and Katanga) that uphold 
the quasi-right of victims to adduce evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused, Judge Ozaki 
has recently written a dissenting opinion in a recent Ntaganda decision opposing that role accorded 
to victims in evidentiary matters. In February 2017, the Trial Chamber VI in Ntaganda handed 
down a decision that, in many respects, echoes the main findings of the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga and Katanga regarding the production of evidence by the victims as discussed above.534  
In his dissenting remarks, Judge Ozaki argues that rights of the accused person would be violated 
if victims are allowed to complement the Prosecutor in presenting evidence relating to the guilt 
and innocence of the accused.535 Aptly put, the Judge asserts that, by allowing victims to tender 
such evidence, the court subjects the defendant to two accusers, leading to a violation of the 
equality of arms principle and fair trial rights. 
Essentially, Judge Ozaki opines that the ICC Statute does not support the extension of the 
Prosecutor’s role under Article 66(2) to the victims due to three reasons.536 First, the disclosure 
regime (Rules 76-84) is only applicable to parties; secondly, allowing the submission of additional 
evidence by the victims and which is not amenable to the disclosure regime leads to a violation of 
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the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 entitled "Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at 
Trial", ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, 16 July 2010, paras 51 – 55. 
534 The Prosecutor V. Bosco Ntaganda, Public redacted version of ‘Decision on the request by the Legal Representative 
of the Victims of the Attacks for leave to present evidence and victims’ views and concerns’ (10 February 2017, ICC-
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the principle of equality of arms as victims become “auxiliary prosecutors”; and thirdly, the right 
to a speedy trial is affected. 
I do not subscribe to the arguments raised by Judge Ozaki in opposing the victim’s role in 
presenting evidence on the criminality of the accused person. The Judge employs a strict 
interpretation of the ICC Statute in a way that could turn victims into mere spectators to the 
proceedings at the ICC. Interestingly, the Judge concedes that victims could be called as witnesses 
but he falls short of describing what should the victim’s role be with respect to the supply of 
evidence on the role of the accused.  
Confusingly, he accepts that he would have allowed only victim a/30012/15 to testify as the 
evidence sought to be adduced is significant in the determination of truth because it is related to 
“the conduct” of Ntaganda.537 One may want to ask, how does the evidence on the conduct of an 
accused person fall outside the scope of their innocence or guilt?  Common sense suggests that 
any body of evidence that does not relate either to the guilt or innocence of an accused person 
would be inadmissible or neglected for lack of relevance.  
Thus, there is absolutely no reason for categorisation of types of evidence to be given by the 
victims. The Appeals Chamber in Katanga and Chui stated that: “Evidence on the conduct of the 
accused is encompassed within the general category of evidence pertaining to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused which victims may be permitted to submit. The Appeals Chamber finds 
no reason to distinguish between distinct categories of evidence the victims may or may not be 
requested to present”.538 
If Judge Ozaki’s approach to the role of victims in the supply of trial evidence is to be followed, 
victim’s right to participate in ICC proceedings would become ineffectual. Such an approach runs 
counter to the victim’s internationally recognised right of access to the Court and the right to be 
heard.  
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In Katanga, it was suggested that non-criminal provisions of the ICC Statute should not be 
subjected to strict interpretations,539 and the outcome of interpretations undertaken by the Court 
must enhance human rights recognised under international law.540 Arguably, Article 68(3) on 
victim participation is not a criminal provision and therefore it should not be interpreted strictly. 
On the issue of double prosecution, Judge Ozaki does not present sufficient reasons to substantiate 
his argument that victims would become “auxiliary prosecutors” if they adduce evidence on the 
guilt or innocence of the accused.  
It is submitted that the parameters of the charges facing the accused are defined by the Prosecutor 
and approved by the Court in confirmation proceedings.541 In confirmation proceedings, the 
Prosecutor must convince the Court that there are “substantial grounds to believe” that the suspect 
is responsible for the allegations contained in the charges.542 Once the Court confirms the charges, 
the suspect is committed to a trial, and such charges can only be amended before a trial begins and 
upon notification of the accused person.543  
Thus, when victims present evidence on whatever issue, such evidence must conform to the scope 
of the Prosecutor’s case as confirmed by the Court. Conformity and relevance to the charges are 
the most important considerations in assessing victim’s applications to tender evidence at the ICC. 
In my view, there can be a violation of the equality of arms principle if victims present evidence 
that seeks to enlarge the scope of charges beyond the Prosecutor’s case and thereby force 
defendants to confront an “unexpected case” at trial. If that happens, then it could be alleged that 
rights of the accused person are endangered by double prosecution. That has never been the case 
at the ICC until now. 
Thus, grounds presented by Judge Ozaki for the exclusion of victim’s evidence relating to the 
criminality of the accused person are hypothetical. The Judge has not provided reasons to indicate 
serious encroachments on rights of the defendants if victims present evidence on criminality. Until 
 
539 Katanga Article 74 Judgment, para 52. 
540 Katanga Article 74 Judgment, para 50. 
541 Article 61(7) (a) and (b), ICC Statute. 
542  The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 2014, para 9. 
543 Article 61 (9) of the ICC Statute. 
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now, the available empirical evidence indicates that no victim has ever testified at the ICC on 
issues which are ultra vires the Prosecutor’s case.  
Most of the victims have testified on the gravity of victimisation and the role of the accused in the 
perpetration of crimes. In the same vein, most of the testimonies have been corroborative to the 
evidence already adduced by the Prosecutor and therefore the accused person has never been 
ambushed in the trial proceedings. 
 The ICC Statute contemplates that there would be “new or additional evidence” that could be 
received by the Court during the trial proceedings, in addition to the evidence already disclosed to 
the parties before the trial begins.  
That is why the ICC is empowered to receive or order the production of additional evidence.544 
Such evidence could come from the parties (Prosecutor and Defence) or victims since the relevant 
provisions do not restrict the supply of such “additional evidence” to the parties. Since the supply 
of additional evidence is envisaged under the ICC statute, it is improper to argue that there would 
be an injustice to accused persons if such evidence came from the victims and when it relates to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.  
In the case of a violation, there is a sufficient protection mechanism for the parties’ rights if they 
have issues on such evidence. Under Rule 64(1) of the ICC RPE, parties are allowed to bring up 
issues relating to the relevance or admissibility of evidence.545 Thus, if the defence finds that 
certain evidence to be adduced by the victims would trump their rights or place them at a 
disadvantage, they can then use that provision to seek an intervention of the Court promptly. 
Lastly, Judge Ozaki raised the issue of “expeditiousness” in relation to the supply of evidence by 
the victims. In the decision over which he dissents, the Chamber allowed three victims to testify 
out of thousands of victims participating in the Ntaganda case.546 The Judge does not provide 
substantial reasons to justify his worries about the possible delay of the proceedings if the three 
 
544 Article 69(3),  and Article 64(6)(d) of the ICC Statute and Rule 84 (Disclosure and additional evidence for trial) of 
the ICC RPE. 
545 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Materials 
Contained in the Prosecution's List of Evidence”, ICC-01/05-01/08-1386, 3 May 2011, para 47. 
546 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, 6 February 2015, para 1. 
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victims testify. It is true that defendants have a “right to be tried without undue delay”.547 However, 
trial without undue delay should not be achieved at the expense of rights of the Prosecutor and the 
victims. As held by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
ICC should equally “preserve and guarantee” rights of the parties and victims.548  
Thus, the fairness of the proceedings should be upheld for all the participants at the ICC including 
the victims. There must be respect for the “procedural rights” of both the parties and the victims.549 
For the victims, fairness would mean that they can exercise their rights as recognised under the 
Statute and international law. Reasonable delays must be tolerated when victims are exercising 
their rights because, as the Appeals Chamber argues, expeditiousness should not be fronted to 
“justify deviations from statutory requirements”.550 In the same vein, I add that expeditiousness 
should not be used to justify derogations from victims’ rights recognised under international law. 
3.2.7 Direct and Indirect Victims: Same Rights? 
Crimes under international law tend to produce large numbers of victims who succumb to the 
victimisation on various levels. Indeed, the harm that ensues from such crimes could affect victims 
directly or indirectly, depending on the circumstances. For institutions, there must be a direct nexus 
between the crime and the harm.551 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber I in Lubanga has applied a 
purposive approach to interpretation and held that the requirement of a direct nexus between the 
harm and the crime is not required for natural persons.552 Thus, for natural persons, they can 
participate in the ICC proceedings as direct or indirect victims of any crime under the ICC Statute. 
 
547 Article 67(1)(c) of the ICC Statute. 
548 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal 
the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 
2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-135-tEN, 31 March 2006, para 43. 
549 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal 
the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 
2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-135-tEN, para 38. 
550 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Materials 
Contained in the Prosecution's List of Evidence”, ICC-01/05-01/08-1386, para 55. 
551 Rule 85(b) of the ICC REP. 
552 Rule 85(a) of the ICC REP; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-
01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2018, para 91. 
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Despite such a finding, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga did not expound further the concept of 
indirect victims in relation to crimes under the ICC Statute. The Court failed to contextualise the 
application of the concept of “indirect victimisation” in relation to serious crimes such as the 
recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts. In reality, the war crime of using child soldiers 
in armed conflicts tend to produce different layers of victims apart from the children themselves 
who are also perpetrators. In that sense, when children are regarded as direct victims, what would 
be the status of people who suffer harm from the conduct of child soldiers? 
The Appeals Chamber in Lubanga has clarified the concept of indirect victimisation by linking it 
to familial relations of the victims. In establishing the familial relation’s principle about indirect 
victimisation, the Appeals Chamber stated that: “harm suffered by one victim as a result of the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the court can give rise to the harm suffered by 
other victims”.553  
Now, who are these “other victims” whose harm could result from the direct victims? The “other 
victims” must be persons who have a close personal relationship with the direct victim, for 
example, parents or blood relatives of child soldiers.554 In principle, the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the finding of the Trial Chamber that individuals can be direct and indirect victims of 
crime as long as the harm suffered is personal. 
However, the court failed to explain the status of persons who, for example, suffer harm from the 
conduct of direct victims such as child soldiers. Implicitly, the conceptualisation of indirect victims 
by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga seem to exclude indirect victims who are harmed by child 
soldiers. Such an exclusion became clearer in another decision in the Lubanga case. 
In 2009, three Judges of the Trial Chamber I in Lubanga were required to decide on the status of 
200 applications for participation as victims. The individuals claimed to have suffered harm 
(murder, rape, pillage, and enslavement) as a result of crimes perpetrated by the UPC (Lubanga’s 
militia). Thus, the major issue for the Court was whether such individuals could qualify as indirect 
 
553 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2008, para 
32.  
554 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against 
Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, para 32. 
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victims, claiming that their victimisation is traceable to the conduct of child soldiers.555 Before 
discussing the decision of the Court on the matter, let us first navigate through the submissions of 
the parties. 
(a) The Prosecutor: Persons Harmed by Child Soldiers Should Participate as Indirect 
Victims 
Relying on the tripartite nexus between personal interests of the victims, the harm suffered, and 
the charges, the Prosecutor argued that persons who suffered harm resulting from the conduct of 
child soldiers recruited by Lubanga should be allowed to participate as indirect victims.556 He 
stated that, “…the protection afforded by the provisions of the Rome Statute relating to the 
recruitment and use of children under the age of fifteen years extends to third parties who suffered 
harm as a result of crimes committed by children within the ranks of the UPC/FPLC”.557 
(b) The Defence: Persons Harmed by Child Soldiers Should Not Participate 
The defence opposed the inclusion of the 200 individuals as indirect victims by reiterating that 
only those with parental relationships with child soldiers should be allowed to participate.558 That 
suggestion is in line with a finding of the Appeals Chamber as discussed earlier. Stressing on the 
importance of linking harm to charges, the Defence underscored that the conduct of child soldiers 
was not part of the charges against Lubanga and therefore the Court would be overstepping its 
jurisdictional mandate if it allowed victims of the crimes of child soldiers to participate in the 
proceedings.559 
(c) Submissions by Office of the Public Council for the Victims 
As Lubanga was charged with the war crime of using child soldiers, the Office of the Public 
Counsel for the Victims (OPCV) submitted that indirect victims should be allowed to participate 
if they suffered harm “which is linked to the criminal enlistment or conscription of children under 
 
555 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, 8 April 2009, 
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556 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, para 6. 
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the age of fifteen or their active participation in hostilities”.560 That point negates the requirement 
of “parental relations” as espoused by the Appeals Chamber.  
Furthermore, the OPCV outlined five categories of victims in relation to child soldiers; first, 
parents of the child soldiers, secondly, persons who suffer harm while intervening to prevent the 
recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts, thirdly, persons harmed during the attacks in 
which child soldiers participated, and fourthly, persons who “suffered harm from the crimes 
targeted at them” by the child soldiers.561 
In deciding, the Trial Chamber I followed the finding of the Appeals Chamber that crimes under 
international law could bring about direct and indirect victims.562 That, for both direct and indirect 
victims, there must exist a causal connection between the harm suffered, and the crimes contained 
in the indictment.563 Regarding the Lubanga case, the Court stated that child soldiers would be the 
direct victims of the crime of enlistment and conscription of children and using them in an armed 
conflict.564  
For indirect victims, the Judges upheld the “familial relations” principle enunciated by the Appeals 
Chamber, by holding that “indirect victims must establish that, as a result of their relationship with 
the direct victim, the loss, injury, or damage suffered by the latter gives rise to harm to them. It 
follows that the harm suffered by indirect victims must arise out of the harm suffered by direct 
victims, brought about by the commission of the crimes charged”.565 
Regarding the various layers of victims that may result from child conscription as outlined by the 
OPCV, the Court only recognises two categories. First, those with parental relations with direct 
victims, and secondly, people who suffer harm resulting from interventions aimed at stopping the 
crimes.566  
 
560 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, para 8. 
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563 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, para 45. 
564 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, para 48. 
565 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, paras 49 and 50. 
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It follows that, persons who experience harm owing to the conduct of child soldiers are excluded 
from the category of indirect victims.567 In locking out victims harmed by child soldiers, the Court 
attempts to draw a distinctive line between the recruitment of child soldiers and the subsequent 
conduct of such soldiers. The main reasoning of the Court is that, those attacked by child soldiers 
do not qualify as indirect victims because the harm suffered does not have a nexus to the harm 
inflicted on children at the time of the crime.568 
3.2.8 Critique of the Court’s Conceptualisation of Indirect Victims 
The exclusion by the Court of indirect victims who suffer harm from the conduct of child soldiers 
is a blow to the millions of victims in the DRC. The argument of the Court that the harm inflicted 
on indirect victims by child soldiers is peripheral to the crime of child conscription is weak and 
unsupported under the law. The decision of the Court fails to appreciate the reasons behind the 
prohibition of the use of child soldiers in armed conflicts.  
The fragility, immaturity, and the willingness to carry out any orders, has made it possible for 
children to be used to unleash monstrous attacks on defenceless civilians in various wars in the 
developing world.569 The Court employs a strict approach to interpretation in holding that there is 
no causal link between the crime of child conscription and the harm occasioned to third parties 
essentially stemming from the conduct of child soldiers. Such an approach is tantamount to 
denying the fact that, in modern wars, children have been extensively used to launch atrocious 
attacks on the civilian population.570  
In most of the wars especially in Africa, the harm experienced by civilians would not have been 
severely devastating in the absence of extensive use of child soldiers in those conflicts. 
Consequently, I am of the view that persons harmed by child soldiers should be allowed to 
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participate in the proceedings because the harm suffered is indirectly linked to the crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed conflicts.571 
It would be safe to argue that, as victim-perpetrators, child soldiers have their victims. The crime 
of conscription and use of children in wars will always result in a two-tier level of victimisation. 
The first tier is the recruited children while the second tier covers those harmed by the subsequent 
conduct of child soldiers. If the ICC continues to recognise indirect victims of that nature, then 
there is a danger that millions of victims in the DRC will be blocked from the path to justice. The 
argument that “the conduct of child soldiers is not criminalised” cannot be used to justify the 
exclusion of indirect victims as international human rights law holds that the status of victimhood 
exists even in the absence of prosecution and conviction of the wrongdoer.572 
The absence of charges for child soldiers under international criminal law may seem to suggest 
that the participation of indirect victims will be ineffectual. However, such victims could tender 
evidence on their victimisation (murder, pillage, rape, and torture perpetrated by child soldiers) 
and this could be useful in clarifying gravity issues and aggravating factors during sentencing.573 
In assessing the appropriate sentence for the convicted person, the ICC is required to fully consider 
the extent of harm caused to the victims and their families.574 
3.3 Admission Procedure for the Victims at the ICC: Unsettled Jurisprudence? 
The admission procedure for the victims at the ICC is unsettled. Mass crimes produce millions of 
victims. The ICC has admitted that, given scarce resources, it is unable to effectively process the 
victim’s application promptly to ensure meaningful participation.575 As a result, different chambers 
of the Court have applied different methodologies for admitting victims. Different paths taken by 
the Court have resulted in inconsistencies and unsettled jurisprudence.  
 
571 Spiga (2010), 190 and 193. 
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This section intends to briefly outline the different admission systems for victims and analyse the 
attendant legal issues to determine whether the victim’s admission regime is effective and efficient. 
The effectiveness of an admission system for victims should be gauged on the basis that a particular 
admission procedure ensures speedy processing of victim’s applications while guarding against 
violation of rights of victims and the parties.576 
3.3.1 The Standard Admission Procedure: Rule 89 
According to Rule 89, victims can get to the Court by lodging a written application with the 
Registrar who should transmit the applications to the Court for a decision.577 Applications can also 
be made on behalf of victims when the victim is a minor or disabled.578 The parties could be 
provided with copies of such applications for observations in accordance with the procedure set 
out by the Court.579 After assessing the applications, the Court may accept or reject them depending 
on whether the provisions of Article 68(3) and Rule 85 have been met.580 
In the early jurisprudence of the ICC on victim’s admission procedure, Chambers of the Court 
adhered to the “standard form” application system based on Rule 89 and Regulation 86.581 The 
standard form approach was used in the Lubanga, Katanga, Chui, and Bemba cases.582  
According to the earliest jurisprudence, the role of the registry was limited to reviewing victim’s 
applications for completeness only before transmitting them to the Court for a decision on 
merits.583 However, in subsequent decisions, some Chambers of the Court widened the role of the 
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registry by requiring it to make a prima facie assessment of victim’s applications on the basis of 
Rule 85 requirements before submitting them to the court for approval.584 
Following its assessment of the legality of victim’s applications, the registry submits completed 
applications to the Court coupled with a report on its findings.585 The parties are afforded an 
opportunity to comment on the applications586 and then the court decides on each application, 
considering the observations of the parties.587 
The individualised approach to admitting victims to proceedings at the ICC was not free of 
drawbacks. The individual review of victim’s applications became an unbearable burden to the 
parties and the Court as a significant amount of time, human and financial resources were needed. 
In some cases, the defence complained about lack of time and resources to review hundreds of 
victim applications.588 At one time in Bemba, the Court granted a request for an extension of time 
limit to enable the defence to review hundreds of applications of victims seeking participation.589 
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Likewise, in 2011, the registry informed the Court of its inability to thoroughly review victim 
applications due to a significant surge in applications for participation.590  
In a report of the Court to the ASP in 2012, it was stated that:  
The Court is experiencing difficulties processing applications in a timely manner to keep pace with the 
proceedings and enable victims to effectively exercise their rights under the Statute. One of the main reasons 
for this difficulty is the lack of appropriate resources in the Registry, parties, legal representatives of 
applicants and Chambers to deal with the volume of applications.591 
The individualised procedure for the admission of victims at the ICC has been complained of by 
the parties and the Court for being extremely time-consuming and resource-intensive. Admittedly, 
such a system could have had a chilling effect on both the victims and the parties as a significant 
amount of time was devoted to processing such applications and that could affect the speed of 
proceedings.  
While I agree with some commentators who argue that the ICC victims’ participation regime is 
time-consuming and expensive,592 I am of the position that the individualised system could be 
reformed and scrapped for a system that is economical with time and resources and ensures 
efficiency by guaranteeing substantive results for the victims. Let us now explore approaches 
devised by various chambers of the Court to mitigate the shortcomings of the standard form 
approach. 
3.3.2 The Gbagbo Procedure: Mixed Approach 
The pre-trial chamber in Gbagbo adopted a partly collective system in receiving and considering 
applications for participation by the victims. Victims were at liberty to either apply individually 
through the standard form process or to submit a group form accompanied by summarised 
individual declarations.593 The role of the registry in reviewing the applications for adherence to 
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Article 68(3) and Rule 85 was maintained for both approaches. Due to potential difficulties in 
recording a collective narrative for victims of atrocity crimes, it has been held that, in the case of 
differences amongst group members on the nature of victimisation and the correct recollection of 
events, victims should fill out separate individual forms or create homogenous groups.594  
3.3.3 Kenya Cases Approach: Differentiated System for Victims Seeking Personal 
Participation and Those Participating Through Legal Representatives 
In the Kenya cases, the Trial Chamber V observed that there should be a victim’s admission system 
that does not unduly prolong proceedings by forcing parties to spend a considerable amount of 
time on non-trial issues (reviewing the applications).595 The Chamber sanctioned a two-tier 
application system whereby victims seeking ‘personal participation’ were required to adhere to the 
“standard form approach” whereas those willing to participate solely through legal representatives 
were required to only register with the Court.596 Victims not seeking individual participation were 
exempted from submitting applications under Rule 89(1).597 
The responsibility for reviewing applications for completeness in accordance with Article 68(3) 
and Rule 85 was placed on the legal representatives who were obligated not to take into account 
“views and concerns” of persons who do not qualify as victims.598 The Court reasoned that in the 
wake of large numbers of victims seeking individual participation, the standard form approach 
under Rule 89 was no longer useful as it would cause unnecessary delays.599  
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Furthermore, it argued that the two-tier application regime (personal appearance or group 
representation) was legally possible under Rule 89.600 Thus, the Judges invoked Article 51(5) to 
disable the strict application of Rule 89 in implementing the involvement of victims at the ICC 
under Article 68(3), by establishing a “differentiated procedure for direct individual participation 
and participation through common legal representatives”.601  
While admitting that heterogenous interests of all the victims may not be fully covered, the court 
opined that group participation through legal representatives could still cover “shared legal and 
factual concerns” of the victims.602 On issues of efficiency and rights of the accused, it was 
observed that the proposed system would require much less time and resources to implement in 
comparison to the standard system and that the accused would have more time for preparing the 
defence.603  
3.3.4 Ntaganda Pre-Trial System: The Simplified Form Approach 
In Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber II observed that there was a need for having an efficient and 
working victim’s admission system and that application forms should be simplified and tailored to 
the demands of the victims in a particular case.604 According to the Court, having a simplified 
victim’s application form would expedite the processing of such applications and ensure that 
proceedings are held expeditiously.605 Judge Trendafilova argued that it would be inconceivable 
for the ICC to have a homogenous victim’s admissions system, suggesting that a victim’s 
application system should respond to the specificities of cases before the Court.606 
 
600 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 27. 
601 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 29. 
602 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 33. 
603 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 36. 
604 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, 28 May 2013, para 17. 
605 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 18. 
606 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 18. 
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Thus, in Ntaganda pre-trial proceedings, the Judge decided that victims should use a “concise and 
simplified one-page individual application form (the simplified form)” containing only essential 
information strictly needed to prove victimhood as per Rule 85.607 The “simplified form” was 
modelled on the requirements of Rule 85, capturing the most important information concisely.608 
The registry was responsible for assisting the victims to complete the forms,609 and due to a 
shortage of human resources, the registry was allowed to enlist the help of local intermediaries for 
that purpose.610 Likewise, the chamber entrusted the registry with the responsibility of reviewing 
the form for completeness,611 transmitting them to the parties for observations, and to the court for 
a decision on merits.612 
To expedite the processing of applications, Judge Trendafilova instructed the registry to aggregate 
the simplified application forms submitted by victims into groups based on; location of crime 
complained of, time of commission, nature of criminality, nature of the harm suffered, and gender 
of the victims.613 It is important to note here that the grouping of victims was done by the registry 
on the basis of criteria set by the Court, and the Court did not restrict the grouping to the conditions 
mentioned but the registry could also consider “other specific circumstances common to 
victims”.614 The Judge also noted that the grouping of victims at the application stage could save 
time and liberate the victims from the potentially traumatising protracted application processes 
and enable the Court to determine the applications expeditiously according to Rule 89(4).615 
 
607 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 21. 
608 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, paras 22 and 24. 
609 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 26. 
610 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, paras 27 and 28. 
611 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, paras 29, 30, and 37. 
612 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 33. 
613 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, paras 33-35. 
614 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 35. 
615 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 34. 
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3.3.5 Ntaganda Trial Approach: Hybrid of Ntaganda’s Pre-Trial and Kenya Cases 
Approach 
In the trial of Bosco Ntaganda, the Trial Chamber VI resolved to adopt a blended approach to the 
victim’s admission procedure by retaining the simplified form approach used during pre-trial while 
seeking to achieve judicial economy benefits by delegating the assessment of applications to the 
registry as it was the case in the Kenya cases.616  
Accordingly, victim applicants would fill out simplified applications forms which are assessed by 
the registry for completeness based on principles set out by the Court, and then such applications 
are transmitted to the Court with a report on compliance with Rule 85.617 In assessing the 
applications for adherence to the law, the registry would group the applications into three groups: 
group A (applicants who qualify as victims), group B (applicants who don’t qualify as victims), 
and group C (applicants with an unclear status).618 Only group C applicants would be subjected to 
scrutiny by the parties,619 and the Court assesses their applications for a decision on merits. As for 
group A and B applicants, the Court only ratifies the assessment of the registry.620 The parties do 
not make observations on group A and B applicants.  
Thus, according to the proposed system, it is the registry, and not the legal representatives as it 
was in the Kenya cases, that assesses applications for conformity to Rule 85 and Article 68(3).621 
In delegating the duty of assessing applications to the registry, the Court invoked Rule 89(4) to 
opine that it is mandated to devise a system that is effective and guarantees expeditiousness of 
 
616 It should be noted that in the Kenya cases the Court delegated Rule 85 assessment to the legal representatives of 
the victims. 
617 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 24(i). 
618 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 24(ii). 
619 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 24(vi). 
620 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 24(vii). 
621 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 32. 
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proceedings and meaningful participation of the victims.622 In defence of its approach, the Court 
further held that there is no absolute statutory requirement that victim’s applications should be 
individually assessed by the Court.623 
3.4 Observations on Victim Admission Systems at the ICC 
The victim’s admission systems discussed above are similar in certain respects. First, the standard 
application form was used in both Ntaganda, Gbagbo, and Kenya cases. However, the standard 
application form was shortened in Ntaganda to only include minimum essential information. 
 Secondly, in both approaches, the administrative wing of the Court (the Registry) retains the 
arduous task of reviewing the applications for completeness. “Completeness” in this sense means 
that victim application forms should have the required identifying information needed by the Court 
to decide on their status as per Rule 85.624 However, it should be noted here that in Gbagbo and 
Ntaganda (trial system), the registry has an enhanced role of assessing victim’s applications for 
completeness and for compliance with Rule 85.625  
By contrast, in the Kenya cases, the role of the registry was limited to managing the victim's 
database and to ensure that it was accessible to legal representatives.  
Thirdly, in both approaches with exception of the Kenya cases’ approach, the Court retained its 
authority of making Rule 85 assessments. However, in the Ntaganda trial admission system, the 
Court only scrutinised those applications with respect to which the registry could not make a clear 
determination on the status of applicants. As for the Kenya cases, the Rule 85 assessment was only 
made by the legal representatives.626 
The four alternatives to the standard form approach discussed above indicate that the jurisprudence 
on victim’s application procedure is far from being settled at the ICC. The Court is still finding its 
 
622 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, paras 32 and 33. 
623 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 34. 
624 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 29 and 30 (on the ingredients of a complete application). 
625 It needs to be mentioned here that in the Ntaganda trial system, the Rule 85 assessments conducted by the Registry 
were based on the grouping criteria established by the Court itself. 
626 Ideally, the Court relegated its judicial function of making Rule 85 assessments to the registry. 
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way on how to treat such applications. Admittedly, it is a daunting task for the ICC to find the 
right system that ensures meaningful participation and guard against violation of the rights of the 
accused. 
 While it could be easier to sort out legal issues that affect the victim’s admission process at the 
ICC, the Court may struggle to find an approach that is neither resource-intensive nor rights-
trampling. All the alternative approaches to the standard system could still need to be fine-tuned 
to be time-efficient and sustainable in the wake of scarce resources available to the Court.627 Aptly 
put, the current ICC victim’s admission system must be changed to smoothly deal with the surging 
number of victims seeking participation.628 As stated in Ruto and Sang, the Rule 89 admission 
procedure is not appropriate for victims of atrocity crimes. 
Searching for a victim’s admission regime that is sustainable, efficient, and effective, the ICC 
submitted a report to the ASP in 2012 in which it outlined possible six options to the current 
system. 
(a) Maintain Rule 89 Regime: Ensure Sustainability by Increasing Funding 
The standard form application procedure created under Rule 89 could work as originally perceived 
by drafters of the statute if sufficient funding is provided to make it sustainable and efficient.629 
Alternatively, the current regime could be practically altered to separate applications for 
reparations from applications for participation in proceedings and that may improve efficiency by 
drastically reducing the number of victims seeking participation at the trial stage.630  
For the current system to function properly, additional human and financial resources are needed 
for all the actors (registry, parties, victim’s lawyers, and the court) involved in the application 
process.631 However, maintaining the current system may not be feasible in the long run, 
 
627 See ‘Victims to lose out with states’ double-standard on ICC budget’, available at 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20161121/victims-lose-out-states-doublestandard-icc-budget (accessed 28th 
March 2017). 
628 In a 2016 ICC report, thousands of victims participated in the proceedings at the ICC. See ‘Report on the Activities 
of the International Criminal Court’, ICC-ASP/15/16 (November 2016) at page 2. 
629 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 22. 
630 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 23. 
631 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 24 and 25. 
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economically speaking, as the Court may never have the required financial and human capital to 
equally run such a system across all the situations before it.632 It would simply not work as the 
individualised approach envisioned under Rule 89 cannot be efficiently applied to large numbers 
of victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.633  
(b) Semi-Collective Approach: Save Time and Reduce Paper Work Through Group 
Applications 
In Gbagbo, victims could apply either individually through the standard form or collectively 
through group forms (detailing common harms and similar criminal incidents) accompanied by 
individual declarations.634 That semi-collective approach adhered to the standard procedure as 
applications were assessed individually and participation could be individual.  
The Gbagbo approach has been deemed to be compliant with the current legal framework on 
victims under the ICC Statute. Assessed against resource-related issues, the regime could 
significantly save the time required for processing the applications though it may translate into 
increasing requirements for registry staff on the ground.635 However, the partly collective approach 
has been criticised by the defence for offering minimal information on victims and criminal 
incidents in question.636 
(c) Collective Application and Participation: Recognition of Victim’s Communities 
Under this approach, a community of people affected by crimes under international law could seek 
participation as a group by submitting a collective application.637 The formation of such groups 
could either be triggered by ICC cases or could precede the institution of proceedings.638 For this 
 
632 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 28. 
633 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 30. 
634 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 32. 
635 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 34 and 35. 
636 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 36 and 37. 
637 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 39. 
638 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 39 (2). 
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approach to function, there should be amendments to Rule 85 to recognise victim’s communities 
or associations.639 Likewise, there should be a mechanism to enable the Court to verify the legality 
of victims organisations under national laws before allowing them to participate at the ICC.  
The group approach could save valuable time for both the Court and the parties as less time and 
resources would be needed for processing the applications.640  
However, it has been submitted that the collective approach could pose some practical and legal 
huddles for the Court.641 Large numbers of victims produced by atrocity crimes make it impossible 
to constitute a fully homogenous group of victims with similar interests and demands and some of 
the victims (sexual and gender crime victims) may not feel comfortable to disclose their ordeal in 
a group setting.642 In the same vein, what would be the role of the ICC if there are no pre-existing 
groups? Further concerns were raised as to how would the ICC respond to situations where the 
national legislation on the composition of victims’ communities differs from the principles 
established by the Court.643 
(d) Registry’s Review of Applications: Enhancing Transparency and Minimising Judicial 
Scrutiny 
Under this approach, the registry receives applications and reviews them for compliance with the 
law and then transmits them together with a consolidated report to the parties and the Court for 
observations.644 The report should be prepared based on criteria set out by the Court and then after 
considerations by the parties, the Court would adopt or amend the report. It is not clear whether 
 
639 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 39(1), 41 and 42. 
640 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 43. 
641 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 44. 
642 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 46. 
643 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 45. 
644 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 50 and 51. 
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this approach would require changes to Rule 85 as the registry would be submitting the report to 
parties, a break-away from the current practice.645  
On the face of it, it appears that widening the role of the registry to that extent (making assessments 
of applications) could affect its neutrality and result into an encroachment on judicial functions of 
the Court.646 However, it has been argued that the neutrality factor could be safeguarded if the 
registry produces a report on victim’s applications that fall short of making Rule 85 assessments.647  
Generally, this approach could be advantageous to the Court as placing the burden of initial 
assessments of applications on the registry could economise the amount of time and financial 
resources that would be needed if all the parties were fully engaged in the process.648 While 
submission of a consolidated report on victim’s applications to the parties could enhance 
transparency, issues of personal security of victims and the exact role of the parties may have to 
be clarified to avoid duplication and violation of rights and protections afforded to victims under 
the ICC Statute. For that matter, if redactions are used on reports, it means there would be an 
additional workload for the registry.649 
(e) Exclusive Judicial Determination on Victim’s Applications: No Litigation Over 
Applications 
This approach envisages fast-tracking of judicial decisions on the status of victim applicants by 
doing away with the requirement of transmitting applications to the parties for observations as 
provided for under Rule 89(1).650 At best, the approach seeks to limit the adversarial contest 
between the parties over victim’s applications for participation by allowing the parties to request 
for exclusion of certain victims only during critical junctures in the trial phase.  
 
645 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 52. 
646 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 52. 
647 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 54. 
648 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 53. 
649 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 55. 
650 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 57. 
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That could be achieved through a three-pronged scenario: giving extremely minimal information 
to the parties for observations; no transmission of victim’s applications to the parties but the court 
may ask them to make observations on certain critical legal issues that may evolve; and no 
observations at all on the applications by the parties.651  
Implementing this system would certainly require amendments to Rule 89 to remove the 
requirement of right of reply by the parties.652 There are concerns that exclusion of the right of 
reply to victim’s applications could violate the parties’ right to be heard.653 While it remains 
unclear as to the usefulness of a procedure of limiting the parties’ role in challenging victim’s 
applications to the trial stage, it is argued that such an approach could be a recipe for duplication 
of judicial functions.654  
Additionally, late challenges on victim’s applications could put victims at a disadvantage as the 
element of certainty on the status of their applications would be lacking.655  Despite such potential 
shortcomings of the proposed approach, there would surely be economic advantages for the court 
and the parties as fewer time and resources would be needed.656 
(f) Pre-Trial Processing of Victim’s Applications for Participation 
The last approach introduces a victim’s admission procedure that proposes to streamline the 
application process by limiting it to a specific stage of the proceedings.657 It should be recalled that 
in Bemba, victim’s applications were dealt with by the Court even during the trial stage and this 
was complained about by the defence for affecting the right to have adequate time for preparations. 
 
651 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 58. 
652 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 59. 
653 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 61. 
654 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 62. 
655 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 63. 
656 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 60. 
657 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 65. 
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 Under the proposed procedure, victims would have to comply with strict deadlines set by the 
Court and to only submit their applications before the confirmation of charges. No applications 
would be accepted after confirmation of charges except when the charges are broader or narrower 
than those originally presented by the Prosecutor.658  
Another side of the coin to this approach would be to restrict victim applications to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber even after a case has moved to the Trial Chamber. It is hoped that such an approach could 
have significant advantages for the Court and the parties as using deadlines and limiting 
applications to a specific stage would save the time required for processing the applications and 
enhance expeditiousness at the trial stage.659 Admittedly, expeditiousness of the proceedings could 
be affected if the Court entertains endless applications of victims seeking to participate. Thus, 
unwarranted delays could be avoided if the trial chamber is not distracted by non-trial issues.  
However, the accused’s right to be tried without undue delay could be dealt a blow if victims-
related issues preoccupy the pre-trial phase unless the pre-trial chamber is allowed to deal with 
victim applications on a rolling basis even when a case advances to the trial phase.660 For the 
proposed system to function smoothly, there would be a need for increasing resources for the pre-
trial chamber, the registry, and the victim’s lawyers to enable them to reach victims at the earliest 
possible opportunity for supplying them with information and assisting them to complete 
applications.661 
3.5 Way Forward: Which Victims Admission System is Suitable for the ICC? 
From the preceding discussion, all the six alternative mechanisms to the current victim’s admission 
regime at the ICC have advantages and disadvantages.662 Ideally, given the nature of crimes being 
prosecuted at the ICC, it would be difficult to devise an admission system that is fully responsive 
 
658 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 66. 
659 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 68. 
660 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, paras 68 and 70. 
661 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 69 and 71. 
662 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 73. 
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to the heterogenous needs of all the victims. It is submitted that some aspects of the proposed 
mechanisms could be combined to produce a working approach as it is virtually impossible to have 
a one-size-fits-all admission procedure for the victims.663  
As argued in Ruto and Sang, the standard procedure approach under Rule 89 is “not appropriate” 
for cases with massive numbers of victims.664 One may ask, what should then be the basic 
considerations for an efficient victim’s admission system at the ICC? In Ntaganda, the Trial 
Chamber VI held that: “The Chamber recognises the importance of effective and meaningful 
victim participation in the proceedings. Achieving an efficient application process which provides 
applicants with a fair and timely determination of their status based on straightforward criteria is 
an essential element in giving effect to such participation”.665 
 Thus, there is a need for a new system that not only upholds the rights of the parties and 
participants but also creates an admission procedure that is certain, time-conscious, effective, and 
sustainable. The sustainability factor cannot be ignored in fashioning a new victim’s admission 
system as resource-related reasons have pre-occupied the court’s discourse on the participation of 
victims at the ICC.666 
For a victim’s admission procedure to be meaningful for the victims and observant to rights of the 
parties, it is argued that there should be a hybrid approach that allows for both individual and 
collective application and participation. In the interests of justice and judicial economy, victims 
should be allowed to participate as communities or associations based on the constitutive criteria 
established by the court itself.  
Since some victims may not feel secure to advocate for their interests in a group setting, the 
individualised approach should be retained as the ‘opt out’ avenue for such victims. If the hybrid 
 
663 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 20. 
664 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 24. 
665 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 26. 
666 Report of the Court on the Review of the System for Victims to Apply to Participate in Proceedings (2012), ICC-
ASP/11/22, para 74. 
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approach is implemented, victims would be able to apply for participation collectively or 
individually depending on the circumstances. 
Because the primary objective of the ICC is to prosecute individuals bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the perpetration of crimes under international law and mindful of the fact that 
protracted victims-related proceedings could flout rights of the accused persons, it is proposed that 
the hybrid mechanism should be implemented under the following criteria or principles: 
1. Decisions on victims seeking participation should be committed to a Pre-Trial Chamber which 
shall determine all the applications before the confirmation of charges. 
2. Victims applications should not be subjected to an adversarial contest by the parties and 
therefore applications should not be submitted to the parties for observations. 
3. In curing potential injustices that may stem from the refusal to subject victim’s applications to 
adversarial contests, the Court should, either on its own motion or by application from the 
parties, have powers to request for or permit submissions by parties on certain legal or factual 
issues relating to victim’s applications. 
4. Parties should be allowed to scrutinise or challenge a victim’s status at critical junctures of the 
case, for example when a victim wants to testify at trial or applies for reparations. 
5. Applications should be restricted to deadlines and should never be entertained after the 
confirmation of charges except when the charges are widened or narrowed. 
6. Since early victim applications could depend on many factors such as outreach activities of the 
ICC, the Court should be at liberty to permit late applications if there is a good cause shown 
by the applicant. 
7. Applications should be commenced by a specially court-approved standard application form 
that is concise; only incorporating vital information on the victim’s identity and harm-related 
accounts.  
8. All applications should be administratively processed by the registry and then transmitted to 
the Court for a judicial determination. 
9. Applications should not be transmitted to the parties except that they should be duly notified 
when victims are admitted to participate in the proceedings. 
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10. For collective applications, the law should permit the participation of natural or case-triggered 
victims’ organisations. Alternatively, up on receipt of applications, the registry should have 
the mandate of organising groups based on criteria set out by the Court. 
11. Group applications accompanied by a report prepared by the registry can be approved by the 
Court without the need to resort to one by one assessment of individual applications. 
12. For individual applicants, they should seek participation by submitting a simplified form to the 
registry which shall vet the forms for completeness before sending them to the Court together 
with a report for approval. 
13. Individual applications should only be accepted when a victim seeks direct participation667 
(giving evidence or views in person) and when the group option is not suitable to the applicant. 
14. The registry should only review the applications for compliance with legal requirements, with 
the Court having a final say on merits (Rule 85 assessments). 
15. Since the Pre-Trial Chamber may not be able to dispose of all decisions on victim applications 
before the finalisation of confirmation proceedings, the Chamber should be allowed to deal 
with such applications on a rolling basis even when a case has moved to the trial stage. 
16. Thus, all applications for participation should continue to be dealt with by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber even when a trial chamber is seized with the case except that the Trial Chamber shall 
be able to decide matters arising from challenges mounted by the parties on the status of 
victims. 
The proposed system can have many advantages than disadvantages for the Court, the parties, and 
the victims as streamlining applications to the pre-trial chamber coupled with deadline limitations 
and non-involvement of the parties could significantly reduce the time spent on victim’s 
applications at the ICC. The number of individual applicants will go down significantly as victims 
can apply and participate in groups. While there would be no significant savings on resources, the 
proposed approach is likely to be less resource-intensive compared to current approaches.  
The Court will have to ensure that the registry and victim’s lawyers get the required resources to 
enable them to be on the ground early enough for outreach activities and assistance to the victims. 
 
667 For the meaning of direct participation, see The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation 
in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para 39. 
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The efficiency of this system could highly depend on outreach measures taken by the ICC in 
situation countries.668  
There would also be some judicial gains if such an approach is adopted as committing decisions 
on victim’s applications to pre-trial chambers would contribute to enhancing expeditiousness at 
the trial level as the Court will be concentrating on trial issues. The role of the registry could also 
be less straining as non-submission of victim’s reports to the parties would obviate the need for 
redactions hence reduction of workload. 
However, the proposed procedure may not be wholly compatible with the current legal framework 
on victim’s participation at the ICC. Although it has been held in some decisions that the Court 
could employ the provisions of Rule 89(4) and 51(5) to craft a victim’s admission process that 
ensures the effectiveness of proceedings,669 it is argued that some of the components of the 
proposed hybrid system are incompatible with Article 68(3) and Rule 85.  
For example, the participation of victim’s communities would require modification of the 
definition of victims under Rule 85 to incorporate victim’s organisations or communities. 
Likewise, obviating the need for transmission of applications to the parties for observations would 
need amendments to Rule 89(1) to absolve the registry with an obligation to transmit such 
applications to the parties. 
Furthermore, restricting victim’s applications to the Pre-Trial Chamber would require amendments 
to Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute which allows for victim’s applications for participation to be 
dealt with at any stage of the proceedings (pre-trial, trial, or appeal stage). It is important that 
victims-related proceedings should have a finality. In my view, allowing endless applications for 
participation at all stages of the proceedings would be distracting for the parties and time-
consuming for the Court.  
 
668 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ Application Process ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 12. 
669 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
449, para 31; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation 
and Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 29. 
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3.6 The Typology of Participation: Stages and Modes of Victim’s Interventions 
3.6.1 Stages of Participation: What are They? 
Article 68(3) guarantees that victims who have the required legal status can be allowed to 
participate in any stage of the proceedings at the ICC. However, it should be noted that victims 
have no general and unfettered right to make interventions at any stage in a particular case even 
when they have been admitted as participants.670 In Ruto and Sang, the Trial Chamber V has held 
that it is for the court to determine the appropriate stage and time for victim’s interventions in the 
proceedings considering rights of both the victims and defendants and the need to ensure that 
proceedings are expeditious.671  
A similar position was taken by the Trial Chamber IV in Banda in which it was further held that 
“stages of proceedings” are specific procedural junctures in which a certain witness wants to testify 
or a particular piece of evidence is under consideration by the Court.672 Therefore, the participation 
of victims in proceedings at the ICC is not applicable to the generality of a case but only possible 
at certain points of the case.673 
What then should be the right moment for the victims to intervene? Judge Pikis has suggested that 
victim’s views and concerns should come forward at the earliest possible opportunity in a case to 
“alert the Court and the parties to the implications of the case on the personal interests of victims 
and how best they may be safeguarded”.674  
 
670 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 11. 
671 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 13; On the discretion of the Court in deciding the timing of involvement of 
victims, see also, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Victim’s 
Representation and Participation, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, 3 October 2012, para 12; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Decision on Victim’s Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 104. 
672 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial 
Proceedings, , ICC-02/05-03/09-545, paras 15 and 16. 
673 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 Concerning the "Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, para 17 at page 20. 
674 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims 
a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 Concerning the "Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 
February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, para 20 at page 22. 
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The suggestion by Judge Pikis underscores the importance of having victim’s ideas early on the 
case than taking them when proceedings are at an advanced stage as that could catch the parties 
off-guard. However, considering the unpredictable nature of atrocity crime prosecutions, it may 
not be feasible to suggest “a fixed moment” for victim’s interventions. There should be some 
flexibility. That’s why, in Kenyatta and Ntaganda, it was held that the appropriate juncture for the 
involvement of victims should be decided on a case by case basis.675 
3.6.2 Modes of Participation 
Victims are not on the same level as the parties regarding rights and duties under the ICC Statute. 
Not being parties, their participation is limited to the presentation of views and concerns and, in 
doing that, it has been held that they should not be allowed to assume prosecutorial functions or 
present views that are beyond the scope of the charges.676  
In other words, the participation of victims should never elevate them to the level of taking over 
the Prosecutor’s primary objective of proving the charges before the Court.677 In Kenyatta and 
Muthaura it was held that the principle of equality of arms would be trumped if victims are allowed 
to support the Prosecutor in discharging the burden of proof.678 
As regards modalities of participation, it has been held that the nature and degree of involvement 
of victims in a case would depend on the nature of charges, the number of victims, and the nature 
 
675 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Victim’s Representation 
and Participation, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para 12; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victim’s 
Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-211, 15 
January 2014, para 82. 
676 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 14; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 Concerning the "Directions and 
Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ICC-01/04-
01/06 OA8, para 15 and 16 at page 19; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Supplemented 
Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-2138 , 22 February 2012, paras 13-15. 
677 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 65; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on 
the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victim’s Participation of 18 
January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, para 93. 
678 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Victim’s Representation 
and Participation, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para 13. 
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of victim’s interests.679 As the nature of participation is case-specific and case-dependent,680 the 
section below outlines the modalities of victim’s participation that have been thus far sanctioned 
by various Chambers at the ICC. 
Victims have been allowed, either by themselves or through legal representatives, to participate in 
the following manner: 
(a) Access to court fillings and documents, subject to confidentiality restrictions imposed by the 
Statute.681 
(b) Production and examination of evidence before the court, including contesting the 
admissibility of evidence.682 
(c) Participation in Court hearings through both oral and written submissions.683 
 
679 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 54. 
680 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victim’s Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 101. 
681 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victim’s Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 105-
107; The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on Victim’s Modalities of Participation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case, ICC-02/05-02/09-136, 6 October 2009, paras 11-15; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision 
on Victim’s Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-
211, para 88 (access restricted to public records); The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, 
Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 64; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah 
Banda Abakaer Nourain, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial Proceedings, ICC-02/05-03/09-545, 
paras 34-39; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Request of Legal Representative of 
Victims for Access to Documents, ICC-01/05-01/08-3445, 17 October 2016, para 8. 
682 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victim’s Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 108-
111; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, paras 81-101, and para 104 (on contesting admissibility of 
evidence); The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 77; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Decision on the 
Participation of Victims in the Trial Proceedings, ICC-02/05-03/09-545, paras  24 – 30. 
683 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victim’s Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 112-
116; The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on Victim’s Modalities of Participation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case, ICC-02/05-02/09-136, paras 16-20 and para 24; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, paras 69 
and 70; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victim’s Participation at the Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06, 15 January 2014, para 85 (on participation at confirmation 
hearings); The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victim’s Participation at the Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06-211, para 96 (on filling submissions at confirmation 
hearing); The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and 
Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460 , paras 70-73; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Decision on 
the Participation of Victims in the Trial Proceedings, ICC-02/05-03/09-545, para 41. 
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(d) Questioning witnesses called by the Parties as well as experts and defendants.684 
(e) Opportunity for opening and closing briefs in court proceedings.685 
3.6.3 Participation at the Investigation Stage: A No-Go Area for Victims? 
The ICC Statute provides that the Prosecutor shall be the sole investigating authority over 
violations suggesting perpetration of core crimes.686 Investigations should be independently 
conducted by the Prosecutor.687 Despite that, the Prosecutor is obligated to notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber when she decides to drop investigations.688 While victims may make submissions to the 
Court in proceedings in which the Prosecutor seeks authorisation to investigate, 689 the actual role 
of victims in the ICC investigation regime is still unclear.  
According to the ICC Statute, it appears that victims may have a role to play when it comes to 
issues touching upon the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate or prosecute. Accordingly, the 
Court could seek victim’s opinion in proceedings reviewing such a decision by the Prosecutor.690 
And for information, victims are entitled to be notified of the Prosecutor’s Article 53 decision 
regarding non-investigation or non-prosecution.691 
Victims can have a participatory right in pre-confirmation Court proceedings related to 
investigations conducted by the Prosecutor. However, the law is still unclear as to the actual role 
and degree of involvement of the victims in such investigations. This section seeks to provide a 
jurisprudential analysis regarding the role of victims in investigations by examining Court 
decisions over the matter. 
 
684 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on Victim’s Modalities of Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage 
of the Case, ICC-02/05-02/09-136, paras 23-24; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, paras 72-75; The 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 74; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Decision on the Participation of 
Victims in the Trial Proceedings, ICC-02/05-03/09-545, paras 31 – 33. 
685 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 68. 
686 Articles 15 (1), 42 and 53 of the ICC Statute. 
687 Article 42(1) ICC Statute. 
688 Article 53(1) (c) ICC Statute. 
689 Article 15(3) ICC Statute. 
690 Rules 93 and 107(1) of the ICC RPE. 
691 Rule 92(2) ICC RPE. 
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3.6.3.1 Early Situation-Level Decisions: Congo, Uganda, and Darfur Situations  
The first pioneer decision regarding the status of victims at the investigation stage came in 2006 
when the full bench of the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Situation of Congo was required to determine 
whether the ICC Statute framework allowed for the participation of victims during 
investigations.692 In disposing of such a question, the Court considered whether Article 68(3) 
would cover the “investigation stage” as judicial proceedings.693  
The Chamber, considering terminological implications of the words “investigations and 
proceedings” under Articles 54(3)(e), 56(1)(b) and (2), and 127, reasoned that “the term 
proceedings does not necessarily exclude the stage of investigation of a situation”.694 In contextual 
terms, the Court also argued that Article 68(3) does not explicitly discount the involvement of 
victims at the investigation stage.695 
Furthermore, citing key provisions of human rights conventions and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the three 
judges observed that regional human rights courts have acknowledged the victim’s right to 
participate in investigations.696 That, victims have a general interest in the fight against immunity, 
and such a fight should begin at the investigation stage.697 Thus, the Court concluded that Article 
68(3) applies to investigations. 
Confronted with the Prosecutor’s argument that participation of victims in investigations would 
be inappropriate for undermining “the integrity and objectivity of investigations”, the Court opined 
 
692 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 
2006, para 22. 
693 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para 27. 
694 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 29 – 38. 
695 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 42-46. 
696 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 50-53. 
697 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para 53. 
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that participation would not affect the objectivity of investigations unless such participation 
extends beyond the presentation of views and concerns.698  
On the potential nexus between personal interests and investigations, the Chamber observed that 
“…personal interests of victims are affected in general at the investigation stage, since the 
participation of victims at this stage can serve to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of 
crimes and to request reparations for the harm suffered”.699 
Aptly put, the reasoning of the Pre-Trial Chamber I regarding the role of victims at the 
investigation stage was acknowledged and followed by other Pre-Trial Chambers in the situations 
of Uganda and Darfur (Sudan).700  
3.6.3.2 Appeal’s Chamber U-Turn Regarding Participation of Victims in Investigations 
On the 19th of December 2008, the Appeals Chamber delivered a unanimous decision that 
effectively overturned earlier jurisprudence of the ICC that sanctioned the participation of victims 
at the investigation stage.701 The thrust of the appeal was whether victims of a situation could 
legally assume participatory rights at the investigation stage.702  
 
698 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 56-59. 
699 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para 63. 
700 Situation in Uganda, Decision on Victim’s Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06, to a/0070/06, 
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-252, 10 August 2007, para 83; Situation in 
Darfur Sudan, Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants 
a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, ICC-02/05-111-Corr, 14 
December 2007, at page 23; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Requests of the 
OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2) (e) of the Regulations 
of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor, ICC-01/04-417, 7 December 2007, 
paras 2-6. 
701 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, 19 December 2008, para 59. 
702 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, paras 10 and 36. 
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Both, the Defence and the Prosecutor pushed that the regime under Article 68(3) could not 
incorporate ‘participation in investigations’ as investigations are not judicial proceedings. 
In contrast, the victims cited three multifaceted factors in support of earlier decisions that granted 
them participation in investigations. They argued that their participation would serve three 
interests: clarifying facts, seeking punishment of the perpetrators, and claiming repatriations.703  
The Appeals Chamber held that it would be contrary to the ambit of Article 68(3) to allow victims 
to participate in investigations as the said provision relates to judicial proceedings to which 
investigations are not.704 Likewise, the Court argued that allowing victims to participate in 
investigations may pollute prosecutorial obligations as the duty of conducting investigations is a 
preserve of the Prosecutor.705  
However, despite refusing to give the victims a direct hand in the investigations, the Court opined 
that victims could still use other avenues under the Statute and furnish information to the 
Prosecutor.706 The Court further added that interests of the victims are well protected as the Statute 
obligates the Prosecutor to take into account the victim’s interests while conducting 
investigations.707 
 
703 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 29. 
704 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 45. 
705 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 52. 
706 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 53. 
707 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 54; See also Articles 54(1)(b) and 53(1)(c) ICC Statute. 
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Since participation is strictly confined to judicial proceedings,708 the Court held that victims can 
still participate in proceedings touching upon investigations conducted by the Prosecutor.709 It 
should be noted here that the Appeals Chamber neglected the chance to lay down the law as to 
how proceedings at the investigation stage should be conducted with respect to the victims.710 That 
is a lacuna that leaves the victims in limbo regarding the extent of their involvement in pre-
confirmation proceedings relating to investigations. 
3.7 Legal Representation for Victims 
As already discussed in previous sections, victims can present their views either in person or 
through legal representatives.711 The jurisprudence of the Court also provides that legal 
representation for victims is not a “pre-requisite for participation” and therefore victims can 
represent themselves or use lawyers.712 As per the Rules, victims are entitled to a lawyer of their 
choice and in the case of disagreements amongst victims over legal representation, the Court is 
empowered to instruct the registry to pick a lawyer for them.713  
However, in the Situation of Uganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber II has held that victim’s right to pick 
counsel is not mandatory as Rule 90 (on legal counsel for victims) envisages common legal 
representation as opposed to individual representation hence the Court retains the option to either 
 
708 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 55; Situation in The Republic of Kenya, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings Related to 
the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-24, para 9. 
709 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 56. 
710 Situation in The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of 
the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 57. 
711 Article 68(3) ICC Statute. Legal Representation is optional as the last sentence of Article 68(3) provides that: “Such 
views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it 
appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”. 
712 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on 
Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures and Time-limit for Submission 
of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-134, 1 February 2007, paras 3, 4, and 10. 
713 Rule 90 (1) and (3) ICC RPE. 
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choose counsel for victims or allow the victims to do that.714 Victims retain the privilege of 
choosing own counsel if they opt for individual representation. 
In the appointment of a lawyer for a group of victims, the Court is obligated to ensure that the 
diverse interests of victims are taken on board.715 The law also provides for pro bono legal services 
for victims who are indigent.716 As decided in Bemba, indigent victims lose the right to select their 
legal counsel.717 Pro bono lawyers are picked by the Court. As for qualifications, counsel for 
victims must have the knowledge and training enabling them to competently represent victims of 
crimes under international law.718  
Some decisions of the ICC have stressed that legal representatives should be geographically 
proximate to the victims to ensure effective communication and that counsel should have 
knowledge of the situation country as well as a good understanding of victims’ communities to 
ensure meaningful representation.719 
Furthermore, in his dissenting opinion in Ntaganda in 2015, Judge Ozaki has laid down important 
principles for the organisation of legal representatives at the ICC.720 One of such principles is that 
a legal representative should be geographically proximate to victims for information sharing and 
consultations and that the counsel’s familiarity with the cultural attributes of the victims may help 
secure a good working relationship which is essential for meaningful representation.721  
 
714 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on 
Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures and Time-limit for Submission 
of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-134, para 5. 
715 Rule 90(4) ICC RPE. 
716 Rule 90(5) ICC RPE. 
717 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Common Legal Representation of Victims for the 
Purpose of Trial, ICC-01/05-01/08-100, 10 November 2010, para 16. 
718 Rule 90(6) and Rule 22(1) ICC RPE. 
719 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Victim’s Representation 
and Participation, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para 60; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, 
Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 60. 
720 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, 16 June 2015. 
721 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, paras 6 and 7. 
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Advocating for the use of local lawyers instead of Hague-based lawyers, Judge Ozaki argued that 
local counsel is better placed to ensure a meaningful tripartite engagement between the victims, 
legal representatives, and the Court.722 In his opinion, representational proximity would also 
provide the Court with unpolluted information regarding the victims.723 The Judge further opined 
that victims would feel “empowered” and the proceedings enhanced if the representation is carried 
out by lawyers with a fine grasp of crime localities, cultural orientation of the victims, and the 
nature of victimisation.724 
The Dissenting opinion by Judge Ozaki was in response to the majority decision in which the Trial 
Chamber VI refused to modify the system of legal representation for the trial proceedings by 
substituting Hague based counsel for those based in the DRC.725 The chamber neglected the 
“proximity definition” espoused by Ozaki, stating that it does not have to be physical but a working 
knowledge of the victim’s culture and the typology of victimisation would suffice for the purpose 
of representation.726 It was therefore decided that victims would continue to be represented by 
Western-based lawyers assisted by local lawyers based in the DRC,727 contrary to the Judge Ozaki 
idea that such representation should “be led from the ground” by local lawyers.728 
As per Article 68(3), it would seem that victims are entitled to representation only in the 
proceedings. However, practice indicates that some Chambers of the Court have sanctioned legal 
representation for victims even during the application phase while others have refused to do that.729 
 
722 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, paras 10-13. 
723 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, para 14. 
724 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, para 15-16. 
725 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
02/06-650, 16 June 2015, paras 28 -32. 
726 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
02/06-650, para 28. 
727 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
02/06-650, paras 29 and 32. 
728 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-Anx, para 17. 
729 Report on Cluster D (1): Applications for Victim Participation (2015), ICC-ASP/14/30, page 21. 
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Most of the court’s jurisprudence seems to be in agreement that persons applying for participation 
as victims at the ICC are not entitled to counsel until their status is determined by the Court.730  
In order to cure some disadvantages resulting from lack of legal counsel for applicant victims, 
some Chambers of the Court have held that the registry (Office of Public Counsel for Victims) 
should provide legal services to such victims.731 That approach should be distinguished from the 
appointment of legal counsel under Rule 90, which is exercisable once a particular applicant has 
been declared ‘victim’ by the Court. 
Even though victims are generally not entitled to legal counsel at the application stage, Judge 
Mauro Politi has argued that “the interests of justice principle” espoused under Regulation 80732 
could be invoked to enable the Court to order the appointment of counsel for victims even when 
their applications are under consideration.733  
One of the scenarios in which such a principle could be used is when there is inequality amongst 
victims owing to access, and lack of access, to legal counsel at the application phase. The 
appointment of counsel for victim applicants under ad hoc considerations was also endorsed by 
Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova in Ntaganda in which she argued that “…should any issue arise 
which warrants submissions by the applicants, their legal representation will be promptly 
 
730 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of 
Applicants on Application Process for Victim’s Participation and Legal Representation, ICC-01/04-374, 17 August 
2007, para 43; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic Ongwen, 
Decision on Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures and Time-limit for 
Submission of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-134, para 11; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision 
Establishing Principles on the Victim’s Application Process, ICC-01/04-02/06-67, para 45. 
731 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of 
Applicants on Application Process for Victim’s Participation and Legal Representation, ICC-01/04-374, para 44; The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Observations on Legal Representation of Unrepresented 
Applicants, ICC-01/05-01/08-651, 9 December 2009, para 18(a); The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision 
on the Role of the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and its Request for Access to Documents, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1211, 6 March 2008, para 34. 
732 Regulation 80(1) says: “A Chamber, following consultation with the Registrar, may appoint a legal representative 
of victims where the interests of justice so require”, Regulations of the ICC, ICC-BD/01-01-04. 
733 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on 
Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures and Time-limit for Submission 
of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-01/05-134, para 12. 
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organized, unless some of the applicants are assisted by a lawyer of their own choice”.734 What 
emerges from the Judge Trendafilova argument is that applicants should be afforded legal 
assistance whenever they seek to move the Court during the application stage. 
Lastly, some Chambers of the Court have stressed that victim applicants should be consulted by 
the registry on the choice of counsel to represent them after they have been granted permission to 
participate.735 This is intended for capturing victim’s concerns on legal representation early on to 
enable them to participate meaningfully in confirmation hearings. 
3.8 Nexus Between Victim Participation and Reparations at the ICC 
In general terms, victim’s right to justice encapsulates the right to obtain reparation for the harm 
suffered. In international criminal justice, the right to reparation for the victims can only be 
executed when the Court gives a guilty verdict for the accused.736 There can never be reparations 
for the victims at the ICC in the absence of a conviction for the defendant.  
Thus, effective participation by the victims in the trial proceedings could lead to substantive gains 
for them when a case reaches the reparations stage. Since the nature and size of reparations would 
depend on the extent of harm suffered by victims of the crimes of a convicted person, it follows 
that the adduction of victimisation evidence by the victims during the trial could help clarify things 
in reparation proceedings.737  
That is notwithstanding the fact that victims are at liberty to either present the evidence relating to 
reparations during the trial or preserve it until the commencement of reparation proceedings.738 
 
734 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victim’s Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 45. 
735 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the Victim’s Application Process, ICC-
01/04-02/06-67, para 46; The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Second Decision on Issues Related to the Victim’s 
Application Process, ICC-02/11-01/11-86, para 44; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on 
Common Legal Representation of Victims for the Purpose of Trial, ICC-01/05-01/08-100, paras 18-21.    
736 Article 75(2) ICC Statute. 
737  Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, paras 184-185; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Decision on the Request by Victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express their Views and Concerns in 
Person and to Present Evidence During the Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 29.  
738 Regulation 56 of the ICC Regulations says that: “The Trial Chamber may hear the witnesses and examine the 
evidence for the purposes of a decision on reparations in accordance with article 75, paragraph 2, at the same time as 
for the purposes of trial.” 
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Since reparation proceedings are distinct from trial proceedings,739 it has been suggested by the 
Court that reparation evidence produced by the victims during the trial could be received by the 
Court and recorded for use in reparation proceedings.740 In addition, the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga has argued that the Trial Chamber may elicit evidence on the harm caused to the victims 
for the purpose of assessing the convicted person’s liability for reparations.741 
More importantly, participation by the victims is crucial in recording their victimisation as ICC 
judgments are based on the evidence submitted to the Court as well as submissions by parties and 
participants (victims).742  
It has been held by the ICC and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that court judgments 
have an important reparative value for the victims.743 Thus, participation enhances recognition of 
the victims, giving them the confidence they need to be more articulative about their plight. Even 
when the participation of the victims at the ICC does not lead to reparations due to non-conviction 
of the defendant, victims could still use the judgment to pursue other justice mechanisms at the 
domestic level because non-conviction does not necessarily mean that crimes were not committed.  
As stated in Katanga, an acquittal does not mean that the accused is innocent and that crimes were 
not committed; it only means that the evidence presented did not meet the “beyond reasonable 
doubt” standard of proof.744  
Thus, it is submitted that ICC judgments, whether resulting in a conviction or acquittal, could help 
the victims get recognised and seek remedy through other justice mechanisms. For example, 
irrespective of whether reparations have been provided to them at the ICC, victims could still use 
the ICC official records (Judgments, Decisions, and Orders) to assert their rights in national 
jurisdictions either against governments or individuals. That proposition is in line with the ICC 
 
739 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 76. 
740 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 119 
- 121. 
741 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 186. 
742 Article 74(2) ICC Statute. 
743 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 237; Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 21 July 1989, para 36; Case of 
Tibi v Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 7 September 2004, para. 243; 
Case of the Plan de Sanchez Massacre v Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 19 November 2004, para. 
81. 
744 Katanga Article 74 Judgment, para 70. 
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Statute and international human rights law since, whatever the outcome of proceedings at the ICC, 
neither state responsibility nor rights of the victims under domestic law are affected.745  
3.9 Chapter Conclusion  
The chapter has attempted to lay down the law relating to the participation of victims at the ICC 
by navigating through decisions of the Court to gauge the compatibility of the ICC victim’s 
participation system to what I call “principles of substantive participation” as alluded to earlier. 
After a decade and a half in operation and with 10 situations under its jurisdiction, it would be the 
ideal moment for one to pinpoint some drawbacks of the victim participation regime at the ICC. 
It is submitted that the victim participation policy that has been carried out by the ICC in sixteen 
years is neither tokenistic nor substantive in terms of responding to justice demands of the victims 
of heinous violations of human rights. One cannot claim that such a policy has significantly 
resulted in substantive gains for the victims.  
This writer concludes that the participation regime for the victims at the ICC is not wholly non-
retraumatising, and it is neither fully amenable to the principle of equal access to justice nor 
affording full access to information. Going by the jurisprudential analysis and considering the legal 
framework of the ICC, I am inclined to conclude that the principles of substantive participation 
have not been fully observed due to the following reasons. 
First, the discourse of ‘defendants first then the victims’ has subjected victims to a disadvantage 
in relation to the accused persons. As demonstrated, most of the Judges have immensely capitalised 
on the ‘parties/non-parties divide’ to close down space for the victims in ICC proceedings. Even 
though victims are not parties and the observance of rights of the accused is stressed upon under 
Article 68(3), the ICC Statute does not suggest that defendants are superior to victims in terms of 
rights and privileges.  
Like defendants, victims also need the protection of the Court, without which they will not be able 
to get justice. While the jurisprudence of the ICC has clearly stated that participation per se can 
 
745 Articles 75(6) and 25(4) ICC Statute; See also paragraph V (9) of the UN Basic Principles on Reparations which 
provides that: “A person shall be considered a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator of the violation is identified, 




never be repugnant to rights of the defendants, some Judges have given in to the slogan “respect 
for rights of the defence”746 resulting in unreasonable roadblocks on the path to justice for victims.  
That is why some of the Judges, as discussed, have invoked utilitarian considerations747 in 
restricting interventions by the victims. Victims need the right to be heard, and that is the rationale 
of Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute. They can never be heard meaningfully if they are regarded as 
second class to the accused persons. 
Secondly, participation is never assured because the exact typology for victim participation is 
unclear under the ICC Statute and the interpretation of Article 68(3) by the Judges has led to 
unpredictable jurisprudence. As held by Judge Steiner in Katanga, “legal certainty” is essential for 
an effective participation of the victims at the ICC.748  
However, it is submitted that legal certainty in relation to victim’s rights at the ICC may not be 
possible because, unlike the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,749 the ICC Statute does not define 
modes of participation for the victims. The modes of participation must be set out by the Judges. 
That is why some Judges say that victims can give evidence on guilt or innocence of the accused 
while others have contested that it is for the Prosecutor to do that and not the victims. Also, as 
indicated, there have been conflicting decisions on the exact role of victims in the investigations. 
Thus, in the absence of specific statutory provisions on the content of rights of the victims, ICC 
Judges will continue to produce inconsistent jurisprudence in that regard.  
 
746 See for example, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on 
the Participation of Victims in the Appeal, ICC-02/04-01/05-324, 27 October 2008, para 10. 
747 Judges are not concerned by the judicial value of victim’s interventions; they are concerned by the number of 
victims seeking participation and the volume of views – that the higher the number the more the likelihood that defence 
rights will be affected, which is unsupported by the ICC Statute.  For example, in one decision in Lubanga, the Trial 
Chamber I suggested that the number of victims seeking personal participation must be trimmed down as allowing a 
large number of victims to directly present views could breach fair trial rights of the accused person. See, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Request by Victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to 
Express their Views and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence During the Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 
para 27. 
748 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 May 2008, paras 
50-51. 
749 Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8. 
144 
 
It is argued that the inconsistence could only be cured by having a provision that defines modes of 
participation.750 The principle of curing jurisprudential inconsistencies through positive law was 
also upheld by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga in support of the adoption of a provision in ICC 
Regulations that regulates powers of the Court to modify legal characterisation of facts.751 
Thirdly, the requirement of proving personal interests for every intervention creates uncertainties 
for the victims as participation is not assured even for the victims who have already been admitted 
in the case. The personal interest’s criterion under Article 68(3) operates as a clawback clause to 
participation as rights granted with a right hand could as well be taken away by the other hand. 
 Arguably, the requirement of personal interests should not be the absolute determinant factor for 
participation as such a requirement does not feature under the specific statutory provisions such as 
Articles 15(3) and 19(3) that grant participatory rights to the victims.752 Victims should only be 
required to establish a nexus between crimes charged and harm suffered, for them to be granted 
participation. In the ECCC, victims do not have to prove personal interests to participate. 
Fourthly, the role of victims in the investigations is another area that has resulted in conflicting 
decisions amongst different Chambers of the ICC. While the Appeals Chamber has held that 
victims can only have the right to be heard in the proceedings relating to investigations as opposed 
to taking investigative steps alongside the prosecutor, other chambers of the court have 
acknowledged the right of legal representatives to investigate. For example, in Katanga, the full 
bench of the Trial Chamber II has held that victims are not allowed to conduct investigations to 
 
750 On how to cure inconsistencies, see, ‘Regulation 55 and Rights of the Accused at the International Criminal Court’ 
Washington College of Law War Crimes Office (2013), at page 9, available at 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/Report17.pdf (accessed 20 April 2017). 
751 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor 
against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants 
that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts may be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court", ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 15 OA 16, 8 December 2009, para 70. 
752 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 61-62; 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on Victim Participation in the Investigation Stage of 
the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in 
the Appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, ICC-
01/04-556, para 29. 
145 
 
establish the guilt or innocence of the defendant but legal representatives may carry out 
investigations for proving victimisations suffered by the victims.753  
What emerges from such decisions is the fact that the jurisprudence of the ICC is unsettled on the 
exact role of victims in investigations. Where does one draw a line between investigations geared 
at proving the guilt of the accused and those directed at proving harm to the victims? Clearly, this 
is a jurisprudential uncertainty that does not help the victims.  
The rationale fronted for banning the victims from investigating incriminating or exonerating 
evidence is that such an approach would violate the principle of equality of arms and fair trial rules 
by subjecting defendants to cases of both the Prosecutor and the victims.754 However, it is my 
opinion that such worries are practically unsubstantiated since, whatever the case, it is the 
Prosecutor-led investigations that will form the basis of charges. It is for the prosecutor to institute 
charges, not the victims. So, if the victims conduct investigations, they may not necessarily be 
ultra vires to the indictment sought by the Prosecutor and that kills the notion of double 
prosecution. 
 The same Trial Chamber in Katanga has suggested, in another decision, that victims can request 
the Prosecutor to undertake certain investigations.755 That suggests that prosecutorial 
investigations may not be comprehensive and fully responsive to victim’s interests, prompting the 
Court to envisage that victims may push the Prosecutor to take a certain direction in the 
investigations.  
Aptly put, the interests of justice demand that victims should be somehow involved in the 
investigations as there is evidence at the ICC that investigations by the Prosecutor could be skewed. 
In the Chui case, which resulted in an acquittal even though crimes were committed in Ituri, the 
Court protested that investigations conducted by the Prosecutor were not thorough for lacking 
 
753 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, paras 102 – 103. 
754 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 102. 
755 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para 83. 
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crucial forensic evidence on the victims and crime localities and for neglecting critical aspects of 
the case such as socio-cultural information.756 
Fifthly, the principle of equal access to justice for the victims as enshrined in human rights 
instruments is strategically unenforceable under the ICC Statute with respect to the victims. 
Prosecutorial selectivity means that victims of uncharged crimes or fugitive defendants such as Al 
Bashir (Darfur Victims) may not be able to participate in the proceedings and claim reparations. 
Likewise, the strategic selection of incidents on which the Prosecutor base the charges would mean 
that a particular situation could produce participating and non-participating victims.  
For example, in Lubanga, the prosecutor restricted the charges to conscription and use of child 
soldiers, leaving out sexual and gender based crimes. That decision locked out victims of sexual 
crimes perpetrated by Lubanga. So, in summary, the lack of equal access affects both the 
participation regime and the reparations case. Ideally, such inequality will continue to exist as long 
as the ICC continues to function strictly as a criminal court as opposed to human rights courts.  
Judge Wyngaert has opined that the ICC can never be a criminal court (prosecutions) and a human 
rights court (restorative justice) at the same time, suggesting that the Trust Fund for Victims should 
be transformed into a reparation or claims commission so as to widen its jurisdictional base in 
dealing with large numbers of victims seeking recognition and reparations.757 
Lastly, the admission system for the victims must be refined by going for the proposed semi-
collective hybrid procedure that incorporates both collective and individual applications. Such an 
approach would cater to both victim’s communities as well as individuals that are not comfortable 
with group settings.  
To economise judicial proceedings and to guard against protracted victim-related proceedings, 
victim applications should not be subjected to a judicial contest by the parties. Applications should 
be administratively assessed by the registry for compliance and submitted to the Court for 
approval. However, in the spirit of safeguarding the parties’ right to be heard, parties should be 
afforded an opportunity to challenge victim applicants whenever they seek to intervene in critical 
 
756 Ngudjolo Chui Article 74 Judgment, paras 115-123. 
757 See Judge Christine Baroness Van den Wyngaert presentation on YouTube entitled “Victims before International 
Criminals Courts: A Challenge for International Criminal Justice” (2011), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYb19TIPOBU (watched on 21 April 2017). 
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junctures of the case. The proposed system should be equally applied to all the cases at the ICC 




















AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S REPARATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
The chapter provides a reasoned analysis of the ICC reparation decisions in Lubanga, Katanga, 
and Al Mahdi to determine their compatibility with an international human rights law requirement 
that reparations should adequate, effective, and prompt.758 
As discussed in the previous chapter, victim’s right to participate in the criminal proceedings is 
crucial to satisfying the right to reparation under Article 75 of the ICC Statute. The reparations 
stage is a province of the victims.759 Therefore, victims’ participation in the reparation process is 
critical to achieving meaningful redress.760  
The ICC Statute begins with a preamble that embodies a commitment of the international 
community towards the elimination of impunity for international crimes. Anti-impunity efforts 
should be directed at both criminal justice as well as restorative justice. Criminal punishment of 
the perpetrators could mean nothing for the victims if their harm remains unredressed. The ICC 
presents a system of international criminal justice that seeks to combine punitive justice with 
reparative justice.761  
Also, the court has admitted in its reparations judgments that its success in eradicating impunity 
for international crimes hinges on the success of its redress system.762 In my opinion, the success 
of the ICC reparation system needs to be measured on the basis of how responsive it is to the needs 
 
758 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 33; Lubanga Reparations Judgment, para 242; Katanga Reparations 
Order (2017) paras 15 and 267; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 44; General Comment No. 4 on the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, paras 8, 
25, and 33. 
759 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 267. 
760 Lubanga Reparations Judgment, para 203. 
761 Article 75 of the ICC Statute; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 177;  Lubanga Reparations Order 
(2015), para 1. 
762 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 14; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 178; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015), para 3.  
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of heterogenous victims and different harm categories. International crimes entail a universe of 
victims with unique and heterogenous redress requirements. 
According to a UN Special Report by Pablo de Greiff, reparations need to be conceptualised as a 
three-term phenomenon that incorporates ‘victims, benefits, and beneficiaries’ as interrelated 
aspects.763 That, complete reparations must extend redress benefits to the right victims, eventually 
turning them into beneficiaries. Thus, reparations should not be solely deemed as a justice 
mechanism but a process through which victims achieve justice. Just like the end result, the 
reparation process matters for the victims. For example, a process laden with complex procedural 
requirements and an overly bureaucratic reparation regime may potentially result in unjust and 
inadequate reparations. 
Diane Orentlicher defines ‘completeness’ with regard to reparations as a scenario where redress 
benefits are provided to all the victims of all categories of crimes under consideration in a given 
case.764  
Since ICC reparations are defendant-based, narrow charges could give rise to ‘incomplete’ 
reparations as some victims from the same situation could be excluded from participation and 
eventual access to reparations. In abstract terms, a reparation program becomes comprehensive 
when all victims of all human rights violations in a particular situation receive reparation. 
However, due to inherent limitations of the ICC reparations, comprehensive reparations are 
inconceivable. Owing to resource constraints, no reparation program whether court-ordered or 
administrative reparations has been able to achieve completeness.765 
More so, the ICC, as a court of last resort, operates in a complementary relationship with national 
courts. Since prosecutions are focused on gross violations and persons most responsible for the 
commission of crimes, many victims in a given situation may not access defendant-based 
 
763 See UN Report entitled ‘Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence’,  
 A/69/518,  14 October 2014, para 23; ‘Rule of Law Tools for Post Conflict States: Reparation Programs’ (2008), 
Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, page 15.  
764 Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, 
E/CN.4/2005/102, 18 February 2005, para 59(b) at page 17; See also a UN Report entitled ‘Independent Study on 
Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist States in Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity to Combat 
All Aspects of Impunity, by Professor Diane Orentlicher’, E/CN.4/2004/88, 27 February 2004, para 60 at page 19. 
765 ‘Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence’, A/69/518, para 26. 
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reparations due to limited charges. That is an inherent limitation. Thus, it would be illusory, at 
least under the current legal regime, for one to envisage comprehensive reparations at the ICC. 
However, the completeness of reparations could be affected by a number of aspects. The scope of 
a reparation program and the number of beneficiaries could be affected by the following: 
availability of information on victims, crimes, and court proceedings; victim’s participation in the 
proceedings; outreach activities; accessibility of the court; and evidentiary requirements.766  
For example, extensive grassroot outreach activities regarding reparations in situation countries 
could enhance the breadth of reparations regarding participation.767 In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber 
I rightly opined that “outreach activities, which include, firstly, gender and ethnic-inclusive 
programmes and, secondly, communication between the Court and the affected individuals and 
their communities are essential to ensure that reparations have broad and real significance”.768 
Similarly, dissemination of information regarding reparation procedures and programmes to be 
implemented is crucial for effective victim participation.769  
In addition, the human rights requirement that victims should be treated equally and fairly 
underscores the need for an equal dissemination of information to all the victims without 
discrimination.770 Victims must have unhindered access to all the information on the violations as 
well as the redress mechanisms under consideration.771 
Judicial accessibility is another aspect that could determine the extent of the provision of 
reparations to the victims. A smooth access to the Court is a critical step towards reparative 
justice.772 That points to the legal framework establishing the right to redress as well as the 
procedural avenue towards the obtainment of reparations by the victims.773 Effective reparations 
 
766 ‘Rule of Law Tools for Post Conflict States: Reparation Programs’ (2008) pages 15 – 18. 
767 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga , Queen's University Belfast's Human Rights Centre (HRC) and University of 
Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) Submission on Reparations Issues pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3551, para 23. 
768 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 205. 
769 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), paras 214 and 259. 
770 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017) , para 29. 
771 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, paras 11(c) and 24. 
772 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para 12. 
773 General Comment No. 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, para 9 at page 4. 
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entail the availability of redress without undue impediments whether legal, technical, or 
procedural.774 It follows that, victim’s access to a remedy could be hindered when you have 
restrictive laws and complicated court procedures.   
To determine whether ICC reparations are near complete or promise completeness, one has to look 
at the way the Court has pronounced itself to the factors affecting completeness as mentioned 
above. That is what this chapter does by assessing the substantive parts of the Court’s reparation 
judgments. 
 4.2 Nature of ICC Reparations  
To have a clear picture of the ICC reparations, one has to understand that, despite being civil, ICC 
reparations are born out of the criminal proceedings. An order for reparations is intrinsically linked 
to the result of a criminal trial in which liability for reparations is pinned to the parameters of the 
conviction decision.775 Therefore, an obligation to repair stems from individual criminal 
responsibility.776 
All reparation decisions of the ICC are unanimous that the purpose of reparations is to obligate 
person held responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes “…to repair the harm they caused 
to the victims and to enable the Court to ensure that offenders account for their acts”.777 The main 
agenda is to ensure accountability of the perpetrators towards the victims by the provision of 
redress for the harm suffered. However, despite agreeing that reparations should revolve around 
remedying the victims for the defendant’s specific transgressions of their rights, other chambers 
of the Court have introduced other considerations.  
Some decisions have gone further by demanding that reparations should be reconciliatory, 
transformative, and deterrent.  
 
 
774 General Comment No. 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, para 23 at page 8. 
775 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 16 and 17. 
776 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 17. 
777 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 15 and 267; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 179; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015), para 65; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 27. 
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4.2.1 Can ICC Reparations Achieve Deterrence? 
In Lubanga and Al Mahdi, Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber VIII respectively introduce the 
concept of deterrence as one of the objectives of reparations. In both decisions, the Court states 
that reparations should be able “…to deter future violations”.778  
Arguably, since reparations are neither punitive nor criminal, the deterrence objective becomes 
illusory for being unachievable. The fact that ICC reparations emanate from a criminal conviction 
does not necessarily make them punitive. They are still civil. In clear terms, reparations are not for 
pain infliction on the part of the offender but for making amends for an injury suffered by a 
victim.779 
Furthermore, the ICC does not provide judicial guidance on the turbulent question of achieving 
deterrence through reparations. While it would be conceivable to accept that fear of criminal 
sanctions for atrocity violations could deter people from committing grave crimes and thereby 
avoid the ICC,780 it is highly unlikely that reparations per se could be deterrent. One pragmatic 
question regarding ICC reparations warrants a discussion here. What would be the deterrent effect 
of ICC reparations when the actual enforcement of reparations does not take a penny from the 
convicted defendants? At the time of writing, the practice of the Court has been to enforce 
reparations through the Trust Fund due to the defendant’s indigence.781 
One may ask whether it would ever be an incentive for people to conform to international criminal 
law for fear of liability for reparations. It is argued that reparations per se may certainly not 
discourage criminal behaviour in atrocity crime environments. It is particularly so as ICC 
reparations are an offshoot of a criminal conviction, only considered when there is a guilty verdict. 
Additionally, no economic strain could be felt by most defendants since it is assured, under the 
current practice, that a reparation order against them will always be enforced by a third party (the 
 
778 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 179; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 71; Al Mahdi 
Reparations Order (2017), para 28. 
779 Sayre‐McCord G ‘Criminal Justice and Legal Reparations as an Alternative to Punishment’ (2001) 35 Noûs 504-
505. 
780 Simmons B and Jo H ‘Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity ?’ (2016) 70 International Organization 
446-448. 
781 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 327-330; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 116; 
Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), paras 269, 273, and 274; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 138. 
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Trust Fund). For example, the indigent Al Mahdi does not have to worry about his 2.7 million 
euros reparations bill because the Trust Fund will take care of it. 
Similarly, the impecunious Katanga may never have to worry about his 1 million euro reparation 
order because the Trust Fund will enforce it.782  
Turning to another side of the coin, would there be deterrence when a defendant shoulders the 
whole economic burden of reparations? In my view, there is no one-size fits all answer to the 
question. However, I hold the view that the deterrent function of international crimes reparations 
is contingent upon the nature and scale of prosecutions at the ICC and in national jurisdictions. 
Prosecution-based deterrence is the point I advance here.  
The primary goal of the ICC is to ‘prevent recurrence of crimes’ through a complementary action 
alongside national authorities.783 Since atrocity crime prosecutions at the domestic level tend to be 
lower due to inaction,784 the aggregate deterrent impact of ICC reparations will potentially be 
minimal and possibly ineffectual because the Court does not prosecute everyone. 
The ICC only goes for serious high gravity crimes targeting perpetrators holding, for example, 
leadership positions and incidents representing atrocious criminality.785 Considering that ICC 
 
782 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 326, 327, and 330. 
783 ICC Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, Office of the Prosecutor, 15 September 2016, para 7. 
784 In the past, many conflict states have not been in the habit of conducting meaningful investigations and prosecutions 
of the persons responsible for core crimes. On this assertion, please see: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber 
II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25 September 2009, paras 69 and 80; The 
Prosecutor V. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 
February 2010, para 29; The Prosecutor V. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 
Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 30 May 2011, para 70; The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali , Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 
May 2011, para 66; The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo , Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s Challenge to the Admissibility 
of the Case against Simone Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/12-47-Red, 11 December 2014, paras 78-79; The Prosecutor v. 
Simone Gbagbo , Judgment on the Appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 
December 2014 entitled “Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone 
Gbagbo”, ICC-02/11-01/12-75-Red, 27 May 2015, para 59; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar 
Al Bashir") , Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
ICC-02/05-01/09-3, 4 March 2009, paras 49-51. 
785 ICC Case Selection Policy (2016) paras 35-40; Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 23 
April 2009, Regulation 33; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir") , ICC-02/05-01/09-
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reparations are an offspring of a criminal conviction, the resultant scenario is that reparations 
awarded at the ICC may never be reflective of the total harm suffered in a given conflict situation. 
Equally, entrenched impunity in some jurisdictions means fewer prosecutions which in turn affect 
reparations. Therefore, unless there is a near impossible situation where atrocity crime 
prosecutions domestically and internationally cover all the perpetrators, it is highly improbable to 
achieve functional deterrence through ICC reparations. 
4.2.2 Is Reconciliation Possible Through Defendant-Focused Reparations? 
Ideally, reconciliation is critical for post-conflict peace initiatives and, if handled rightly, it can 
help heal wounds inflicted by past crimes.786 However, to achieve meaningful peace in atrocity 
crime situations, reconciliation needs to be conceptualised as a healing process that comes at the 
very end of a truth-telling process. In the past, a number of post conflict transitions have used truth 
commissions to establish historical truth regarding past atrocities to achieve forgiveness and 
trigger reconciliation. Thus, apologies and truth-telling are critical for reconciliation as a post 
conflict justice process.787 
As alluded to earlier, some ICC reparation decisions have premised reconciliation as one of the 
objectives of reparations. Some reparations decisions have mentioned reconciliation as a post-
conflict justice mechanism but they fall short of describing how it should be done. Neither the ICC 
Statute nor the current jurisprudence of the Court provides a clear definition of reconciliation. 
Black’s law dictionary defines reconciliation as “restoration of harmony between persons or things 
that had been in conflict”.788 While defendant-focused reparation system of the ICC presupposes 
the existence of ‘from defendants to victims’ redress typology, the judgments of the Court do not 
provide guidance on how to effectuate reconciliation in a scenario where you have, for example, 
one defendant and a million victims. 
Hayner argues that individual reconciliation that applies to an individual needs to be distinguished 
from national reconciliation that essentially seeks to achieve aggregate political goals that benefit 
 
786 Hayner PB Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001) 154. 
787 Hansen WL and Adhikari P ‘Reparations and Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Civil War’ (2013) Journal of 
Human Rights 425. 
788 Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999) 1278. 
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the society as a whole.789 Noting that ICC reparations could be individual or collective, how does 
the Court conceptualise reconciliation in mass crime cases? Interestingly, the prevailing 
jurisprudence of the Court is unanimous that reparations should promote reconciliation “between 
the victims of the crime, the affected communities and the convicted person”.790 
Understanding that individual-focused reconciliation is difficult to achieve in certain mass crime 
prosecutions,791 the Court seeks to achieve community-focused healing process that could 
potentially foster long-standing peace. Since the implementation of reparations in Lubanga, 
Katanga, and Al Mahdi has not been completed, it would be difficult to assess the impact of any 
reconciliatory efforts that have been earmarked through court-ordered reparations.  
However, some reparation orders that are at the implementation stage could provide an 
understanding of how the Court perceives community-based reconciliation process. Consequently, 
one could be able to make a preliminary finding regarding the functional potentiality of such 
redress processes.  
In the Katanga case, the Defence made submissions before the court that the defendant would be 
willing to participate in a traditional ceremony of forgiveness where Katanga could issue a public 
apology to the victims.792 It has been suggested that the ceremony should take place in Bogoro, 
the place where horrendous crimes against humanity were committed against civilians. However, 
in an interim draft implementation plan that is still before the Court for final orders, the TFV has 
expressed that Katanga may not be able to participate as he is still incarcerated in the DRC.793 
Thus, the implementation of the public apology ceremony as a reparation measure that hinges on 
voluntary consent of the defendant may not be possible unless the government of the DRC ends 
the detention or permits Katanga to attend.794 This situation serves as one of the many possible 
scenarios where reconciliation in mass crime cases may not succeed. 
 
789 Hayner (2001) 155. 
790 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 28; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 317; Lubanga Reparations 
Judgment (2012), paras 193 and 244. 
791 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), footnote 431 at page 82. 
792 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Defence Observations on the TFV’s Draft implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3764, 11 September 2017, para 9. 
793  The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga , Draft Implementation Plan Relevant to Trial Chamber II’s Order for 
Reparations of 24 March 2017 (ICC-01/04-01/07-3728), ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, 25 July 2017, para 134. 
794 Katanga Reparations TFV Draft Implementation Plan (2017), ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, para 135. 
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In Al Mahdi, a case involving a war crime of attacking protected cultural and religious buildings 
in Timbuktu in Mali, the TFV has proposed community dialogue and religious ceremonies around 
the conflict zone to raise awareness on the importance of cultural heritage and to foster 
reconciliation.795 According to the TFV, the objective of community dialogue and the ceremonies 
is to restore the victim’s dignity and heal the trauma experienced by the society following the 
destruction of historical and religious mausoleums in Timbuktu.796 To enhance reconciliation and 
peaceful coexistence, a video containing Al Mahdi’s apology will be streamed to the public.797 
The few case studies examined above provide a glimpse of how tricky reconciliation could be in 
atrocity crime situations. It is submitted that it could be an uphill task for the ICC to foster 
reconciliation in situation countries through defendant-focused reparations due to the following 
reasons. 
First, reconciliation as an aspect of justice requires full truth regarding particular violations. For 
the case of the DRC, domestic reconciliation efforts failed to yield any meaningful results due to 
a malfunctioning truth commission. Ideally, it would not be possible to obtain aggregate truth on 
past violations in mass crime prosecutions. Prosecutions, streamlined along strict procedural and 
evidentiary rules that focus on individual perpetrators and select charges and incidents, may 
potentially not produce global truth on the violations under consideration. Half-truths are not 
needed for transitional justice reconciliation. 
Secondly, given that reparations are voluntary and may not be forced on the victims,798 so does 
reconciliation. For example, the jurisprudence of the Court is clear that apologies by defendants 
can not be ordered by the Court and that victims are at liberty whether or not to accept the hand of 
forgiveness. In Al Mahdi, a three-bench Judge of Trial Chamber VIII held that:  
The Chamber recognises that it is ultimately up to each individual victim to decide whether he or she 
considers Mr Al Mahdi’s apology to be sufficient. Some victims may already be satisfied with the apology 
 
795 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Public redacted version of “Corrected version of Draft Implementation 
Plan for Reparations, With public redacted Annex I, 20 April 2018, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Conf”, 30 April 2018 ICC-
01/12-01/15-265-Conf-Corr+Corr-Anx, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, 18 May 2018, para 256. 
796 Al Mahdi Reparations TFV Draft Implementation Plan (2017), ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, paras 259 and 260. 
797 Al Mahdi Reparations TFV Draft Implementation Plan (2017), ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, para 259. 
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given, and others will not be satisfied no matter what kind of further apologies are given. This is inevitable, 
and eminently understandable.799  
Therefore, the point here is that prosecution-based reconciliation has to adhere to certain rules and 
that includes, for example, not ordering apologies or forcing their acceptance on the victims.  
Thirdly, despite convictions, some defendants may not perceive themselves as perpetrators and 
accept responsibility. For example, in a sentence reduction hearing in Lubanga, a three-bench 
judge of the Appeals Chamber noted that Lubanga had not genuinely dissociated himself from his 
crimes.800 It is critical that reconciliation should be undertaken when perpetrators accept 
wrongdoing and ask for forgiveness. There cannot be reconciliation without acceptance of 
responsibility. For the Congo situation before the Court, some convicted defendants consider 
themselves as heroes in their communities. They established tribal-based military groups to protect 
the interests of their respective communities.801 
For example, during mitigation before sentencing, Thomas Lubanga told the court that he formed 
the UPC/FPLC to restore peace in a conflict-prone region of Ituri in Eastern DRC.802 While already 
convicted for the war crime of using children in an armed conflict, Lubanga contested that charge 
during sentencing by arguing that the enlistment was voluntary and that it was necessary for him 
and his people to build a large army “…in order to establish political and military control over Ituri 
as a response to the threat pf massacre and given the absence of any intervention from the United 
Nations.”803 The peace objective was a central issue throughout defence submissions during 
sentencing.804 The Court accepted that the peace agenda could have been achieved but this was 
rejected as a mitigating factor for sentencing due to the extensive use of child soldiers.805 
 
799 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 69. 
800 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Second Decision on the Review Concerning Reduction of Sentence of  
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3375, 3 November 2017, paras 52 and 57. 
801 Lubanga Trial Transcript, Submissions by the Prosecutor, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-107-ENG ET WT, 26 January 2009, 
page 21, lines 8-12; See a Human Rights Watch Report entitled ‘ITURI: “COVERED IN BLOOD” Ethnically 
Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo’ July 2003, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), pages 14-16, available at 
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Similarly, in Bemba, the defence argued that the MLC (military group) was created to establish a 
constitutional democracy in the DRC.806 As Bemba’s military group was responsible for war 
crimes in the Central African Republic (the CAR), the Court reasoned that his peace efforts in the 
DRC had no relevance for the CAR.807 Again, the Court rejected the defendant’s peace rhetoric at 
sentencing because his military group’s political goals for the DRC created a fertile ground for the 
growth of an atrocious conflict in the CAR where crimes against humanity and war crimes claimed 
thousands of lives.808 
Fourthly, inherent limitations of criminal prosecutions may affect victims’ perception of justice in 
a negative way. Case selection criteria used at the ICC may lead to non-prosecution of certain 
crimes in a given situation. That essentially brings up a category of victims, for example, those 
whose harms relate to crimes that were not charged may feel discriminated against as they will not 
receive reparations.  
Reconciliation could be impossible to achieve under such circumstances. While it is generally 
accepted that the ICC may never prosecute all the crimes in the world, it is submitted that the 
Prosecutor has to prosecute for crimes that represent the largest category of harms suffered by 
many people in a given situation. For example, in Lubanga, the Prosecutor submitted testimonies 
to the Court on horrendous sexual crimes that were committed against women and children but no 
sexual and gender based charges were brought up.809 Limited charges lead to categorised 
reparations only for certain victims and that violates human rights for being unfair and 
inequitable.810 
Fifthly, the layout of reconciliation programs in a transitional society has to be responsive to 
societal and ethnic issues that caused the conflict. Since ICC reparations are defendant-based, 
charges could be a determining factor when it comes to reconciliation. For example, three cases of 
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Katanga, Lubanga, and Chui relate to war crimes and crimes against humanity that were 
perpetrated in the region of Ituri in Eastern DRC.811 The defendants come from different ethnic 
groups (Hema, Lendu, and Ngiti) that were pitted against each other during the war. Thus, charges 
preferred by the Prosecutor could unwittingly leave out some communities and affect reparations 
if harms suffered are unrelated to crimes proved in court.812 
In Lubanga, a case involving conscription of child soldiers from the Hema ethnic group, victims 
from the same tribe as the defendant will receive reparation while victims from other ethnic groups 
(Lendu and Ngiti) may not access redress because the Prosecutor did not charge child conscription 
in the Katanga and Chui case.813  
In its first reparations report in the Lubanga case, the TFV observed that:  
The selectivity of charges in the present case, which as noted above may seem to favour one ethnic group 
fighting in the conflict over the other, while both sides seem to have committed atrocities on a similar scale, 
will make it extremely challenging to promote reconciliation in the region and reduce tensions stemming 
from the underlying causes fuelling the conflict and dividing the pastoral (Hema) and the agricultural lifestyle 
(Lendu) that underlies the conflict.814 
Therefore, due to the factors explained above, it is clear that reconciliation may not be achieved 
easily through judicial reparations. 
4.2.3 Can ICC Reparations be Transformative? 
As discussed in chapter one, some scholars have underscored the point that reparations should be 
able to transform societies dealing with mass crimes. Similarly, in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICC held that reparations should have a “transformative value”.815 What does not come out 
clearly is the actual nature of transformation envisaged by the Court. Is it political, social, 
economic, and cultural transformation? While it is possible for certain international crimes to 
affect a community,816 one should not expect court-ordered reparations that hinge on an 
 
811 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case Information Sheet, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC2-06-006/15_Eng; The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case Information Sheet, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-01-016/17_Eng; The Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga, Case Information Sheet, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-03-014/18_Eng. 
812 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 180. 
813 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 151. 
814 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 183. 
815 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 67. 
816 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 212. 
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individual’s criminal responsibility to bring about a society’s transformation in all spheres of life. 
It is practically impossible. 
To start with, the limited nature of ICC prosecutions may not yield redress measures that cut across 
all reparative demands of the victims, let alone effecting societal changes. So, what kind of 
transformation is envisaged by the ICC? In Lubanga, the TFV submitted that reparations should 
be transformative by rooting out “imbedded inequality and exclusion” that led to the violations.817 
Indeed, gender inequality and economic exclusions of a certain group of people could ignite and 
perpetuate conflicts in a society. However, this could not be achieved in certain cases, for example, 
as gender-based and sexual crimes were not charged in the Lubanga case.818  
Considering this scenario, it would be difficult to have transformative reparations of whatever 
nature that aim at putting a stop to gender-based violations since defendant-focused reparations 
will not focus on the non-charged crimes.819 That notwithstanding, the TFV has underscored the 
need for a gender-inclusive reparations programme that responds to the needs of women.820 While 
reparations in Lubanga are yet to be implemented in full, collective reparations proposals by the 
TFV do not seem to be gender sensitive.821 
In one of its submissions at the ICC, the TFV spoke of the transformative importance of economic 
empowerment for women in the DRC. It stated that “Reparations that support women's economic 
empowerment can contribute to transformative justice by placing them in a better position to break 
with historic patterns of subordination and social exclusion”.822 If achievable, that would help 
restore dignity for the women, considering a deeply culturally-imbedded masculine domination 
that affects women.823 However, the concept of economic empowerment sounds like an economic 
development program. Are reparations for economic development? 
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It is submitted that reparation programmes should not be confused with development projects 
carried out by governments.824 In most post-conflict poor societies, victims prefer reparations that 
come in the form of compensation or basic needs such as housing, roads, and medical care, to 
name a few.825 Post-conflict justice expectations of the victims could be myriad. It is not practically 
possible to meet all the expectations. However, a good reparations framework must be responsive 
to the victim’s needs and perceptions as they relate to harm suffered.826  
In Al Mahdi, the Court recognised the economic impact of the attack on Timbuktu’s historical and 
religious mausoleums. Consequently, victims demanded compensation for the economic losses 
stemming from the destruction of the mausoleums as they lost income from tourism and other 
investments around the historical sites.827  
Also, the TFV noted that some victims live in abject poverty as a direct consequence of the war 
crime of destruction of the religious historical sites.828 To deal with the economic impact of war 
crimes, the TFV proposes a set of reparation programs that will redress financial losses suffered 
by the victims. The programmes intend to rehabilitate the economy by supporting income 
generating activities on “agriculture, trade, small and light industry, and handicrafts”.829  
The economic recovery programs are victim-specific, in the sense that they respond to particular 
harms brought about by Al Mahdi crimes. While the programmes will be implemented in 
Timbuktu, the collective nature of such reparations does not make them transformative. 
Programmes will focus on reviving light handicraft industries, improving agricultural output at the 
family level and extending small loans to the victims.830 Looking at the actual nature of 
programmes proposed by the TFV, they will only have a micro-level economic impact on the 
people of Timbuktu and therefore, minimal transformation, if any. 
 
824 Lubanga Draft Implementation Plan for Collective Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, para 70; The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 187. 
825 Hansen and Adhikari (2013) 425 and 427. 
826 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 185. 
827 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 73. 
828 Al Mahdi Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, para 245. 
829 Al Mahdi Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, paras 247-249. 
830 Al Mahdi Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, paras 250-254. 
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Provisionally, this section has demonstrated that, due to many factors, it could be tricky and 
practically impossible for the ICC’s defendant focused reparations to be fully reconciliatory, 
deterrent, and transformative.  
Unlike administrative state reparation programmes, court-ordered reparations are inherently 
inflexible in nature and scope, making them impossible to achieve the triple goals of reconciliation, 
deterrence, and transformation of a society. Things such as reconciliation and human 
transformation could be achieved easily under administrative reparation programmes that emanate 
from truth commissions or state policy (Latin American transitions).  
The ICC does not have the mandate, capacity, and resources to repair all historical wounds caused 
by egregious violations in a society to achieve transformation through the restoration of social 
justice.831 
ICC reparations proceedings are judicial proceedings in nature.832 They are intrinsically linked to 
criminal proceedings. Consequently, they focus on perpetrators whose liability for reparations 
must be within the conviction decision. That gives no room for consideration of issues alien to the 
case. The primary objective is to redress victims for the harm suffered. It is not about wealth 
creation and redistribution, and righting historical injustices.  
As stated by Judge Wyngaert and Judge Morrison in Bemba’s acquittal decision by the Appeals 
Chamber, “…international criminal law is concerned with individual responsibility and culpability 
and not with righting socio-historical wrongs.”833  In any case, the nature of reparations at the ICC 
depends on reparation principles set out by the Court in a particular case. Such principles may 
differ due to the types of crimes under consideration, mode of criminal participation, and the 
gravity of the violations. 
 
 
831 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo , Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against 
Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, Separate Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, 8 June 2018, paras 74 and 75. 
832 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 18. 
833 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo , Separate Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Howard Morrison, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, para 74. 
163 
 
4.3 Reparation Principles: Pioneer Lubanga Decision Followed in Katanga and Al Mhadi  
The ICC Statute does not provide for principles applicable to reparations. Knowing that many 
issues, both judicial and non-judicial, could come into play when determining reparations, drafters 
of the ICC Statute decided to leave this to the Judges. Accordingly, the ICC Statute obligates the 
Judges to establish principles to be applied to reparations for the victims.834 In the first reparations 
decision of the ICC in Lubanga, the Court held that reparations principles applied in that case 
could be “applied, adapted, expanded upon, or added to by future Trial Chambers”.835 
The following reparations principles were pronounced by the Appeals Chamber of the ICC in the 
Lubanga case. 
• Reparations could be granted to direct and indirect victims, including family members of 
direct victims and persons who suffer harm while intervening to help others or prevent the 
commission of violations.836 
• Legal persons such as business entities and providers of social services may receive 
reparations upon proof of harm.837 
• Reparation decisions of the ICC or other bodies, whether domestic or international, are 
independent of each other and they should not prejudice the victim’s right to redress.838 
• Harm or injury, whether direct or indirect, must be personal to the victim.839 
• Eligibility for reparations depends on the causality principle that harm suffered must result 
from crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.840 
• The equality principle needs to be adhered to by treating the victims with dignity, afford 
them equal access to information, and award reparations that respond to their needs.841 
• Human rights and dignity of the victims must be respected and access to reparations must 
be equally granted to all victims without discrimination of any nature.842 
 
834 Article 75(1) ICC Statute; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 176. 
835 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 5. 
836 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 6. 
837 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 8. 
838 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 9. 
839 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 10. 
840 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 11. 
841 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), paras 12-14. 
842 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), paras 15-16. 
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• Reparations should not reinforce practices that caused human rights violations and the 
implementation of reparative measures should not re-traumatise the victims.843 
• Reparations should be gender-sensitive.844 
• The provision of reparations should prioritise victims who are vulnerable or those in need 
of urgent help.845 
• Victims that qualify for reparations should have unhindered access to the reparations 
case.846 
• Reparations are voluntary and they may not be forced on the victims.847 
• Outreach measures and consultation with the victims are necessary before an award of 
reparations.848 
• Reparations could be individual and collective. When collective, they should also respond 
to individual harms.849 
• Reparations may not be limited to ‘restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation’.850 
• Compensation should be used for harms that can be quantified economically.851 
Even though the ICC does not operate under the common law doctrine of precedent, the Trial 
Chamber II and VIII in Katanga and Al Mahdi respectively decided to unreservedly apply the 
reparation principles established in Lubanga.852 That was done notwithstanding the heterogeneous 
nature of crimes in the three cases.  
 
843 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 17. 
844 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 18. 
845 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 19. 
846 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 29. 
847 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 30. 
848 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), paras 31-32. 
849 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 33. 
850 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 34. 
851 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 37. 
852 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 30; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), paras 25-26; The Prosecutor v. 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Public redacted version of “Corrected version of Draft 
Implementation Plan for Reparations, With public redacted Annex I, 20 April 2018, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Conf”, 30 
April 2018 ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Conf-Corr+Corr-Anx, ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red, 18 May 2018, para 69. 
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However, in Al Mahdi, the Court observed that “…reparations of crimes against cultural heritage 
are adequately addressed under the same framework and thus sees no reason to deviate from the 
relevant principles formulated by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga.”853 
To a large extent, the reparation principles enunciated by the ICC in its various judgments adhere 
to international human rights precepts on reparation as provided for under the UN Basic Principles 
on Reparations.854 Despite this, all reparation decisions of the ICC until now have conspicuously 
neglected to address the question of reparation for the victims when a case does not end with a 
conviction. Ideally, a case may terminate due to an acquittal or death of an accused person. What 
will be the fate of victims in the event of a mistrial, death of a convicted defendant, or termination 
of a case on account of other reasons? 
International human rights law provides that states should redress victims of human rights 
violations when a perpetrator is unable or unwilling to do that.855 The inability or unwillingness to 
provide reparations by defendants could emanate from a pool of factors, some of which are those 
mentioned earlier. Thus, being an enforcer of international human rights law through international 
criminal justice, it is significantly important for the ICC to pronounce itself on these issues. 
Following a 2016 majority decision of the Trial Chamber V(A) to vacate charges in the Ruto and 
Sang case,856 counsel for the victims approached the Court with an application requesting the ICC 
to hold the Kenyan government responsible for reparations to the victims and to order the TFV to 
rehabilitate victims of the Post-election violence of 2007.857 By majority, Judge Eboe-Osuji 
dissenting, it was decided that the ICC can only deal with the question of reparation when a guilty 
verdict has been entered against a person.858 With this decision, the Judges seem to have accorded 
significant weight to legal formalism at the expense of a more flexible approach to Article 75 that 
would have benefited the victims. 
 
853 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 26. 
854 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 25. 
855 Para IX (16) of the UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
856 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments 
of Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, 5 April 2016, page 1. 
857 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , Decision on the Requests regarding Reparations, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-2038, 1 July 2016, para 4. 
858 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2038, para 7. 
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Eboe-Osuji argued that a positivist and formalistic reading of 
Article 75 of the ICC Statute may never afford a “convincing system of reasoning” that prevents 
the ICC from entertaining reparation matters in the absence of convictions.859 Citing the European 
Convention on Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes and domestic laws of some 
jurisdictions, he argued that there is no principle of law that says reparations should be conviction-
based.860 The European Convention on Compensation provides that victims of violent crimes can 
receive reparations in the absence of prosecution or conviction of the offender.861 
In buttressing his argument that the norm of no conviction no reparation has no place in civilised 
legal systems, Judge Eboe-Osuji cites Article 75 (6) of the ICC Statute862 which provides that the 
whole reparations provision under the Statute (Article 75) should not be interpreted in a manner 
that prejudices the rights of victims under domestic or international law.863 
Additionally, in the decision vacating the charges in the Ruto and Sang case, the Judge offered 
more cogent reasons for rejection of the conviction-based reparation system at the ICC. He argues 
that; first, international crimes represent an attack on a civilian population, often leaving behind 
the objective reality that people have been harmed even when individual criminal responsibility 
has not been established. 
Secondly, traditional tort-based compensation litigations have been deemed inefficient and 
expensive and that is why most jurisdictions have opted for no-fault compensation schemes that 
do not rely on convictions. 
 
859 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, CC-
01/09-01/11-2038-Anx, 1 July 2017, para 12. 
860 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, CC-
01/09-01/11-2038-Anx, para 13; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , Decision on Defence 
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji, para 201. 
861 Article 2(2), ETS 116 – Compensation of Victims of Crimes, 24.XI.1983. 
862 Article 75 (6) provides: “Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under 
national or international law.” 
863 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, para 201. 
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Thirdly, ICC victims have no active role or say in the prosecutions and framing of the charges and 
therefore it is not for them to ensure that there is a conviction; and lastly, lengthy criminal 
proceedings derail prompt access to reparations by the victims.864 
Turning to the specifics of the Ruto and Sang case in the Kenya situation before the ICC, the Judge 
noted that the case collapsed due to obstruction of justice emanating from witness interference as 
well as coordinated obstructive rhetoric against the Court by the government and other influential 
political voices in Kenya.865  
While accepting that the ICC cannot order reparations against states, the Judge questioned whether 
extensive political meddling seen in Ruto and Sang could justify action by the ICC.866 No clear 
direction comes from the Court in that regard despite the admission that the ICC may have to step 
in at some point when it is manifestly clear that a state has violated its obligations under 
international law.867 The issue of state responsibility for reparation under the ICC system is dealt 
with extensively in chapter five. 
 4.4 Legal Mechanics of Individual Liability for Reparations 
The reparations jurisprudence of the ICC is unanimous that a reparation order must reflect an 
individual culpability for certain crimes in a conviction decision.868 In determining the scope of a 
convicted defendant’s reparative responsibility, the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga introduced a 
proportionality principle to mean that liability for reparations should be proportional to the harm 
caused and to the mode of participation in the perpetration of crimes.869 
The proportionality principle has been followed religiously in the Katanga and Al Mahdi 
reparation decisions.870 From the surface, the proportionality principle enunciated by the Court 
 
864 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, para 202. 
865 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, paras 156 and 161-163. 
866 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, para 208. 
867 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang , ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Reasons of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, paras 209-210. 
868 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017) para 50; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 20; Katanga Reparations 
Order (2017), para 251; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 65. 
869 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 118; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 21. 
870 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 50; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 252. 
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appears to demand that an individual’s reparative burden should be reflective of their actual role 
in the commission of crimes. Thus, does it follow that a convicted person’s reparative obligation 
should be strictly limited to harms stemming from their specific criminal acts in a given situation? 
Atrocity crimes entail multiple perpetrators, would it be possible for the ICC to disaggregate an 
individual’s role in the crimes from the other contributory perpetrators to demarcate reparative 
responsibility based on the proportionality principle?  
These questions came under scrutiny in the Katanga reparations case. In his appeal against a 
‘disproportionate’ one million euros reparation bill, Katanga argued that the Court failed to take 
into account the role played by other people in the commission of crimes in Bogoro.871 Making 
reference to the Appeals Chamber decision in Lubanga that reparations should be proportionate to 
harm caused and to mode of commission, the Court rejected Katanga’s appeal by arguing that the 
amount of reparations ordered against a convicted person need not be pinned on harms resulting 
from his actual role as disaggregated from other persons who allegedly committed the crimes.872  
The Court further reasoned that the purpose of reparations is to remedy harm suffered by the 
victims and that contributory participation by other persons in the commission of the crimes for 
which a person has been convicted for may not be relevant.873 Additionaly, it was noted that a 
person’s reparations bill should not exceed what is needed to repair although it may not be 
inappropriate to hold the person responsible for the full reparation costs.874 Therefore, Katanga 
was held responsible for the full amount of reparations needed to repair harms suffered by victims 
of the Bogoro attacks in Eastern DRC. 
In a bid to liberate itself from a rather awkward interpretation of the proportionality principle, the 
Court held that in situations where a case results in multiple convictions relating to similar crimes 
then it would be reasonable to apportion the reparation costs among all the convicted defendants.875 
While admitting that “a plurality of persons potentially bear responsibility for having contributed 
 
871 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Defence Document in Support of Appeal against the Reparations Order, ICC-
01/04-01/07-3747-Red, 29 June 2017, para 81; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment on the appeals against 
the order of Trial Chamber II of 24 March 2017 entitled “Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute”, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 174. 
872 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 175. 
873 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 178. 
874 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 178. 
875 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 180. 
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to the commission of the crimes which caused harm to victims”, the Court rightly argues that 
matters of individual criminal responsibility are not for the reparations phase and, apart from 
Katanga, there are no other convictions in relation to crimes perpetrated in Bogoro.876 
It is submitted that the decision of the Court in Katanga regarding the applicability of the 
proportionality principle is legally and factually erroneous. In arriving at its decision, the Court 
neglected important legal and factual considerations. Despite admitting that atrocity crimes 
potentially result from multiple actors as was the case in Katanga,877 the Court declined to take 
that aspect into account when ordering reparations.878 Additionally, the Court wrongly held that 
the mode of liability was not relevant for a determination of liability in reparation cases.879  
In general, the Appeals Chamber decided that the proportionality rule as regards reparations cannot 
be worked out by looking at contributory harm from other persons apart from the convicted person 
and the mode of criminal liability of the convicted person. Without providing a reasoned decision, 
the Court gives a blanket argument that reparations are for repairing harm suffered and not for 
determining the mode of criminal liability.880 
The proportionality principle as originally espoused in Lubanga clearly gives a direction that the 
actual size of a defendant’s reparative obligation should be proportionate to harm caused, nature 
of criminal participation, and specific circumstances of a case.  Legal liability, of whatever nature, 
must be distributed justly and equitably. To hold a person responsible for the full amount of 
reparations for harms suffered by multiple victims due to multiple criminal incidents by mass 
perpetrators without considering their roles is unjust. Unfortunately, the Appeals Chamber in 
Katanga did not give reasons as to what it understands by proportionality. 
It is submitted that the whole ICC Statute system indicates that criminal liability for international 
crimes comes up in different levels. Article 25 of the ICC Statute provides for various modes of 
criminal responsibility which include direct and indirect perpetrators. As Werle suggests, the 
statute provides for four clearly distinguishable modes of individual criminal responsibility 
 
876 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 263. 
877Katanga Reparations Order (2017) , para 263. 
878 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 182. 
879 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 179. 
880 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, paras 182 and 184. 
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(commission, ordering and instigating, assistance and, contribution to a group crime).881 Thus, it 
is argued that modes of individual criminal liability under Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute provides 
a hierarchical structure of responsibility with some modes attracting a higher degree of individual 
responsibility than others.882 
Noting that international crimes entail the participation of a large number of people in their 
commission, it is crucially important to determine each person’s degree of involvement to establish 
their rightful mode of responsibility. Arguably, mode of participation and the nature of commission 
of crimes are essential factors for sentencing.883 Why would the nature of a criminal act and method 
of perpetration (gravity) be critical for sentencing? Criminal punishment is for punishing criminal 
behaviour and for deterring people from committing crimes. Usually, horrible crimes attract 
harsher punishment and vice versa. That is proportional sentencing.884 
In addition to listing a number of mitigating and aggravating circumstances for sentencing,885 the 
ICC Statute and decisions of the Court require that a sentence must consider “the degree of 
culpability and balance all the relevant factors”.886 Since the law requires proportionality at 
sentencing, the same should be applied to reparations. Defendant-focused reparations emanate 
from a criminal conviction that sets out liability which then provides a basis for reparative demands 
by the victims.  
Ideally, victims could be harmed by multiple criminal incidents in atrocity crime environments 
and sometimes it could be difficult to practically allocate responsibility to the perpetrators 
according to their roles. However, that does not mean that victims should recover all reparations 
from a single defendant who was selected by the Prosecutor for prosecution out of hundreds of 
potential accused persons. 
However, for the actual doctrine of proportionality to function properly, the ICC may have to do 
a near impossible task of establishing criminal responsibility for all the perpetrators in a given 
 
881 Werle G ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 957.  
882 Werle (2007) 956-957. 
883 Article 78 (1) ICC Statute. 
884 Katanga Sentence Decision, para 39.  
885 Article 78 ICC Statute and Rule 145 of the ICC RPE. 
886 Katanga Sentence Decision, para 40. 
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situation for it to proportionally assign reparative liability to all the defendants.887 That is 
practically impossible. That is why the ICC hides behind an argument that the reparation phase is 
not for criminal responsibility since accepting that ‘mode of participation’ is critical for assessing 
liability for reparations will call for establishing a global truth on the crimes. The ICC neither has 
the capacity nor the competence to pursue all the perpetrators of international crimes.  
Due to misapplication of the proportionality principle on reparations, the defendant’s liability for 
reparation has not been based on the extent of actual damage and the nature of crimes but on what 
harm has been caused and what amount of money is sufficient to repair.888  
I argue that conviction-focused reparations should inherently be reflective of the nature of the harm 
caused and the type of crime committed, including specific circumstances of the defendant. 
Arguably, case selection and institution of charges is done by an independent Prosecutor. It will 
not serve the interests of justice to impose a huge reparative liability on one person simply because 
other perpetrators have not been charged. The resulting situation is a huge reparations bill which 
may never be paid by the indigent defendants. 
4.5 Types and Modalities of Reparations 
4.5.1 Types of Reparations Under International Human Rights Law 
The prevailing jurisprudence of the Court has understood reparations as being of two main types. 
Reparations could be individual or collective and they may be awarded concurrently depending on 
circumstances of a given case.889 However, the ICC Statute does not define individual and 
collective reparations.890 
In Katanga, the Trial Chamber II conceptualised individual reparations as redress measures aimed 
at addressing specific individual harms resulting from crimes of which a person was convicted.891 
 
887  The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo , Observations by the Redress Trust Pursuant to Article 75(3) of the 
Statute and Rule 103 of the Rules, ICC-01/05-01/08-3448, 17 October 2016, para 24. 
888 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 184. 
889 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 265; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), paras 217 and 220; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015), para 33; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 45; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, para 16; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 149. 
890 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 270; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), paras 61 and 63. 
891 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 271. 
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Since individual reparations are selective and tend to respond to specific harms caused by 
numerous criminal incidents in atrocity crime situations, it is possible that some victims from the 
same situation may be ineligible for reparations.892 
Collective reparations have been defined as reparation measured intended for a group of that 
suffered harm collectively from a similar crime.893 A group may exist on the basis of a shared 
identity or shared victimisation and it is not important that the group must have had a legal 
personality before the violations.894 It is factual that victims of international crimes could suffer 
harm caused by heterogenous violations. For collective reparations to be accessible by a group of 
people, they must have suffered shared harm, irrespective of the form of violations.895 The Court 
sees the ‘concept of shared harm’ as resulting from violations of either individual or collective 
rights, or both.896 
The jurisprudence of Regional Human Rights Courts indicates that collective and individual 
reparations can be implemented simultaneously.897 Similarly, depending on the circumstances of 
a case, it has been decided that Trial Chambers of the ICC have the discretion to order individual 
or collective reparations, or both.898 In Al Mhadi, the Court awarded both individual and collective 
reparations.899 The Court noted that the destruction of historical sites of Timbuktu had resulted in 
both community and individual economic harm.900  
While individual reparations could prove costly in mass crime environments, they have been 
deemed proper for reassuring the victim’s status as individual holders of rights which in turn 
ensures personal satisfaction.901 Comparatively, while collective reparations can respond to 
 
892 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 19. 
893 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 274. 
894 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 276. 
895 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 275; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-
Red, para 20. 
896 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 276. 
897 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 283. 
898 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 334. 
899 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 83. 
900 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), paras 74-76. 
901 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 285. 
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‘shared needs’,902 they may be difficult to implement in post-conflict societies especially when the 
victims are scattered all over the world.903 
Generally, without trivialising the value of individual reparations, the ICC deems collective 
reparations as more appropriate in mass crime situations due to their capability to benefit a large 
number of victims (the utility concept) and thereby ensure resource maximisation.904 In Katanga, 
the Court ordered collective reparations for supporting housing, income generation, education, and 
psychological care.905 In addition, collective reparations, though extended to groups, are cheaper 
to implement as they potentially obviate the need for individualised verification of the victims.906 
The ICC’s preference for collective reparations over individual reparations is purely for economic 
reasons. While it is generally acceptable that the provision of collective redress measures to mass 
victims would be speedier and less costly in the implementation, it is critical for the Court to 
appreciate that harms suffered by the victims are always personal. Ideally, collective reparations 
may not fully respond to the individual needs of the victims. International human rights law 
stresses the needs for considering ‘individual circumstances’ in redressing the victims.907 
In Katanga, it has been held that the approach of the Court should be first to establish the harm 
suffered and then propose the appropriate modalities for redress before determining the question 
of costs.908 However, given the mass number of victims in international prosecutions, the ICC may 
never be able to individually assess harms suffered by each victim as that would prolong the 
proceedings and flout fair trial principles.909 It is submitted that the non-assessment of individual 
reparations applications by the Court may not necessarily be unlawful but it does trivialise the 
legal position of the victims as individual holders of rights. 
 
 
902 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 289. 
903 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 286. 
904 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 292; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 274; Lubanga Appeals 
Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 140. 
905 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 304. 
906 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 274; 
907 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para IX (18). 
908 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 2 at page 5. 
909 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 3 at page 5. 
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4.5.2 Modalities of Reparations 
Modalities of reparations refer to methods that can be used to redress victims of human rights 
violations.910 The ICC Statute prescribes ‘restitution, compensation and rehabilitation’ as forms of 
reparations.911 On the question of modalities or forms of delivering reparations to the victims, it 
has been unanimously held by the ICC that the listed forms under Article 75 are not conclusive.912 
The mentioned modalities have been defined as follows. 
First, compensation entails an economic benefit in the form of money provided to the victims.913 
This redress method can only be applied to harms that are economically quantifiable.914 However, 
due to the scarcity of resources, it may not be possible to award sizeable amounts of monetary 
compensation to mass victims. Consequently, in Katanga, the Court awarded symbolic 250 USD 
for each of the 297 victims as compensation for the harms suffered.915 I believe a similar trend 
could be replicated in future cases before the Court. 
Secondly, restitution has been conceptualised as an umbrella term for all redress measures that 
seek to restore victims to pre-violations life.916 It may include measures such as “restoration of 
liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of 
residence, restoration of employment and return of property.”917 However, restitution may not 
work in some situations. For example, as noted by the Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, children who 
have been recruited and used in an armed conflict could not be restored to their original status.918 
Thirdly, rehabilitation encompasses a range of redress measures stemming from the provision of 
medical and psychological help to the provision of social services and legal assistance.919 
 
910 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 46. 
911 Article 75(1) ICC Statute. 
912 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 46; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, 
para 297; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 222. 
913 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 47;  
914 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 226; UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para IX(20). 
915 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 300 and page 118. 
916 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), paras 35-36; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 224. 
917 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para IX (19). 
918 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 223. 
919 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 42; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 48; UN Basic Principles on 
Reparations, para IX (21). 
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Other reparative mechanisms recognised under human rights law include: satisfaction (it may 
include measures for ceasing hostilities, apologies, searching for the disappeared, and establishing 
historical truth regarding the violations);920 and guarantees of non-repetition.921 As discussed in 
chapter two, these kinds of reparations could be difficult to implement in the defendant-focused 
reparative system of the ICC. 
All reparation decisions in Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mhadi agree that reparations should look 
beyond the conventional mechanisms recognised under the ICC Statute by also considering other 
modalities that have “symbolic, preventative or transformative value”.922  
In conformity with international human rights jurisprudence,923 the Court has determined that its 
conviction and sentencing decisions could have a significant reparative value for the victims.924 In 
particular, publicisation of court judgments could serve a crucial preventative factor in the form of 
educational reparation.925 Raising public awareness about past violations could help educate a 
society and possibly prevent recurrence of the violations.926 
 4.5.3 Apologies as Reparation 
Apologies have been regarded as symbolic reparation that can help transform societies 
transitioning from conflict to peace.927 In transitional justice, apologies can come from individuals, 
groups, organisations and states. A genuine apology should convey an unequivocal and formal 
 
920 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para IX (22). 
921 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para IX (23). 
922 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 49; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 297; Lubanga Reparations 
Judgment (2012), para 222; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 34. 
923 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala Judgment of 
November 19, 2004 (Reparations), para 81; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. 
Honduras Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Reparations and Costs), para 36; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case 
of Tibi v. Ecuador Judgment of September 07, 2004 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), para 
243. 
924 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 237. 
925 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) para 43; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), paras 238-239; The Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga, Prosecution’s Observations on the Procedure for Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/07-3544, 30 April 
2015, para 24. 
926 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 240. 
927 Carranza et al ‘More than Words: Apologies as a Form of Reparation’ (2015), International Center for Transitional 




acknowledgement that crimes have been committed and the person apologising must accept all or 
part of the responsibility for harm suffered by the victims.928 Generally, apologies entail 
acceptance of responsibility by the wrongdoer.929 While doubtful that victims could be entitled to 
apologies from the liable persons or states, it is generally accepted that victims have a right to 
reparation against territorial states inclusive of which are apologies.930 
Judgments of the ICC have mentioned apologies by convicted defendants as possible forms of 
reparation.931 The jurisprudence of the Court directs that apologies by the defendants should be 
voluntary and that could be communicated to the victims publicly or privately.932 To fulfil judicial 
standards, an apology must be “genuine, categorical and empathetic”.933 Being symbolic and 
voluntary, apologies by themselves may not be satisfying for the victims. Imagining them as side 
dishes, they should be accompanied by a delicious main meal of material reparative measures to 
fill a victim’s stomach. Apologies without affirmative reparative action and accountability 
measures may not be acceptable to the victims.934 
Just like liable parties, victims too cannot be forced to accept apologies. It is a matter of perceptions 
and personal convictions. For example, in the Al Mahdi case, some victims expressed 
dissatisfaction with the apology of the convicted person.935 However, in reference to an apology 
tendered by Al Mahdi, the Trial Chamber VIII opined that “some victims may already be satisfied 
with the apology given, and others will not be satisfied no matter what kind of further apologies 
are given.”936 Here, the Court accepts the fact that the issuance and acceptance of apologies are 
matters of personal conviction and therefore they should not be effected through judicial orders. 
 
928 Carranza et al ‘More than Words: Apologies as a Form of Reparation’ (2015), ICTJ, at page 4. 
929 Foley T Developing Restorative Justice Jurisprudence: Rethinking Responses to Criminal Wrongdoing (2014) 193 
– 194. 
930 Carranza et al ‘More than Words: Apologies as a Form of Reparation’ (2015), ICTJ, at page 5. 
931 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 70; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 315; Lubanga Reparations 
Judgment (2012), para 241; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 67 (VIII). 
932 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 315; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 241; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015), para 67 (VIII). 
933 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 70. 
934 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Public redacted version of “Submissions of the Legal Representative 
of Victims on the principles and forms of the right to reparation” dated 2 December 2016 (ICC-01/12-01/15-190-
Conf), ICC-01/12-01/15-190-Red-tENG, 25 July 2017, paras 43 and 45. 
935 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-190-Red-tENG, para 44. 
936 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 69. 
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Therefore, a court of law cannot order the issuance of an apology by the liable persons, let alone 
prescribing the contents of an apology. The role of the Court is to ensure that an apology by a 
defendant is accessible in whatever form or language understandable by the victims.937 Whether 
the apology is sufficiently acceptable to the victims, that is a completely different matter that 
cannot be determined by the Court. 
 4.6 Eligibility for Reparations and Evidentiary Matters   
 4.6.1 The Eligibility Framework  
The eligibility criteria for the victims in reparation proceedings are the same as those pertaining to 
participation in the trial as discussed in chapter three. However, for reparations, the only addition 
is that harm suffered by a victim must emanate from the crimes of the convicted person.938 The 
harm inflicted upon the victims does not have to be direct but it must be personal. 
Consequently, it has been held that a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC could give rise to 
direct and indirect victims,939 both of which must have suffered person harm to qualify for 
reparations.940 
To be considered for reparations, victims can submit individual reparation requests to the court.941 
The application can be made in the course of criminal proceedings. However, it has been held that 
the provision of reparations should not be limited to the victims who participated in the trial and 
applied for reparations.942 The decision to extend reparations to non-participating victims is 
premised on a rationale that only a small section of mass crime victims could be aware of ICC 
cases, let alone being conversant with the procedures. For example, in Al Mahdi, the Court noted 
 
937 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 71. 
938 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 37; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, paras 8 and 65; Al 
Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 42. 
939 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 63;  
940 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for Collective 
Reparations to Victims Submitted to the Amended Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, para 6; Al Mahdi Reparations Order 
(2017), para 40. 
941 Rule 94 of ICC RPE. 
942 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 187; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 12. 
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that the 139 applications admitted for reparations were a fraction of the actual number of potential 
victims in Timbuktu in Mali.943 
Given that the actual number of eligible victims may not be known at the time of reparation 
proceedings, how would the Court identify qualified reparation claimants? This is a question that 
has no one-size fits all answer. It depends on the circumstances of each case. In Katanga, the Court 
received 341 individual applications.944 However, after an individual judicial scrutiny of the 
applicants, the Trial Chamber II determined that only 297 applicants qualified for reparations.945 
The approach to individually assess the eligibility of reparations applicants came under criticism 
by the Appeals Chamber in Katanga. Despite conceding that it did not amount to an illegality or 
an abuse of judicial discretion, the Appeals Chamber held that the ‘individual assessment 
approach’ was undesirable for causing delays in the provision of reparations to the victims.946 
In Al Mahdi, while noting that the Appeals’ Chamber decision in Lubanga did not take a position 
as to whether an individual assessment of reparation claimants would be necessary for both 
individual and collective reparations,947 the Trial Chamber VIII decided that a judicial scrutiny is 
not required even for individual reparations.948 Instead, the Court determined that individual 
reparation beneficiaries could best be identified through an administrative screening procedure 
carried out by the TFV.949 The Court further stressed that the screening only concerned individual 
reparation applicants, meaning that non-participating victims could still be eligible for collective 
reparations.950 
Despite delegating a rather judicial function to the TFV, the Court has set out the following 
principles to be adhered to in identifying the victims eligible for reparations. 
• The TFV must reasonably strive to identify all eligible victims.951 
 
943 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 141. 
944 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 168. 
945 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 43 and 168. 
946 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 1 at page 4 and para 160. 
947 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 152. 
948 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 142. 
949 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), paras 142 and 144. 
950 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 145. 
951 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 146 (i). 
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• Applicants must fill out prescribed forms and supply identifying documents to the TFV.952 
• Before determining eligibility, the TFV must allow and consider representations from the 
victim applicants and the Defence.953 
• Subject to an applicant’s consent, the identity of individual reparation claimants should be 
disclosed to the TFV and the Defence.954 
• A decision on eligibility must be communicated to the victim applicants and the Defence. 
However, since the TFV administrative screening process does not impact the liability 
threshold for the convicted person, the Defence should not be allowed to challenge an 
eligibility decision.955 
Since the jurisprudence of the Court directs that screening of individual reparation claimants would 
be desirable to determine their suitability, what then would be the procedure for extending 
collective reparations to non-applicant victims? In Lubanga, where the Court ordered collective 
reparations, the TFV proposed to conduct structured interviews with direct and indirect victims to 
determine if they qualify for reparations.956 Considering that the DRC is a country with a high 
number of victims of sexual violence, the TFV has committed itself to have an interviewing 
protocol that can successfully identify victims from marginalized social groups.957 
4.6.2 The Evidentiary Threshold for Reparations  
Given the civil nature of reparation proceedings, various decisions of the ICC have determined 
that a standard less demanding than that applicable to criminal proceedings should be used.958 In 
the Court decisions, it has been noted that a lesser standard of proof than that of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ would be ideal for the reparations stage since victims may encounter difficulties in 
 
952 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 146 (ii). 
953 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 146 (iii). 
954 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 146 (iv). 
955 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 146 (v). 
956 Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for Collective Reparations to Victims Submitted to the 
Amended Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-
01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, paras 45 and 46. 
957 Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for Collective Reparations to Victims Submitted to the 
Amended Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-
01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, para 52. 
958 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 251; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 59. 
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obtaining evidence due to destruction or unavailability of evidence due to the longevity of atrocity 
crime trials.959 
Referring to the jurisprudence of the ECCC and regional human rights courts,960 the ICC is 
unanimous that a reparations claimant should establish his case through the balance of probability 
standard.961 What would be the requirement in establishing this standard? Arguably, there may not 
be a unified procedural criteria for establishing that standard in reparation proceedings for all cases. 
 However, in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber held that a reparation applicant must “provide 
sufficient proof of the causal link between the crime and the harm suffered, based on the specific 
circumstances of the case”.962 Therefore, the question of what could be ‘sufficient’ in discharging 
the balance of probability standard depends on the circumstances of a case.  
In Katanga, for example, the Trial Chamber II held that the applicant needs to show that ‘it is more 
probable than not’ that they suffered harm as a result of crimes of the convicted person.963 
Similarly, in Lubanga and Al Mahdi, it was held that the ‘proximate cause’ principle could be used 
to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the actions of the convicted person could have 
foreseeably resulted into the harm suffered by reparation claimants.964 
Consequently, depending on the circumstances of a case, a reparation claimant must sufficiently 
discharge the balance of probability standard in proving their identity, the harm suffered, and the 
causal nexus of such harm to crimes of the convicted person.965 
Thus, issues like time elapsed between the commission of crimes and the beginning of court 
proceedings and other potential difficulties that victims may face could be critical in determining 
whether a particular piece of evidence is sufficient or not.966 For example, in Katanga, the Court 
noted that victims would have difficulties proving material losses since there was no 
 
959 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 252; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 47 and 53.  
960 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 48. 
961 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 49 and 50; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 253; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015), para 65; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 44; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 42. 
962 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 81. 
963 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 50. 
964 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 44; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 59. 
965 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 45. 
966 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 53 and 60; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 81. 
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documentation to prove ownership of property in Bogoro, the place where Katanga crimes took 
place.967  
The Court deemed sufficient to presume the existence of material harm of pillaging of domestic 
effects for any victim who proved the destruction of a house during the attacks.968 The operative 
paragraph of the decision of the Court read: “…where an Applicant establishes that he or she 
suffered material harm as a result of the destruction of a house, an outbuilding of a house, or a 
business premises, the material harm resulting from the destruction or pillaging of furniture, 
personal effects or wares is presumed to be established, absent any specific piece of evidence.”969 
The decision of the Court to use presumptions and circumstantial evidence in ordering 
compensation for material losses was appealed by Katanga for being “insufficiently proven”.970 
While accepting that an attack on a house could reasonably lead to a loss of domestic belongings, 
Katanga argued that there was no sufficient evidence to connect his crimes to other losses such as 
those relating to cattle and crops.971 He further argued that a reliance on presumptions that do not 
sufficiently link his crimes to the claimed losses violated his fair trial rights.972 
While cautioning that ‘factual presumptions’ should not violate rights of the parties, the Appeals 
Chamber held that judicial presumptions are discretionary in nature and, absent direct evidence, 
they could be used to identify harm suffered by the victims in reparation proceedings.973 Whether 
a certain presumption is reasonable or not, that is a matter to be determined in light of 
circumstances of a particular case.974 The Court decided that the trial chamber’s use of factual 
presumptions was justified as it was reasonably responsive to the evidentiary huddles faced by the 
victims in proving the harms caused by the crime of pillaging in the Katanga case.975  
 
967 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 53; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, 
para 48. 
968 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 61 and 90. 
969 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 91. 
970 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 46. 
971 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 52. 
972 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 53. 
973 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 75. 
974 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para 76. 
975 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, paras 89 and 92. 
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It is submitted that the Court’s approach to the question of the standard of proof resonates with the 
requirements of international human rights law and practice. Without prejudicing fair trial rights 
of the defendants, victims should not be subjected to restrictive and inconveniencing procedures 
in their quest for justice.976 A highly demanding standard of proof would be unreasonably 
restrictive to the right of access to justice and remedy. Victims may never be able to provide 
primary documentary evidence to prove their claims in post-conflict environments. For example, 
in the work of the United Nations Compensation Commission for the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, it was 
noted that, because of the extensively destructive armed conflict, many claimants and even the 
Iraqi government could not supply primary evidence to support their case.977 
In addition, the use of factual presumptions and circumstantial evidence in reparation claims could 
benefit traditionally marginalised groups such as women in their redress claims. In societies where 
masculinity reign supreme, it could be difficult for women to come forward and assert their rights, 
let alone approaching the courts for justice.978 
4.7 Implementation of Reparation Orders 
Reparations proceedings of the ICC are of a dual nature.979 The first part consists of a decision of 
the Court to award reparations to the victims or a decision not to order reparations.980 When 
reparations are awarded, the second part concerns the implementation of the reparation order.981 
 As discussed in the previous chapters, the practice of the Court has been to order the 
implementation of reparation orders against the convicted persons through the TFV. When it is so 
ordered, the TFV becomes seized and its regulations become applicable.982 While the TFV is 
 
976 Paras 12 and 27 of the UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
977 Chung JJ ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of Rights between Individual 
Claimants and the Government of Iraq’ (2005) 10 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 155-156. 
978 UN Mapping Report on Congo, para 539; See UK Home Office Report entitled ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Women Fearing Gender-based Harm or Violence’ (2017) pages 25 and 29, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/976636/download (accessed 3 July 2018). 
979 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the admissibility of the appeals against Trial Chamber I's 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations and directions on the further conduct 
of proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, 14 December 2012, para 53. 
980 Article 75(2) ICC Statute; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, para 54. 
981 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, para 55. 
982 Rule 98 of the ICC RPE and Regulation 50 (b) RTFV. 
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statutorily independent of the Court,983 when seized with a reparation order that needs to be 
implemented, the Court is allowed to make some interventions and directions.984 
Upon being seized with an order to redress the victims on behalf of the ‘indigent’ convicted 
persons, the TFV becomes an implementing agency and it should prepare a draft plan to carry out 
the reparation order of the Court.985 The draft plan for reparations must consider observations of 
the victims and it should devise reparation projects that are responsive to the modalities of 
reparations ordered by the Court.986 
Once a draft plan is submitted before the Court for approval, the Court will strive to see that 
observations of the parties have been considered by the TFV and once satisfied, it will issue an 
approval order for the actual implementation of the reparation order.987 For disputes arising from 
the implementation activities, the Court will be available to help the parties.988 
The implementation of a reparation order is a critical phase for the victims. A judicial order on 
paper may not necessarily be operationalised as ordered by the court. In its various decisions, the 
ICC has awarded individual and collective reparations to the victims of mass crimes. These 
reparations may require an enormous amount of resources to be implemented fully.989 
Pragmatically, that may not be the case. In its proposed draft implementation plan in Lubanga for 
collective reparations, the TFV stated that:  
…the liability of Mr. Lubanga exceeds what may be complemented by the Trust Fund, i.e. there will be harm 
caused to victims by the crimes that he committed that cannot be redressed through the activities outlined in 
this plan.990 
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989  Lubanga Reparations Draft Implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-Red, para 113. 
990 Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims Submitted to the Amended 
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The admission by the TFV is indicative of the fact that some eligible victims may not receive 
reparations pursuant to a court order.991 As admitted in Lubanga, the TFV may never have the 
required financial resources to effectively implement reparation orders of the ICC, even in future 
cases.992 
 The resultant legal conundrum is that court decisions will lack certainty and finality. The finality 
issue comes into being as the non-implementation of a reparation decision as ordered entail an 
amendment of that order without judicial authority. A reparations order is a substantive decision 
that cannot be varied by a non-judicial body such as the TFV. While the scarcity of resources is 
not to be blamed on the TFV, the prioritisation of reparation beneficiaries on account of economic 
considerations may occasion an injustice on the victims. 
Arguably, the implementation of reparations could be affected by a number of non-legal 
operational matters such as security conditions, infrastructure, and time that has elapsed since 
violations took place.993 Therefore, while accepting that the operationalisation of a reparation order 
could be affected by the legal, economic, political, social, and cultural circumstances in a situation 
country, it is argued that the operational adjustments by the TFV should not limit a substantive 
order of the Court. 
Another legal controversy surrounding the role of the TFV in the ICC reparation system is an 
interplay of the reparations mandate and the assistance mandate. The reparations mandate relates 
to the implementation of court-ordered reparations by the TFV while the assistance mandate refers 
to non-judicial reparative assistance extended to the victims in situation countries at the behest of 
the Board governing the TFV.994  The assistance mandate is not connected to court decisions and 
it does not respond to any specific cases or issues before the Court. It is for the Board of Directors 
of the TFV to decide when and how to provide redress to the victims of crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC in situation countries.995 
 
991 Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims Submitted to the Amended 
Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-01/04-01/06-
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Dependent on voluntary financial contributions, a decision to intervene through assistance 
programs depends on the availability of financial resources.996 Despite the existence of a legal 
framework that demarcates clearly the power of the ICC over the TFV regarding assistance 
reparative measures, the Court, in all its reparations decisions until now, has been requesting the 
TFV to use its ‘assistance mandate’ to provide reparations to unqualified victims.997 By unqualified 
victims, I mean victims whose harms do not emanate from the crimes of the convicted person. 
Recognising its jurisdiction limits over the TFV, the Court has avoided the use of mandatory 
language in giving out instructions to the TFV on how to help the victims. For example, in 
Katanga, the court stated that: 
… the Chamber invites the TFV to give consideration as part of its assistance mandate, wherever possible, 
to the harm suffered by the Applicants in the attack on Bogoro upon which the Chamber has not been in a 
position to act in the case.998 
Thus, the Court is not ordering the TFV, but inviting it to provide redress to the victims whose 
harm categories do not relate to the crimes contained in the Katanga conviction decision. 
Notwithstanding the discretionary language directed at the TFV by the Court, it is submitted that, 
being part of a reparation order, such requests amount to recommendatory orders that could force 
the TFV to act. Now the question is, are those kinds of requests legally tenable? 
Since atrocity violations could give rise to multiple victims and criminalities and considering that 
the ICC may not deal with all the perpetrators and incidents at the same time, the TFV has 
submitted that using the assistance mandate to provide reparations for unqualified victims in a 
given case may occasion an injustice to the accused parties in the present or future cases that relate 
to the same situation.999 
Since the deployment of resources of the TFV is to be managed sustainably through its Board of 
Directors that reports only to the ASP, it has been argued that the interventions of the Court over 
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the running of assistance programmes consists an infringement of the authority of the Board.1000 
Furthermore, the TFV has cautioned the Court against using the assistance mandate to palliate the 
‘inherent’ limitations of the defendant-focused reparation system of the ICC.1001 
4.8 Chapter Conclusion  
The chapter’s main objective has been to examine the ICC’s reparation system to determine its 
compatibility with international human rights law and the jurisprudence of regional human rights 
courts. In the three reparations decisions in Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi, the ICC has 
extensively relied on the human rights jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
as well as the UN Basic Principles on the Right to Reparations. 
In designing the reparation principles, the Court has shown rigidity in some areas that appear to be 
either in conflict with the Statute or unambiguous regarding what should be done. For example, 
the Statute empowers the Court to order reparations against convicted persons and not states or 
organisations. However, the jurisprudence of the Court at the time of writing indicates that orders 
against the convicted persons are unenforceable for lack of means. The defendants have been 
adjudged impecunious. 
Faced with that enforceability stalemate, one would have expected the Court to stretch its 
discretion under Article 75 by designing reparations principles that could incorporate third parties, 
say complicity territorial states or organisations, in the provision of redress to the victims as 
contemplated under international human rights law that reparations should come from territorial 
states when the liable party is unable or unwilling to redress the victims. Instead, the Court has 
adopted a positivist interpretative style by, first, ordering reparations against insolvent defendants, 
and, secondly, requesting the Trust Fund to operationalise the order. That approach, as it has been 
shown, does not ensure finality to court decisions and is uncertain and unsustainable. 
Similarly, the chapter has demonstrated that the defendant-focused reparation system has 
limitations that may prevent the ICC from achieving its reconciliatory, transformative, and 
 
1000 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  Additional Programme Information Filing, ICC-01/04-01/06-3209, 
para 89. 





deterrence goals for the benefit of the victims. For the ICC reparation system to redress the victims 
meaningfully, there is a need for support from the states and organisations. Territorial states in 
particular have to step up their complementarity efforts to fix reparative gaps in the ICC Statute 
regime. 
Another situation that demonstrates the unwillingness of the Court to flex its jurisprudential 
muscles is the question of redress for the victims in cases that do not end with a conviction. Except 
for the dissenting interventions by some Judges, this question has not been fully litigated and 
determined by the ICC.  
The ICC Statute does not give guidance on what should be done for the victims when a case 
terminates with an acquittal or ends with a mistrial. Additionally, the ICC Statute does not say that 
victims should not receive reparation when there is no conviction. Given that the ICC reparation 
regime provides for the involvement of states and organisations, one would have expected the 
Court to liaise with states and interested organisations in reparation proceedings and determine the 
modality of providing redress to the victims in those circumstances. 
In its decisions, the Court has held that reparations should uphold the principle of human dignity 
and equality. It is submitted that the unpredictable nature of the ICC reparation system and the 
inherently discriminatory nature of the conviction-based reparations violate the dignity of the 
victims as right holders. There may not be dignity and equality when victims from the same 
situation are unwittingly categorised into qualified and non-qualified victims. The Bemba case is 
a classic example of the unpredictable nature of ICC proceedings. Initially, he was convicted of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity and victims of his crimes had applied for reparations. 
However, such victims may never receive reparations as the Appeals Chamber overturned the 
whole conviction decision. 
It is submitted that the object and purpose of the ICC Statute is to eradicate impunity for egregious 
human rights violations that plunge the victims into unbearable losses. Ending impunity is not 
about prosecutions alone. It includes reparative justice for the victims. The absence of convictions 
at the ICC should not be a burden for the victims. The next chapter provides theoretical proposals 





STATE-DEFENDANT REPARATIVE CO-RESPONSIBILITY: A SOLUTION TO 
INDIGENCY AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT? 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
The chapter presents an enforcement model that can mitigate economic restrictions emanating 
from indigence and allow for joint reparative responsibility mechanism for states and defendants. 
Chapter four has extensively analysed the ICC’s normative framework for reparations. The 
prevailing framework may not foster full accessibility, equality, equity, non-discrimination, and 
satisfaction for the victims in the realisation of the right to reparation.  
As noted in the previous chapters, ICC reparations tend to suffer from two potentially chronic 
implementation obstacles. First, most of the defendants are impecunious and therefore they have 
been adjudged unable to execute reparation orders.1002 Secondly, while atrocity crime 
environments imply state participation either directly or indirectly, international criminal tribunals 
do not have an express jurisdictional mandate to order reparations against states.1003 Absent such 
jurisdictional powers, criminal tribunals can only ‘encourage’ national governments to 
complement judicial reparations through national redress programs.1004 
If the international community is to redress the victims effectively, state impunity for reparations 
in mass violations’ cases needs to be addressed. The Judges of the ICC must uphold a victim’s 
right to dignity and effective remedy by choosing realism over formalism in interpreting Article 
75 of the ICC Statute.  
 
1002 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) paras 327-328; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 101;  
Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 138; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 269. 
1003 Appeal Judgement (KAING Guek Eav), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC , Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, 3 February 2012, paras 702-703, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ECCC,4f2fbff92.html (accessed 3 December 2017). 




The formalistic approach to interpreting Article 75 has given rise to mechanical jurisprudence that 
ties the enforcement of reparations to indigent convicted persons. The jurisprudence is mechanical 
(irresponsive to realities) as all the Judges have persistently ordered massive reparations against 
impecunious defendants without addressing the enforceability question for such decisions. As it 
will be shown later, that approach does not fully appreciate the sociological and utilitarian 
consequences of such decisions for the victims.  
The Court has been more concerned with the legal implications of its Article 75 decisions than the 
sociological and utilitarian effectiveness of such decisions in providing reparative justice to the 
victims. In its judgments, the Court attaches significant weight in determining the scope of 
reparations’ liability for the defendants.  However, little attention has been directed at providing 
an alternative implementation mechanism as a remedy to the shortcomings of individual reparative 
responsibility. Arguably, state-defendant reparative co-responsibility may help palliate the 
inadequacies of defendant-centered reparations at the ICC. 
The concept of shared reparative responsibility (co-responsibility) was scantly referred to in 
Katanga reparation decision. In that decision, the Court instructed the implementor of reparations 
(the TFV) to invite the DRC government to determine how it could contribute to reparations.1005 
The crucial thing to note here is that the invitation was post factum to the reparation decision, and 
the Court did not describe a practical legal avenue for state participation.  
Until now, the ICC has not developed any state-defendant partnership mechanism for providing 
meaningful redress to the victims. At best, the practice of the Court has been just to instruct the 
non-judicial TFV to liaise with governments in view of learning as to how they could contribute 
to reparations.1006 
Using various theories of justice, doctrines of international human rights law, customary 
international law, and positive international law, the author presents a state-defendant reparative 
co-responsibility mechanism under Article 75(3) of the ICC Statute. Against the backdrop of 
defendant-focused reparations under Article 75 of the ICC Statute,1007 the chapter advances legal 
justifications for dual liability for reparations for both territorial states and defendants. 
 
1005 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 325. 
1006 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 325. 
1007 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 147. 
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Consequently, it provides normative avenues for the effectuation of reparative co-responsibility 
without upsetting the traditional individual criminal responsibility regime under the ICC Statute. 
5.2 The ICC Reparation System: Some Critical Vulnerabilities  
The birth of the ICC in 2002 signified the desire and willingness of the international community 
to ensure that there is no impunity for crimes under international law.1008 The ICC positions itself 
at the apex of transnational criminal justice by seeking to investigate and prosecute individuals 
who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of core crimes.1009 Normatively, the ICC 
Statute, like the Nuremberg Charter, seeks to impose individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes.1010 Unlike previous criminal tribunals, the Statute codifies the victim’s right 
to reparation and provides avenues for participation.  
On victim’s justice, the ICC Statute has been glorified for being victims’ friendly. Substantively, 
victims are entitled, subject to certain procedural conditions, to participate in all stages of the 
proceedings to safeguard their interests.1011 In the same vein, unlike Nuremberg and ad hoc 
criminal tribunals established in the 1990s,1012 the ICC is legally empowered to award reparations 
to victims of core crimes.1013  
However, in spite of the unprecedented legal provisions on victim’s right to participation and 
reparation, there is skepticism about the outcome of the ICC’s reparation regime regarding 
delivering meaningful redress to the victims.1014 Unlike predecessor criminal courts, the ICC takes 
a binary approach to dispense justice by combining prosecutions (retributive justice) and 
reparations (reparative justice). At the ICC, individual criminal accountability is inseparable from 
 
1008 Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998. 
1009 Article 1 ICC Statute. 
1010 The term ‘international crimes’ denotes core crimes covered under Article 5 of the ICC Statute namely, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression; Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 
2 Edn (2009) 29. 
1011 Article 68(1) of the ICC Statute. 
1012 By ad hoc criminal tribunal of the 90’s, I mean the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Both tribunals were established by the UN for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. 
1013 Article 75 of the ICC Statute; Moffett (2013) 371. 
1014 Moffett L Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (2014) 151. 
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liability for reparations and therefore the primary duty of providing reparations to the victims goes 
to the convicted person.1015  
With the first three reparation judgments in Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mhadi, the Court has largely 
opted for collective reparations,1016 with minimal symbolic compensatory individual reparations 
in Katanga and Al Mahdi.1017 The reparations judgments are a significant step towards the 
realisation of the right to reparation for victims of egregious human rights violations. Despite the 
judgments affirming victim’s right to redress, there are implementation issues that may derail or 
potentially scupper the provision of reparation to victims. Reparations must be effective in 
remedying the actual harm as well as adequate and prompt in their delivery to the victims. 
Internationally, prosecution and punishment of individuals responsible for human rights violations 
has been conceived as the most appropriate method of legal justice. This tradition stems from 
Nuremberg and it has been maintained as such until now. However, as we shall see later, the 
normative importance of individual criminal accountability does not augur well with the demands 
of restorative justice in post-conflict contexts. Specifically, the ICC principle of tying liability for 
reparations to individual criminal responsibility,1018 although legally correct, presents critical 
challenges in the provision of effective redress to victims of core crimes.  
This is particularly so as the nefarious capacity of individuals to perpetrate acts that cause large 
scale harm does not necessarily correspond to their ability to repair the harm caused. Individuals, 
whether acting on their own or under state directives, have been proved to be unable to pay 
reparations to victims. This inability to pay may scupper the implementation of defendant-focused 
reparations at the ICC.  
Thus, there is a need for reforming international criminal justice approaches to victim’s justice 
(reparation) to pave way for a working reparation regime. I shall elaborate on that at a later stage. 
Victims need to be sure that they will have access to adequate, effective, and prompt reparations 
 
1015  Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 158; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 50; Lubanga Appeals 
Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 99. 
1016 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), para 53; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 281; Lubanga Appeals 
Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 143; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 84. 
1017 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 306; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), paras 81, 133 and 134. 
1018 Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2015), para 99. 
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as required under international law.1019 One would pose a question: how can this be possible at the 
ICC when its justice terrain bears all the hallmarks of a traditional criminal justice system that 
focuses on the perpetrator?  
The three reparations judgments expose the vulnerability of the ICC reparation system. The ICC 
reparation system requires a nexus between the victim, the harm suffered, and the charges which 
the convicted person has been convicted for. This normative triangle presents implementation 
problems that spring from indigency and scarce resources. In three convictions at the ICC, the 
convicted persons have been adjudged impecunious and therefore they cannot provide redress for 
victims.  
That is the problem that the ICC grapples with right now. Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mhadi have 
all been declared indigent and so far there has not been any resources traced to their names which 
could be confiscated for reparations.1020 Logically, victims of horrendous mass crimes that have 
been proved in those cases may not receive effective reparations from the convicted persons. What 
has the ICC done to overcome that shortcoming?  
In the three reparation decisions handed down by the ICC until now, the Court has opted to deal 
with indigence by ‘requesting’ the TFV to execute reparation orders against the defendants.1021 
While convicted persons are still legally liable to pay reparations, the ICC requests the TFV to use 
its resources to implement the reparation orders and consequently it may be able, in the future, to 
reclaim the advanced resources from the convicted persons whose asset acquisition will be 
monitored by the court for confiscation.1022  
Given limited resources of the TFV and attendant legal issues, I argue that the solution provided 
by the Court in Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi may not work out effectively in providing 
meaningful redress to the victims. The TFV may never succeed in overcoming the inherent 
 
1019 Principle 15, UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
1020 Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 327; The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, The Registry’s 
Observations on Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’s Solvency and Conduct while in Detention, ICC-01/12-01/15, 21July 
2016, paras 5-7. 
1021Katanga Reparations Order (2017), paras 330 and 342; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 
115; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 138. 
1022 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, paras 104 and 116; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015), paras 
61-62; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 329. 
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limitations of ICC reparations.1023 The ICC’s over dependence on the TFV as the reparations 
implementor could prove catastrophic for the victims due to the following reasons. 
First, the TFV has a dual mandate of extending localised reparative assistance (rehabilitation and 
psychological treatment) to the victims and, if asked by the Court and approved by its governing 
board, implementing court ordered reparations.1024 The twin mandate of the TFV applies to all 
situations before the Court. The TFV, which depends on voluntary contributions from states and 
private entities,1025 has limited financial resources which are expected to cater for reparative justice 
for all cases before the Court at a given period.  
Until December 2017, the ICC’s reparation reserve stood at € 5.5 million.1026 Since it is a decision 
of the TFV Board to decide whether or not to accept the court’s request,1027 it may happen that 
TFV does not have the resources to cater for reparative demands of all the victims before the court 
at a given time.  
In Lubanga, the TFV admitted that: 
 …the funds available to the Trust Fund to complement the payment of awards for reparations are inherently 
limited so that, if reparations are primarily funded out of the Trust Fund’s reparations reserve, it is unrealistic 
that there will be sufficient financial means to remedy all harm to all victims in all cases.1028  
 That would beget discrimination as some victims could access redress while others may not be 
lucky.1029 That would run counter to international human rights law as victims are not to be 
subjected to unfair treatment1030 or any form of discrimination.1031  
 
1023 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Additional Programme Information Filing, ICC-01/04-01/06, para 90. 
1024 Regulation 50 of Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3; Lubanga Appeals 
Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 107. 
1025 Regulation 20, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, 3 December 2005. 
1026 Report of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims, Sixteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties 
New York, 4 December 2017, page 7. Available at 
https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/reports/ASP-16-BDTFV.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
1027 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 113. 
1028  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Additional Programme Information Filing, ICC-01/04-01/06, para 
18.  
1029 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Additional Programme Information Filing, ICC-01/04-01/06, para 19.  
1030 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 29; Katanga Reparations Order (2017), para 30. 
1031 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), paras 31 and 34. 
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Secondly, until now, the TFV has not obtained funds from primary sources such as reparation 
awards and proceeds of fines and forfeiture as contemplated under the law.1032 All the money held 
at the TFV is from ‘other resources’, meaning voluntary contributions from states and 
organisations.1033 The point I advance here is that, after almost two decades in operation, victims’ 
reparation purse at the ICC depends on unpredictable contributions from donors. That means the 
TFV is not sustainable and therefore it may eventually not be able to implement any reparation 
orders. 
Thirdly, the implementation of court-ordered reparations through the TFV does not have the 
element of certainty and authoritativeness expected of judicial decisions. It is particularly so since 
the decision to implement or not rests with the non-judicial TFV Board.1034 The ICC jurisprudence 
confirms that the TFV has the discretion to use its resources to execute reparation orders against 
defendants.1035 The Court has also affirmed that it lacks legal authority to order the TFV to 
implement reparations.1036 Despite the ICC Appeals Chamber holding that a reparations order is 
at par with a conviction or an acquittal decision,1037 the ICC lacks a predictable and authoritative 
enforcement mechanism for its reparation decisions.  
The Court can only ‘request’ or ‘encourage’ the TFV to provide redress to the victims on behalf 
of impecunious defendants. In Katanga, the court stated that “…the Chamber directs the Board of 
Directors of the TFV to advise the Bench whether it is minded to use its “other resources” for the 
funding and implementation of reparations…”.1038  
The same trend was replicated in Al Mahdi in which the court held that “The Chamber encourages 
the TFV to complement the individual and collective awards to the extent possible…”.1039 This 
legal atmosphere throws the victims into the unknown. While the ICC is legally correct to seek to 
 
1032 Regulation 47, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3; Article 79 (2) ICC Statute. 
1033 Trust Fund for Victims Annual Report 2016 at page 29, available at 
https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/reports/Annual%20Report- 
2016_ENG_September_Online.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
1034 Regulation 56, TFV Regulations; Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 111. 
1035 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 111; Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 112;  
1036 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) paras 112 and 114. 
1037 Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) para 67. 
1038 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 342. 
1039 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 138. 
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implement reparations orders through the TFV,1040 the situation in which the TFV operates does 
not afford assurances that victim’s reparations will be implemented adequately and effectively.1041 
Although the TFV has not yet refused to implement court-ordered reparations, it is highly probable 
that it may not be able to implement reparations in all situations and cases before the Court. 
Aptly put, the ICC reparation mandate faces two potentially chronic obstacles; first, indigent 
convicts, and secondly, weak resource base at the TFV.1042 It is submitted that reparative 
responsibility in atrocity crime environments should not be left to individual perpetrators alone. 
Accountability for reparations should be reflective of the perpetration dynamics in a given 
situation. At a later stage, I will explain how reparative co-responsibility can be operationalised 
under the current reparation framework of the ICC.   
The section below provides an account of the intersection between state and individual 
responsibility for crimes under international law perpetrated in the Congo conflict. 
5.3 Intersection of State and Individual Responsibility in the Congo Conflict 
5.3.1 Is State-Individual Dual Responsibility Possible Under International Law?  
Crimes under international law (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) entail 
systematic or large scale use of force1043 that results into massive damage. Perpetration of such 
crimes presumes participation of states or state-like organisations.1044 Even though states may have 
a critical role in the perpetration of core crimes, international criminal law focuses on the individual 
perpetrator.1045 The logic behind this norm is that crimes under international law can only be 
ascribed to an individual and therefore the principle of individual accountability seeks to prevent 
individuals from hiding behind state sovereignty.1046  
 
1040 Article 75(2) ICC Statute; Rule 98 of the ICC RPE. 
1041 Lubanga Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, para 118. 
1042 Lubanga Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, para 115. 
1043 Werle (2009) 32. 
1044 Werle (2009) 32. 
1045 Werle (2009) 40. 
1046 Cryer R ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?’ (2006) 16 The European Journal of 
International Law 979-1000. 
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Conversely, states can only be held responsible under international law if a violation can be 
attributed to it. Accordingly, state responsibility would be due when individual violations qualify 
as acts of state.1047 However, as a rule, perpetration of an act that violates international criminal 
law does not necessarily create a responsibility on the part of the state.1048 Likewise, state 
responsibility under international law does not necessarily impose individual liability on state 
agents involved. Despite such strict rules on the attribution of responsibility to individuals and 
states under international law, there would often be an intersection between individuals and states 
especially in the context of crimes under international law.1049 Werle rightly submits that 
“…crimes under international law and wrongful acts by a State will often coincide”,1050 leading to 
the duality of responsibility under international law.1051  
The concept of duality of responsibility under international law was upheld in the ICJ judgment in 
the genocide reparations case between Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro.1052 
Double attribution of responsibility to states and individuals is also supported under the ICC 
Statute which provides that individual responsibility does not affect state responsibility.1053 
Although positive international law does not provide for state criminality, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that a criminal state may exist when internationally wrongful acts such as genocide and 
torture are systemically perpetrated by individuals as part of state policy.1054  
Conversely, a criminal state may exist when government orders, encourages, or tolerates the 
commission of grave crimes by individuals.1055 That was the case with post-world war II Germany 
and Japan; Balkan crimes in the 1990s; Khmer Rouge crimes in Cambodia;1056 the 1994 genocide 
 
1047 Nollkaemper A ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law’ 
(2003) 52 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 616. 
1048 Article 25 (4) of the ICC Statute. 
1049 Nollkaemper (2003) 618. 
1050 Werle (2009) 41. 
1051 On co-responsibility between states and individuals, see; Nollkaemper (2003) 619. 
1052 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] ICJ Reports 43, para. 173. 
1053 Article 25(4) ICC Statute; Nollkaemper (2003) 620. 
1054 Nollkaemper (2003) 625. 
1055 Nollkaemper ‘Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for International Crimes’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 316.  
1056 ‘Top Khmer Rouge Leaders Guilty of Crimes against Humanity’, BBC News, 7 August 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28670568 (accessed 4 April 2018). 
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in Rwanda; the Darfur genocide in Sudan; and the Derg crimes in Ethiopia,1057 just to name a few. 
Therefore, international crimes are systemic in nature and, although their perpetration is attributed 
to individuals, state involvement has been manifested in many conflicts.1058 
In short, states may participate in the commission of international crimes through aiding and 
abetting, omissions through lack of action to protect people and to prevent violations from taking 
place, and failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators.1059  
Thus, in atrocity crime situations, state responsibility may exist on account of failure to protect 
and prevent,1060 notwithstanding whether individuals involved are agents of the territorial state or 
not.1061 When state responsibility sits next to individual responsibility, states cannot be criminally 
punished but they are obligated to provide reparations under international law.1062 While 
international law does not provide room for holding states accountable for state criminality,1063 
this author seeks to propose a mechanism for attributing reparative responsibility under the 
auspices of the ICC to the territorial states and other states that were complicit in the commission 
of core crimes in the Congo conflict, especially during the Second Congo war. 
5.3.2 The Congo Conflict and State Criminality 
Historians agree that the causes of modern day instability of the DRC, the second largest country 
in Africa and a country well-endowed in natural resources, stretches back to pre-independence 
Belgian rule that sowed seeds of corruption, nepotism, embezzlement of public resources, and 
unequal distribution of public wealth.1064 Many conflicts have taken place in the DRC since its 
independence in 1960. However, this scholarship draws its arguments and conclusions relating to 
 
1057 Tiba FK ‘The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
1058 Nollkaemper (2010) 317-319. 
1059 Nollkaemper (2010) 314 and 319-320. 
1060 Botte A ‘Redefining Responsibility to Protect as a Response to International Crimes’ (2015) 19 The International 
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1061 Moffett (2013) 379. 
1062 Nollkaemper (2003) 622; Bonafè BI ‘Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes’ (2016) 37 
Sequência: Estudos Juridicos e Politicos 28. 
1063Bonafè (2016) 21; While the term ‘state crimes’ has been colloquially used to mean atrocity crimes perpetrated by 
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Sheep’s Clothing? Transitional Justice and the Effacement of State Accountability for International Crimes’ (2016) 
39 Fordham International Law Journal 453; Moffett (2013) 370. 
1064 Turner (2007); Ikambana (2007); Lemarchand (2003). 
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state responsibility for reparations in the context of the Second Congo War that lasted between 
1998 and 2003.  
The Second Congo, charactersised as the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II, was 
triggered by the invasion of Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC in August 1998.1065 The war, although 
it later on turned to be a war of partition and plunder,1066 was started by Rwanda and Uganda as 
an attempt to oust President Laurent Kabila who had turned his back on his allies (Rwanda-RPF 
and Uganda-UPDF) who had helped him topple Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997. Despite the fact 
that the invaders created rebel movements in the Eastern part of the DRC to hasten the removal of 
Kabila, the rebellion against Kabila was unsuccessful mainly due to the support he got from foreign 
forces.1067  
It must be recalled that the First Congo War (1996-1997) was also triggered by an invasion of 
Rwanda’s RPF into the DRC to eliminate Hutu refugees and former soldiers of the Rwandan army 
(ex-FAR/Interahamwe) who had supposedly perpetrated genocide against Rwandan Tutsis in 
1994. To legitimize the invasion and camouflage the real intentions of the war, Rwanda created 
and extended logistical support to an anti-Mobutu rebel movement called ‘Alliance of Democratic 
Liberation Forces’ – known by the French acronym AFDL- which succeeded in claiming power 
in 1997. AFDL was under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. The success of AFDL in toppling 
Mobutu was an easy project as the Congolese population had tired of Mobutu’s dictatorial 
tendencies and also the regime had lost the support of the West following the end of cold war.1068 
As earlier alluded to, the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda was vigorously resisted by 
neighbouring foreign forces who fought alongside government forces. A total of eight countries 
participated in the military confrontation during the deadly Second Congo War.1069 Foreign forces 
of Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Sudan backed Kabila while Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Uganda supported rebel movements. The engagement of such military forces in the DRC resulted 
in the commission of egregious human rights violations which could be characterised as crimes 
 
1065 Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004). 
1066 Naidoo S (ed) ‘The War Economy in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2003) IGD Occasional Paper No.37. 
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(2015) United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 14; Turner (2007) 5. 
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under international law. In particular, mass rapes were committed on a large scale in the Eastern 
part of the DRC.1070  The war fed on deep-rooted historical ethnic conflicts and the scramble for 
the mineral-rich Eastern DRC.  
It is submitted that war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated against defenceless 
civilian population especially in the Eastern region of the DRC (Kivu, Goma, Ituri, and Bunia). 
The crimes were committed by both state forces and rebel militia groups. Thus, states were highly 
complicit in the perpetration of atrocity crimes in the DRC.1071 It is in this context that the author 
proposes the attribution of reparative responsibility by the ICC to states that had a role in the Congo 
wars.  
I shall revert to this proposition at a later stage. Let us turn to the issue of state responsibility in 
relation to the manner, level, and degree of involvement of foreign government forces in the 
military confrontation during the Second Congo War. For this chapter, the focus will be on Uganda 
and Rwanda (the aggressors). 
Uganda’s participation in the DRC conflict was focused on Ituri, a region close to its border with 
the DRC. The 2005 Judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Armed 
Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) confirms that 
Uganda was the occupying power in Ituri during the relevant period of the conflict.1072 General 
Kazini, the commander of Ugandan forces in the DRC, established a new province called Kibali-
Ituri and handpicked Ms. Adele Lotsove as Governor.1073 As the occupying power, Uganda was 
responsible, under The Hague Regulations of 1907, for making sure that public order was restored 
and that inhabitants were protected against violations.1074  
Sadly, Uganda did not honor its obligations under international law. Its troops (UPDF) were 
involved in ethnic conflicts in Ituri, mostly siding with the Hema tribe;1075 and child recruitment – 
children were subjected to massive abduction in areas of Bunia, Beni, and Butembo and sent to 
 
1070 ‘The War Within the War Sexual: Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo’ (2002) Human Rights 
Watch. 
1071 Hüls (2004) 21. 
1072 Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) para 178. 
1073 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 175. 
1074 Article 43 of The Hague Regulations of 1907. 
1075 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 187. 
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Kyankwanzi military camp for training.1076 The ICJ made a finding that Uganda’s UPDF soldiers 
were heavily involved in the perpetration of gross human rights violations and grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law.1077 
On particular violations committed by Ugandan forces on Congolese soil, the ICJ held that: 
“Having examined the case file, the Court considers that it has credible evidence sufficient to 
conclude that the UPDF troops committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane 
treatment of the civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, failed to distinguish 
between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other 
combatants, incited ethnic conflict and took no steps to put an end to such conflicts, was involved 
in the training of child soldiers, and did not take measures to ensure respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law in the occupied territories.”1078  
Even more, the ICJ made a finding that Ugandan troops were also responsible for “looting, 
plundering, and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources”.1079 The court concluded that 
Uganda, as a fully-fledged state under international law, was internationally responsible for the 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated by its soldiers in the 
DRC during the relevant period.1080 
As for Rwanda, there is massive documentation by the UN and human rights NGOs that point to 
the fact that Rwanda was responsible for the perpetration of atrocity crimes in the DRC conflict. 
Rwanda has a very long history of involvement in armed conflicts that took place in the DRC in 
the 90s. According to the 2010 UN Mapping Report on Congo, Rwandan soldiers, alongside 
AFDL, perpetrated serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during 
the first Congo war.1081  
The UN report has also documented serious crimes of an international character committed by the 
Rwandan forces in the DRC during the Second Congo War.1082 Despite Rwanda’s rejection of the 
 
1076 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 185. 
1077 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 207. 
1078 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 211. 
1079 ICJ Judgment (2005) para 250. 
1080 ICJ Judgment (2005) 220. 
1081 UN Mapping Report, para 565. 
1082 UN Mapping Report on Congo, para 578; Yearbook of the Unite Nations (1998) Volume 52, pp.80-83. 
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UN Mapping Report on Congo for allegedly using unverified sources and assumed evidence,1083 
there is a clear admission of Paul Kagame regarding the deployment of Rwandan troops in Congo 
during the conflict period.1084  
Likewise, in the recent wave of bloody fighting in the Eastern DRC, Rwanda has been confirmed 
as the creator and supporter of the rebel group M231085 which was under the leadership of 
Rwandan-born Congolese General Bosco Ntaganda who is currently on trial at the ICC for charges 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.1086 According to findings of experts commissioned by 
the UN Security Council,1087 Rwanda, acting through Defence Minister James Kabarebe, extended 
logistical assistance to M23 by giving them weapons and ammunition;1088 provision of information 
and financial resources; and provision of recruits from Rwanda including child soldiers.1089 To 
sum up, the M23, under the assistance and support of Rwanda and Uganda, committed several 
violations of international humanitarian law especially in the Kivus in Eastern DRC.1090 Having 
established state responsibility for Rwanda and Uganda in the perpetration of crimes under 
international law in the DRC, let us turn to conceptual issues on state responsibility through the 
lens of international criminal justice. 
The preceding section has demonstrated that two States – Rwanda and Uganda – were highly 
complicit in the commission of crimes under international law in the DRC during the relevant 
period of the conflict. Surely, attribution of criminal responsibility to individual perpetrators 
 
1083 ‘Official Government of Rwanda Comments on the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC’ (30 September 2010). 
Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_Report_Comments_Rwanda.pdf> (accessed 29 
May 2016). 
1084 ‘Rwanda admits having troops in Congo’ (1998) BBC News, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/209319.stm (accessed 29 May 2016). 
1085 Rebel Group created mainly by Congolese [Tutsi] soldiers on 6 May 2012. This was a new version to the then 
defunct rebel group called CNDP that was commanded by General Laurent Nkunda. On 23 March 2009, Nkunda’s 
CNDP signed a peace deal with the Government of Congo, agreeing to, among other things, cessation of the violence 
on the condition that there would amnesty for the fighters and that they would be incorporated into the DRC National 
Army. Three years later, CNDP decided that the peace deal was not being implemented by the government hence the 
formation of a new rebellion called M23, named after the date of truce in 2009. 
1086 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06. 
1087 ‘Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security 
Council’ (2012). 
1088 UN Security Council Report, paras 10-18. 
1089 UN Security Council Report, paras 23-24. 
1090 UN Security Council Report, paras 156-160. 
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without invoking state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed by such countries 
may not work out well for the victims regarding reparative justice at the ICC.  
The ICC’s reparation paradigm is restricted normatively by the individuality of responsibility for 
reparations and, for it to work in favour of victims, there is a need to broaden, subject to certain 
conditions, the reparative responsibility to states also. It is trite law that individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of international law does not preclude state responsibility for the same 
if such violations could be attributed to a state under international law. Let us now contextualise 
the law relating to State responsibility in relation to the participation of Rwanda and Uganda in the 
DRC conflict. 
The international law of state responsibility provides that responsibility of a state is due when a 
particular violation can be attributed to it either by being a violation committed by its organs or 
other actors under its control and direction.1091 This customary rule has also been endorsed by the 
ICJ.1092 So, whoever with a working connection to any branch of state power (whether it is the 
executive, parliament, or judiciary) may trigger responsibility of the respective state if their 
conduct represents violations of international law.1093  
As for private actors, the general rule is that their violations may not be attributed to a state save 
if a state failed to take necessary preventive measures to palliate effects of a violation.1094 However, 
international law dictates that states would be responsible for a violation of international law not 
only when it is involved through its agents but also when it fails to prevent the violations and 
punish the perpetrators.1095  
In Velazquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rightly held that: 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, 
because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to 
 
1091 ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfully Acts with Commentaries’, Report of the 
International Law Commission, 53rd Session (2001), page 38; Brownlie I System of the Law of Nations: State 
Responsibility (1983) 132-166; Przetacznik F ‘The International Responsibility of States for Unauthorised Acts of 
Their Organs’ (1989) 1 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 151. 
1092  Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1. C. J. Reports 1999, p. 62, para 62 at page 87. 
1093 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001), at page 40. 
1094 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001), para 4 at page 39; ICJ Judgment in 
‘United  States  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Staff  in  Tehran’ (1980). 
1095 Nollkaemper (2003) 620. 
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international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.1096  
That important human rights jurisprudence has also been upheld by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Opuz.1097 
State responsibility, not being criminal, comes with a consequence under international law.1098 The 
consequence is an obligation to repair what has been damaged by an internationally wrongful 
act.1099 State responsibility for reparation is unavoidable even when perpetrators did no act in an 
official capacity.1100  
Therefore, the states of Rwanda and Uganda, having been implicated in the Congo conflict through 
violations committed by their armed forces and other governmental actors, should be held 
responsible for reparations to the victims of atrocity crimes committed in the DRC during the 
relevant period of the conflict. In the same vein, the DRC, as the state of commission,1101 should 
also be at the forefront in providing reparations to the victims.1102 How can state responsibility be 
connected to individual responsibility at the ICC despite the court’s lack of jurisdiction over states? 
The following section addresses the issue of state-defendant joint responsibility for reparations 
under the auspices of the ICC Statute. 
 
1096 Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, para 172. 
1097 Opuz v. Turkey, Application no. 33401/02, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 9 June 2009, 
paras 83-86. 
1098 It is submitted that state responsibility is neither criminal nor civil, it is sui generis. See, Boggero G ‘Without 
(State) Immunity, No (Individual) Responsibility’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 395. 
1099 Article 31, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001); Fletcher (2016) 453 – 455. 
1100 Article 2 (3) of the ICCPR. 
1101 ‘State of Commission’ is an international criminal law terminology meaning a state on whose territory a core 
crime has been committed. For more on this; Werle (2009) 69. 
1102 Manirabona AM and Wemmers J ‘Specific Reparation for Specific Victimisation: A Case for Suitable Reparation 
Strategies for War Crimes Victims in the DRC’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law Review 1007; Bassiouni CM 
‘International Recognition of Victim’s Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 213. 
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5.4 State-Defendant Reparative Co-Responsibility Under the ICC Statute System  
5.4.1 Arguments for State-Defendant Co-Responsibility for Reparations 
As noted in previous chapters, the ICC reparations system may suffer enforcement hitches if the 
liability model is not revitalised to respond to its chronic limitations. The current reparations 
enforcement system does not promise full and effective enforceability of reparations orders.  
The trend of the Court has been to seek to provide redress to the victims ‘through’ resources of the 
TFV, not those of the defendants because they have nothing to offer. That is liability without 
accountability as a defendant’s responsibility for reparations is executed by a third party (the Trust 
Fund). That may affect the rights of the victims as there is a high possibility that redress through 
the Trust Fund’s scarce resources will not be effective, at least in the long run. 
Victims of human rights violations have a right to enforceable remedies.1103 International law 
demands that reparations ordered must have an enforceability element for them to be certain, 
meaningful, and effective. As stated by the ECCC in Duch, unenforceable awards would be 
violative of victim’s right to effective redress.1104  
From the standpoint of legal pragmatism, I posit that the ICC’s practice of ordering reparations 
against indigent defendants and seeking to enforce them through the TFV creates uncertainty. The 
uncertainty stems from the failure of the Court to appreciate the fact that; first, the impossibility 
of providing meaningful reparation through impecunious defendants, and secondly, the need to 
develop a reparation mechanism that ensures full accountability by extending enforcement 
responsibilities to other complicity actors such as states and organisations. 
Defendant’s indigence is surely an impediment to effective redress.1105 While all ICC reparation 
decisions are unanimous that impecuniosity is no bar to ordering reparations against 
defendants,1106 the Court should heed to the fact that ‘the inability to pay’ would be a valid 
justification for extending reparative accountability to complicity states and organisations. The 
 
1103 Article 2(3)(a) ICCPR. 
1104 Duch Appeal Judgment, Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC , para 667. 
1105Duch Appeal Judgement, para 684. 
1106 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 104; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3778-Red, para 189. 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights has rightly held that the right to an effective remedy is 
satisfied when the court’s decisions or judgments are fully enforced.1107  
That, the right to an ‘enforceable right’ is intrinsic in victim’s right to a remedy. Of particular 
interest to my point is a statement made by the Court that “It is also necessary that there are 
effective mechanisms to execute the decisions or judgments, so that the declared rights are 
protected effectively”.1108 
It is argued that a formal existence of the right to reparation under Article 75 of the ICC Statute is 
of no relevance to the victims if the court’s reparation orders are inexecutable.1109 As held in the 
European Court of Human Rights decision in Airey, positive international law guarantees rights 
that are ‘practical and effective’.1110  
To make the victim’s right to reparation practical and effective, the ICC needs to craft an 
enforcement mechanism that would deplete the effects of defendant’s indigence and scarce 
resources at the TFV. Indigence is increasingly becoming a huge burden for the victims1111 as 
economic considerations than victims’ needs appear to determine the reparation package at the 
ICC. The attendant consequence to that conundrum could be a partial implementation of reparation 
orders or the provision of reparations that are practically unresponsive to the actual harms suffered 
by the victims. 
Ideally, the Court may not be able to fully repair the atrocious harm suffered by victims of 
international crimes. In 2014, the registry of the Court admitted that “…it seems likely that the 
resources available for reparations for victims in the case will not be sufficient to remedy all the 
harm caused by the crimes and re-establish the situation prevailing previously for all the victims 
concerned”.1112  
 
1107 Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al v Peru, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, IACHR Series C no 
144, IHRL 1541 (IACHR 2006), 7th February 2006, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, para 220. 
1108 Acevedo Judgment (2006) para 220. 
1109 Acevedo Judgment (2006) para 213. 
1110 Case of Airey v. Ireland (Application no. 6289/73), European Court of Human Rights, Judgment, 9 October 1979, 
para 24. 
1111 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 335. 
1112 Report on Applications for Reparations in accordance with Trial Chamber II’s Order of 27 August, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3512-Conf-Exp-Anx1 notified on 16 December 2014, para 87. 
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However, it is expected reparations judgments granted by Court should be fully responsive to the 
needs of the victims by covering as many harm categories as possible. Sadly, it appears that the 
implementation of reparation orders will always respond to redress needs, not on the basis of what 
a victim is entitled to, but on account of economic resources available.1113  
In other words, reparations are extended on the basis of what kind of redress could be provided 
from a certain amount of money. The scarcity of resources could also affect the scope of victims’ 
eligibility for reparations in a given situation. In Lubanga, the TFV admitted that reparations may 
not be extended to all potentially eligible victims due to lack of resources.1114 Therefore, it is clear 
that the ICC reparation scheme needs to be revitalised to respond to the critical challenge of 
resource scarcity. 
That can be achieved if the reparation provision of the ICC Statute is broadly interpreted to be 
responsive to pragmatic challenges facing the Court. Broadening the scope of reparation actors to 
states and organisations could be possible through judicial innovations. The ICC jurisprudence is 
unanimous that the principle of strict interpretation only applies to criminal responsibility and 
definition of crimes.1115 Article 75 is a human rights provision that seeks to enforce a victim’s right 
to reparation. As held by the European Court of Human Rights in Baykara, human rights must be 
interpreted in a manner that renders them practical and effective.1116 As such, the ICC reparation 
provision should not be subjected to strict interpretation. Arguably, any interpretative method to 
Article 75 must bring about results that reinforce the right to reparation under international human 
rights law.1117 
 
1113 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Second Report of the Registry on Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2806, 
para 14. 
1114 Trust Fund for Victims, Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims Submitted to the Amended 
Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ICC-01/04-01/06-
3177-AnxA 03-11-2015, para 27. 
1115 Katanga Article 74 Judgment, paras 52 and 57. 
1116 Demir and Baykara v Turkey, Merits and just satisfaction, App no 34503/97, (2009) 48 EHRR 54, IHRL 3281 
(ECHR 2008), 12th November 2008, European Court of Human Rights, para 66. 
1117 Article 21(3) ICC Statute. 
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Since Article 75 is unrelated to criminal responsibility and definition of crimes, it is highly critical 
for the ICC to adopt the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘living instrument doctrine’1118 in 
interpreting Article 75 by coming up with a forward-looking reparations enforcement formula that 
appreciates ‘present day conditions’1119 that defendants are unable to deliver reparations in mass 
crime cases.  
In my submission, an evolutive approach to reparation adjudications under Article 75 would not 
be averse to the fact that individuals are not mere perpetrators of core crimes. Since the concern of 
victims is redress for harm suffered, the apportionment of reparative responsibility should not be 
limited to criminal defendants. Instead, reparative accountability at the ICC should be reflective 
of potentially multi-layered perpetration dynamics of international crimes. That underscores the 
significance of state-defendant partnership in providing redress to victims. 
However, it should be noted that the ICC Statute has no express provision for substituting 
individual responsibility for state responsibility for reparations.1120 So the question for discussion 
is whether state-defendant reparative co-responsibility for reparations would be inconsistent with 
the ICC Statute and international law as alluded to under Article 21(1)(c) of the ICC Statute; and 
whether it would affect rights of defendants.1121 I argue that state-individual joint liability for 
reparations in atrocity crime cases is legally justifiable on account of the following reasons.   
First, the ICC is not legally obligated to order reparations against the defendants. The statute 
provides that “The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation”.1122 Use of the word ‘may’ under Article 75(2) is indicative that ordering 
reparations against defendants is a “discretionary power as opposed to the mandatory cause of 
action”.1123 Therefore, the Court has the discretion to order or not to order reparations against the 
 
1118 Mowbray A ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 60-61; 
See also, Letsas G ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’ (2013) Cambridge University 
Press Online 106 – 141. 
1119 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2008) para 68; Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, 5856/72, Council of Europe: European 
Court of Human Rights, 15 March 1978, para 31. 
1120 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 105. 
1121 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 37. 
1122 Article 75(2) ICC Statute. 
1123 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir , Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-
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convicted defendant.1124 Does this mean that victims will not have access to redress if reparations 
are not ordered against the defendant?  I would answer this question in the negative.  
It is submitted that victims could still receive reparations even when there is no court order against 
the defendants. The relevant Article 75(2) is not a source of substantive rights for the victims but 
a mere procedural provision on how to effectuate a reparations award for the victims. 
 Victims’ substantive right to reparation is captured under Article 75(1) of the ICC Statute which 
obligates the Court to establish reparation principles in respect of reparations to the victims.1125 
Since Article 75(1) does not espouse as to when, how, and under what circumstances can the Court 
establish such reparation principles, the Court may establish reparative accountability precepts that 
can be applied to complicity states or organisations. Therefore, in the absence of an order against 
the defendant, victims could still receive reparations from thirds parties.1126 In other words, there 
is nothing in the ICC Statute to suggest that victim’s reparative burden cannot be taken up by states 
or organisations. 
Secondly, state obligation to provide reparation under international law does not depend on the 
result of a criminal trial.1127 Whether there is a conviction or an acquittal, territorial states are 
obligated to provide reparations to the victims. In its General Comment 4, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that: 
Victims’ access to reparation shall not depend on the initiation of and/or successful outcome of an 
investigation or criminal proceedings against a perpetrator.1128  
 
30, 11 December 2017, para 24;  The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir , Decision under article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-30, para 61;  
1124 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Trial Chamber V(B)’s 
“Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute”, ICC-
01/09-02/11 OA 5, 19 August 2015, para 41. 
1125 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 55. 
1126 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012), para 666. 
1127 Article 25(4) and 75(6) ICC Statute. 
1128 General Comment No. 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, para 33 at page 10. 
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In essence, a person does not become a victim on account of a perpetrator’s prosecution and 
conviction or acquittal. Victimhood exists even when the perpetrator has not been identified, 
prosecuted, and convicted or acquitted.1129  
Thirdly, the drafting history of the ICC Statute and even the current reparation framework of the 
ICC point to the fact that states are indispensable in the provision of meaningful reparations to the 
victims in mass crime situations. The drafting history of the ICC Statute indicates that the idea of 
state responsibility for reparations is not farfetched.1130  
The Draft Statute presented by the ICC Preparatory Committee for discussion at a Diplomatic 
Conference in Rome included a proviso under Article 73 (Reparation to Victims) which would 
have allowed the ICC to order reparations against states if convicted persons were indigent or they 
acted for their states. The relevant part of the draft Article 73 read: 
(b) The Court may also make an order or [recommend] that an appropriate form of reparations 
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, be made 
by a State: 
- if the convicted person is unable to do so himself/herself; and 
- if the convicted person was, in committing the offence, acting on behalf of that State in an 
official capacity, and within the course and scope of his/her authority; 
(c) In any case other than those referred to in subparagraph (b), the Court may also 
recommend that States grant an appropriate form of reparations to, or in respect of, victims, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.   
 
The draft Article 73 on reparations was subject to difficult negotiations in Rome.1131 States were 
strongly opposed to the idea of enabling the ICC to award reparations against them.1132 One critical 
point which was raised in opposition to that was that the ICC was meant to deal with individual 
culpability and not state responsibility.1133 The rationale for the argument gathered from Japan’s 
point of view is that awards against states would make the doctrine of individual responsibility 
dysfunctional.1134  
 
1129 UN Basic Principles on Reparations, para 9. 
1130 Moffet (2014) 152; Benedetti et al Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 
(2014) 154 – 159. 
1131 Lee R (ed) The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999) 267. 
1132 Khan S Rights of the Victims: Reparation by the International Criminal Court (2007) 39; Moffett (2014) 152; 
1133 Lee (1999) 268; Moffett (2014) 151. 
1134 Lee (1999) 268. 
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In the end, France and UK submitted a compromise formulation that omitted state responsibility 
for reparations, which was then accepted by states.1135 Succinctly, Article 73 embodied the 
customary position of international law that reparation for victims of human rights violations 
should come from the state if the perpetrator is impecunious.1136 Even more, prosecution and 
punishment of state officials responsible for human rights violations do not alleviate state 
responsibility for such violations.1137  
Fourthly, co-responsibility is not an introduction of a new norm under international law, but a 
theoretical proposal on how state responsibility could be operationalised under the ICC legal 
regime without upsetting the individuality of criminal responsibility. Furthermore, reparations 
entail civil responsibility as opposed to criminal liability (the concept of guilt). Consequently, the 
invocation of state responsibility under the ICC framework would not necessarily mean that states 
are guilt for the crimes charged against the defendants.  
Holding states accountable for reparations does not cause dysfunctionality of individual criminal 
responsibility. Individual and state responsibility are complementary and not substitutional for 
each other. States are merely responsible to provide reparations to territorial victims.  
The intersection of individual and state responsibility for reparation in criminal contexts may hinge 
on the deconstruction of the concept of guilty and responsibility. While individuals have been 
perceived as direct perpetrators of violations, states have largely participated as aiders, abettors, 
and supporters of individuals who carry out state criminal policies (for example, Sudan, Syria). 
Indeed, the commission of international crimes involves many actors and international criminal 
law does not reject the notion that states could have a role in the perpetration of such acts. In a 
broader sense, the harm occasioned to victims of violations could result from actions or inactions 
of both states, individuals, and organisations.  
In principle, criminal law assigns culpability to individuals on the basis of mens rea (guilt mind) 
and actus reus (criminal conduct). It follows that all individual perpetrators, whether as principals 
or accessories, are equally responsible for the crimes committed, meaning that guilt is indivisible 
 
1135 Schabas W The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) 880; Lee (1999) 269; 
Moffett (2014) 152. 
1136 Moffett (2014) 152; Article 16 of the UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
1137 Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) page 143. 
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even though there is state involvement.1138 However, when it comes to harm, it would be improper 
to say that an individual is liable for 100% of the harm.  
That is to say, Thomas Lubanga who has been convicted for the war crime of conscripting child 
soldiers, may not necessarily be responsible for 100% of the harm resulting from child conscription 
in Ituri, as there were many players in the conflict including foreign states who also recruited and 
used children in the war. At sentencing, in addition to claiming that he was not the most responsible 
person for the crimes committed in Ituri, Lubanga argued that the governments of the DRC, 
Rwanda, and Uganda were extensively involved in the crimes.1139 What comes out of this sentence 
mitigation attempt underscores the point that defendants are not to blame for the whole harm 
occasioned to the victims in atrocity environments. 
Harm can be quantified. For victims, harm is harm, whether it results from a single or multiple 
causations. Therefore, the causation of the harm could be divisible between states and individuals, 
especially in the context of mass crimes.1140 Thus, the argument that a confluence of individual 
and state liability for reparations in the context of ICC proceedings diffuses individual criminal 
liability falls as both could still be held liable for reparation under international law.  
Likewise, in the context of atrocity crimes, it would sometimes be difficult to draw a line between 
individual liability and state responsibility as such crimes entail participation of states. 
Consequently, both states and individuals, albeit on different levels of accountability rules, can be 
jointly and severally held liable for reparations in the wake of massive human rights violations. 
Unlike individuals, states have deeper pockets and governmental structures that may enable them 
to initiate viable reparation programs, as was the case with the transitional Latin American States. 
Fifthly, prevailing international criminal tribunal’s jurisprudence is unanimous that large scale 
reparations for mass crime victims can only be successfully implemented by governments and not 
individual defendants.1141 
 
1138 Mégret (2016) 10. 
1139 Lubanga Sentence Decision, para 83. 
1140 Mégret (2016) 11. 
1141 Duch Trial Judgment, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, paras 674 and 675. 
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As discussed, there are legal justifications under international law for twin reparative responsibility 
for reparations between states and individuals. How then could reparative co-responsibility be 
triggered under the ICC system? 
5.4.2 Operationalisation of State-Defendant Co-Responsibility  
As noted earlier, the ICC Statute neither grants the Court with jurisdiction over state responsibility 
nor provides for powers to issue reparation orders against states. In Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that there is no provision under the ICC Statute that would allow replacement of individual 
liability1142 with state responsibility for reparations.  
Legally, a court of law cannot adjudicate on a matter over which it has no jurisdiction.1143 
Therefore, absent express provision granting jurisdictional mandate, international tribunals do not 
have inherent powers to order enforcement measures against states.1144 Granting orders that are 
incapable of enforcement would be a mockery of the victims and potentially retraumatising. In 
law, remedies must be enforceable for them to be effective.1145 
In Duch, the ECCC refused to endorse victims’ reparation demands for lack of jurisdiction as 
orders sought were directed at the national government.1146 Incapable of issuing binding orders 
against the government, the ECCC could only request the government of Cambodia to participate 
in the implementation of reparations by providing financial resources.1147 The ECCC further 
observed that it would be legally untenable to issue reparation orders against the government since 
the state was neither a party to the proceedings nor had been allowed making observations.  
The specific paragraph reads, in part:  
…unlike the framework applicable before the ICC, the ECCC legal framework does not provide for a 
mechanism to invite representations from the State. It would run counter to basic principles of procedural 
fairness to issue binding orders against the Cambodian State, or, to the same effect, any individual or legal 
 
1142 Lubanga Appeals Chamber Reparations Judgment, para 105. 
1143 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 663. 
1144 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgement on the Request of The Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision 
of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ICTY, para 25. 
1145 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 663. 
1146 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) paras 663, 710, 712, and 716. 
1147 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 717. 
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entity, which has neither been a party to the proceedings nor been afforded the opportunity to submit 
observations.1148 
The rationale that could be garnered from the courts’ observations is that it would have been legally 
tenable for the ECCC to order reparations against the state if the government was a party to the 
case and it submitted observations in which it accepted responsibility for reparations.  
Transposing the ECCC jurisprudence to the ICC, I posit that it would be legally acceptable for the 
ICC to order reparations against states or directly requesting state assistance in implementing 
reparation orders if a particular state has accepted responsibility and participated in reparation 
proceedings pursuant to Article 75(3) of the ICC Statute and Rule 98(4) of the REP. Article 75(3) 
allows for state participation in reparation proceedings and the mandatory requirement is that the 
Court is obligated to take into account the state’s reparation observations in the final order.1149 
Thus, governments could use Article 75(3) procedure to record their commitment with the Court 
on how they would contribute to providing reparations to victims. This voluntary approach to state 
responsibility could provide an avenue for national governments to earmark, plan, and submit 
redress proposals before the Court. Given the indigence of most defendants, the Court could be 
willing to accept and endorse state reparation programs.1150 
Likewise, Rule 98(4) of the ICC RPE provides for judicial consultations in consequence to which 
the Court may order that reparations be implemented by national authorities.1151 This is another 
opportunity for governments to voluntarily accept reparative responsibility.  
However, the crucial point here is that the whole state participation procedure under Article 75(3) 
and Rule 98(4) is optional to the states.  
Empirical evidence indicates that conflict states have not made use of that process. The question 
then is, how could the Court order reparations against states or effectively ask for state assistance 
 
1148 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 656. 
1149 Article 75(3) of the ICC Statute provides: “Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and 
shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or 
interested States”. 
1150 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 703. 
1151 Rule 98(4) provides: “Following consultations with interested States and the Trust Fund, the Court may order that 
an award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund to an intergovernmental, international or national 
organization approved by the Trust Fund”. 
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in providing reparations when states have not activated and accepted reparative responsibility 
under the participatory procedure alluded to? The section bellow provides a two-pronged approach 
to effectuating state-defendant reparative co-responsibility under the ICC Statute. 
5.4.3 State’s Voluntary Acceptance of Reparative Responsibility under Article 75(3) 
As explained above, states may opt to voluntarily accept reparative responsibility under Article 
75(3). This procedure could be triggered by the Court or any interested state. However, the current 
practice indicates that the Court has been using this process post factum to the reparation 
decisions.1152 It would be meaningful if state cooperation is sought before the Court delivers a 
reparation decision.  
In Katanga, it was clear to the Court that the DRC government wanted to participate in reparations. 
However, instead of using its powers under Article 75(3) and Rule 1031153 to invite the DRC 
government to submit its observations before the reparation decision, the Court delivered its 
judgment without the government’s input and then ordered the TFV to contact the government to 
learn how it would contribute to reparations.1154 
Similarly, on 15th July 2016 in Lubanga, the Court made an order post factum to its 2015 reparation 
decision in which it requested the DRC government and interested organisations to “…present it 
with proposals for future collective projects to support the setting up of a range of collective 
reparation projects for the former child soldier victims of Mr Lubanga”.1155  
While Rule 103 of the RPE empowers the Court to solicit for observations on any matter from 
states or organisations at any stage of the proceedings, I argue that it would not be in the interests 
of victims to have such observations after a reparation decision. As demonstrated, the Court tries 
to use Rule 103 to request for help of the DRC government in delivering redress to the victims. 
 
1152 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 325; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012), para 278. 
1153 Rule 103 of the ICC RPE provides: “At any stage of the proceedings, a Chamber may, if it considers it desirable 
for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to submit, in writing 
or orally, any observation on any issue that the Chamber deems appropriate”. 
1154 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 325. 
1155 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Order Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-3217-tENG, 15 July 2016, para 8. 
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That procedure could be helpful if done before the decision and as per Article 75(3) so that third 
party observations could be incorporated in the final reparation order. 
It is submitted that the Court could encourage territorial states to use Article 75(3) procedure to 
accept reparative responsibility, in whole or in part, for the harm caused to the victims. Voluntary 
acceptance of responsibility may apply to both territorial states and third states since victim’s 
reparations could also come from third parties, including those not responsible for the harm. The 
significance of state’s reparative interventions is buttressed by the wording of Article 75(3) 
whereby the Court is obligated to issue a reparation order that considers representations made by 
governments, victims, and interested persons. The Article reads: 
Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take account of representations from 
or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or interested States. 
Therefore, when a state participant in reparation proceedings voluntarily commits to the Court of 
its desire to provide redress to the victims, that would serve as ‘consent to jurisdiction’ in 
consequence to which the Court may issue a binding reparation order against the particular state. 
Therefore, if a national government submits reparation observations under Article 75(3) in which 
it records a commitment to implement certain reparations for the victims, the Court would be 
legally justified to heed to that commitment in its final reparation order notwithstanding the scope 
of the defendant’s reparative responsibility. 
The basis of a court’s reparation order against a state would be its voluntary acceptance of 
responsibility to provide redress to the victims under the auspices of the ICC. Arguably, that would 
be an ad hoc acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction on reparations. In Duch, the ECCC hinted that 
it would have been able to issue a reparation order against the Cambodian state if there was 
voluntary acceptance of responsibility for reparations.1156  
Arguably, voluntary acceptance of legal obligations or court’s jurisdictions by consent is a 
standard practice for states under international law. For example, a state’s consent is key for the 
functioning of the International Court of Justice.1157 Also, absent state consent, a treaty cannot 
 
1156 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 703. 
1157 Article 36, Statute of the ICJ. 
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create rights or obligations for non-signatories.1158 There are also scenarios through which non-
party states could accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.1159 
Therefore, Article 75(3) approach to co-responsibility is predicated on obtaining state consent 
before the ICC can order reparations. It would be conceivable that not many states will take that 
route and therefore the ICC may lack a basis for ordering reparations against governments. The 
following part offers an escape route to this conundrum.  
5.4.4 Invocation of State’s Reparative Responsibility by Recommendatory Orders 
Considering that individual criminal responsibility does not negate state responsibility,1160 and in 
response to the state’s violation of the duty to prevent and protect people against violations, the 
ICC could invoke international human rights law principles through Article 21(3) of the ICC 
Statute by demanding that territorial states should provide redress to the victims. State obligation 
to redress harm suffered by its territorial citizens is well enshrined under international law.1161  
In Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, the Inter American Court of Human Rights held that impunity, 
which entails non-prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators, constitute a violation of state’s 
human rights obligations towards the victims and it precipitates repetition of violations.1162 
Consequently, the Court deemed that the conduct of investigations on the violations and the 
punishment of the perpetrators by the territorial state constitute an important segment to the 
victim’s right to redress.1163  
In fact, during the preparatory work for the ICC Statute, the DRC government submitted that the 
ICC should be enabled to order reparations against territorial states for failure to protect.1164 In 
Lubanga, Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice rightly requested the Court to assign reparative 
responsibility to the DRC government as the territorial state concerning victims of the Lubanga 
 
1158 Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 
1159 Articles 12(3) and 11(2) ICC Statute. 
1160 Article 25(4) ICC Statute; Lubanga Reparations Order (2015) para 50. 
1161 Paras 16 and 16 of UN Basic Principles on Reparations. 
1162 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Judgment of November 27, 2003 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), para 176. 
1163 Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, para 177. 
1164 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 16 March-3 April 1998, Proposal 
by the Democratic Republic of Congo, A/AC. .249/1998/WG.4/DP.38, 27 March 1998. 
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crimes.1165 However, that request was not acted upon by the Court in an authoritative manner as 
explained earlier. 
When a territorial state does not trigger the Article 75(3) mechanism to accept responsibility, the 
ICC could issue semi-binding recommendatory orders by requesting such states to, first, 
implement certain complex and resource-intensive reparations measures, and secondly, ask them 
to cooperate effectively in the enforcement of reparation judgments against defendants.  
I refer to such orders as semi-binding recommendations as they would not emanate from the court’s 
express statutory powers, but from customary international law. In Duch, the ECCC has, albeit 
with a soft language, issued recommendations to the government of Cambodia concerning 
reparations that may never be enforced against the convicted person.1166 
The drafting history of the ICC Statute proves that the concept of recommendatory reparation 
orders against states is possible. The Drafters, perhaps with the understanding that executing state 
responsibility in criminal settings would be impossible, came up with a provision that would have 
allowed the ICC to recommend victims’ reparations against states that are complicit in the crimes 
or when the defendant is impecunious.1167 Despite being in line with international human rights 
law, the state responsibility aspect in that provision was dropped at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference for the fear that states would reject it.1168 
Alternatively, recommendatory orders for reparations could also be issued under the obligation to 
cooperate provision.1169 In all reparation orders, the ICC has called upon states to ‘facilitate’ the 
enforcement of its decisions.1170 Such requests for cooperation have been rather general and they 
do not relate to specific reparation questions. Since the obligation to cooperate provisions are 
 
1165 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Observations of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice on 
Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2016, para 27. 
1166 Duch Appeal Judgement (2012) para 712. 
1167 Preparatory Committee of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 16 March – 3 April 1998, 
A/AC.249/1998/CRP.12, 1 April 1998, at page 19 and 20. 
1168 See “Article 73, Reparations to Victims, available at http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc15c8/ (accessed 3 April 
2018). 
1169 Article 86 of the ICC Statute. 
1170 Katanga Reparations Order (2017) para 324; Lubanga Reparations Judgment (2012) paras 256 and 278; Lubanga 
Reparations Order (2015) para 50.  
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meant to ensure that international tribunals operate smoothly,1171 the Court could use Article 86 of 
the ICC Statute to ask for state participation in specific reparation measures for the victims. 
Aptly put, state responsibility for reparations in the ICC context could be operationalised by way 
of voluntary acceptance of responsibility or through reparative recommendations endorsed by the 
Court. It is highly probable that the enforcement limitations intrinsic to the defendant-based 
reparations could be overcome or immensely reduced if there are state interventions under the 
proposed modalities. Participation of states could smoothen the identified enforcement huddles 
and possibly enhance the effectiveness of the ICC reparation system. 
5.5 Benefits of State Participation in Atrocity Crime Reparations 
State cooperation is essential for the proper functioning of any international tribunal. Reparative 
co-responsibility could enhance participation of national governments in the implementation of 
reparations. Cases before the Court have proved that governments are indispensable for successful 
court-ordered reparations.  
In light of the foregoing, I argue that states, other factors remaining constant, could be better placed 
to facilitate the provision of meaningful redress to the victims due to the following reasons. 
5.5.1 Wider Resource Base 
Governments, compared to individuals and the TFV, have a relatively wider resource base that 
may work out well for victims. That has been the case with reparations granted to victims of past 
crimes in Latin American states following dictatorships, enforced disappearances, and extra-
judicial killings. Such reparations came in the form of  ‘state-sponsored programs’ that ranged 
from a return of illegally acquired property, compensation for economic losses, provision of 
education and healthcare, monthly pensions, erection of commemorative monuments, one-off 
payments, and provision of housing.1172 
 
1171  Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, ICTY, para 31; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on 
the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest 
and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-151 , 26 March 2013, para 22. 
1172 Comparative Country Studies Regarding Truth, Justice, and Reparations for Gross Human Rights Violations: 
Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, April 2014 IHRLC Working Paper Series No. 2, page 9. Available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Working-Paper-2-India-Comparative-Country-Studies-
151027.pdf (accessed 3 April 2018). 
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5.5.2 In Situ Understanding of the History of Atrocities 
In situ knowledge of the perpetration dynamics of atrocity crimes is needed for the proper planning 
and implementation of reparations. Naturally, governments have a good understanding of the 
nature and types of crimes perpetrated in their territories. For example, in Lubanga, the ICC 
requested the DRC government to provide it with local information on the crimes and past or future 
collective reparation programs for the child soldiers.1173 
 5.5.3 Large Number of Victims 
Mass victimisation creates a large pool of victims with different needs. For the Courts, it could be 
an uphill and resource-intensive task to identify every victim for reparations.1174 Ideally, atrocity 
crime victims are too many to identify through a judicial process which suffers from complex 
procedural rules and scarcity of time and resources. Administrative reparations by states may not 
be worked out by strict adherence to ‘crime for harm’ causation principles. That would allow for 
larger victim participation and easier identification of eligible victims. 
5.5.4 Network of Civil Servants 
Implementation of reparation programmes for victims of mass victimisation is highly demanding 
in terms of human resources. Governments have an ever-ready civil service that could be used to 
identify and verify victims as well as gather, collate, and analyse information on victims. Public 
resources could also be used for planning and for the provision of logistical necessities for 
enforcing reparations. 
5.5.5 Access to Information on Victims 
The planning and implementation of reparation programmes require an avalanche of information 
on victims. Obtaining complete and precise information on mass crime victims would be difficult 
for a court of law. Governments, through state institutions, could be able to obtain and piece 
together crucial information on the victims.  
 
1173  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Order pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-3217-tENG, paras 7 and 8. 
1174 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 141. 
220 
 
The absence of critical information on the victims has been identified as one of the main obstacles 
in the Lubanga reparation case. The TFV has admitted that state cooperation is necessary for it to 
be able to obtain information on victims of the Lubanga crimes in Ituri.1175 The Court has requested 
the DRC government to disseminate information on ‘disarmament, demobilisation, and 
rehabilitation’ programs undertaken in the country to enable the Court to identify eligible former 
child soldiers for collective reparations.1176 In certain situations, governments may be reluctant to 
share such information with the Court especially when it is apparent that they do not ‘own’ the 
reparation program. State-defendant partnership for reparations could make governments feel part 
of the process. 
 5.5.6 Local Partners are Critical for ICC Reparations 
The Hague based ICC may not have local expertise and experience to enable it to implement 
reparation programmes in remote territories of foreign countries. The Court has already held that 
reparations should be provided in accordance with the local conditions in a given situation.1177 To 
do that, one must have a good understanding of the culture, administrative and political hierarchies, 
social values, and the prevailing local challenges. The TFV could only be able to implement 
reparations that adhere to local values if it seeks and obtain the collaboration of local implementing 
partners such as NGOs and local authorities.1178 This could be done easily through co-
responsibility. 
5.5.7 Mass Reparations Entail Extensive Planning and Implementation 
Redress for mass violations are by nature very extensive in scope and extremely demanding 
regarding resources and administrative logistics. In the absence of non-cooperation from 
governments, certain collective reparation programmes cannot be implemented as they may 
require legal clearances and administrative approvals from national authorities. For example, in 
 
1175 Lubanga Reparations Draft Implementation, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-Red, at para 41. 
1176 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , Order inviting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to Submit Observations on the Participation of Child Soldiers in Programmes for the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration of Armed Groups in Ituri, ICC-01/04-01/06-3260-tENG , 22 November 2016, paras 
4-6.  
1177 Al Mahdi Reparations Order (2017), para 148. 




Katanga, the Court has requested the government to waive taxes and school fees for certain 
reparation projects and to provide free land as restitution for the victims who lost their land during 
the conflict.1179 Issues such as these could be dealt with easily when national authorities become 
reparation partners through co-responsibility.   
5.6 Chapter Conclusion 
 The chapter has proposed co-responsibility as a mechanism for solving the identified inherent 
limitations of the ICC reparation regime. While the ICC is firmly committed to making sure that 
victims receive meaningful redress, the thesis demonstrates that the ICC reparation regime is 
vulnerable to structural and legal limitations relating to scarce resources, prosecutorial limitations, 
and indigence of the defendants.  
Such structural and legal impediments may not palliate if the ICC is unable to exercise ad hoc 
jurisdiction over [conflict] states when it comes to reparations. Reparative complementarity 
springing from co-responsibility between individual perpetrators and complicity states could serve 
as an antidote to such impediments.1180  
The involvement of states in court-ordered reparations should, whenever possible, be earmarked 
for reparations that require significant financial resources as well as those that are inexecutable in 
the absence of state cooperation.1181 For example, collective reparations for former child soldiers 
in the Eastern DRC can only be successfully implemented by national authorities. Same applies to 
service-based reparations such as phycological and physical rehabilitation and the provision of 
educative and other preventative redress measures.  
As discussed, states could be able to somehow fill the gaps of the defendant-focused reparations. 
Making the ICC able to award reparations against states is not a novel idea. Regional human rights 
courts1182 and even domestic courts have been issuing reparation orders against states. When 
territorial states refuse to implement reparation orders or recommendations stemming from co-
 
1179 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga , Draft implementation Plan  Relevant to Trial Chamber II’s Order for 
Reparations of 24 March 2017 (ICC-01/04-01/07-3728), ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, para 70. 
1180 Moffett (2013) 383-384. 
1181 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Observations on Issues Concerning Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2863, 18 April 2012, paras 124 and 128. 
1182 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights; The European Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of 
Human and People’s Rights. 
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responsibility, the Court could make a finding of non-cooperation under Article 87(7) of the ICC 
Statute and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties for action.  
In addition, bilateral countermeasures by individual states or collective sanctions by the ICC 
Statute signatories may force recalcitrant states to act for the victims. For ICC cases that originate 
from the UN Security Council,1183 the ICC could seek interventions of the UN through sanctions 
or diplomatic pressure.1184  
Another radical solution is for state parties to the ICC Statute to change the wording of Article 
751185 to enable the ICC to issue reparation orders against states and or individuals especially when 












1183 Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute. 
1184 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (1997) para 33. 






The overriding objective of the thesis has been to study the role of the ICC in the provision of 
reparative justice to victims of international crimes. The study has focused on the DRC as a 
situation country at the ICC. Specifically, the study has examined the reparation judgments in 
Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi to determine their compatibility with international human rights 
law. 
As indicated in chapter one, the specific objectives of the study have been to: provide a historical 
account of the Congo conflict and the resulting intervention of the ICC; analyse the role of victims 
in mass crime prosecutions; analyse the specific legal and factual issues surrounding the ICC 
reparation regime to determine the potential contribution of the Congolese cases to the 
development of the jurisprudence of the Court; examine the implementation framework for 
reparation orders issued by the Court to determine their utility level in ensuring effective, adequate, 
and prompt reparations as required under International Law. 
Throughout the thesis, the study grapples with the following questions. First, is the ICC legal 
regime adequately capable of providing meaningful reparations to the victims of atrocity crimes? 
Secondly, is the Congolese legal system and post conflict justice supportive of reparative 
complementarity? The section below provides some general conclusions to these questions. 
The following issues are the major findings of the study.  
1. The ICC’s reparation system as currently constituted does not ensure accessibility, equality, 
equity, non-discrimination, and satisfaction for the victims as required under international 
human rights law.  
2. Defendant-based reparations are inherently limited in scope due to selective charges.  
3. The defendant-focused enforcement model, despite being legal under Article 75, does not 
ensure an effective remedy for the victims for lack of an enforceability element owing to 
indigence and resource constraints.  
4. The ICC reparation system creates a pyramid of victims with unequal status – qualified and 
unqualified victims due to acquittals, non-prosecutions in crucial cases (Al-Bashir and 
Kenyatta), narrow charging (Lubanga), and mistrials (Bemba and Ruto and Sang cases).  
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5. The implementation mechanism for reparations is uncertain and unsustainable. The 
enforcement uncertainty stems from the fact that the resource-strained Trust Fund for Victims 
cannot enforce reparation orders in full and promptly.  
6. The inherent limitations of the ICC reparation regime are compounded by the fact that there 
has been very weak positive reparative complementarity on the part of Congo as a situation 
country. That could also be the case with other situation countries before the Court. 
On the role of victims, the study has demonstrated that victims have a dual status. In criminal 
proceedings, victims have been regarded as ‘participants’ with limited rights to be determined at 
the discretion of the Court. In reparation proceedings, victims assume the role of ‘parties’ with 
more specific rights enshrined in the ICC Statute.  
In the general framework of criminal proceedings, the thesis provides a rights-based analysis of 
the victim participation regime. In chapter three, an analysis of various decisions of the Court has 
revealed that the Court does not have a ‘unified’ admission system that would ensure meaningful 
participation of victims. 
As demonstrated, the standard admission system for the victims under Rule 89 is not suitable for 
mass crime prosecutions. The study makes a case for a new system that not only upholds the rights 
of the parties and participants but also creates an admission procedure that is certain, time-
conscious, effective, and sustainable. Tu cure the deficiencies of the victim participation procedure 
at the ICC, the study has proposed a hybrid mechanism that allows for both individual and 
collective application and participation.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that, to effectuate participation as collectives, the Court may 
develop a set of judicial principles on the participation criteria of victims as communities or 
associations. That could maximise resources and serve the interests of victims who are not attuned 
to participating in individualised settings. 
Regarding post conflict justice and reparative complementarity, it has been demonstrated, in 
chapter two and three, that the magnitude of the Congo conflict required multi-faceted 
accountability measures domestically. That underscores the presence of a transitional justice 
mechanism that, while striving for peace, introduces justice and accountability measures to deal 
with a vast array of perpetrators and violations to enable the victims to obtain the truth regarding 
the crimes and to be redressed effectively for the harms suffered. 
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However, as discussed in chapter two, the post conflict transitional justice in the DRC was based 
on ‘rebuilding the state’. As such, justice for the victims was not a priority. The study has indicated 
that the state reconstruction perspective was not attuned to building strong rule of law institutions 
as an essential step for the provision of justice. As a result, state institutions of justice became 
weak and ineffective, leading to very few and inconsequential prosecutions. In general, it is safe 
to conclude that the DRC did not act for the victims as required under International Human Rights 
Law. 
On the ICC reparation system, the study demonstrates that the implementation framework for 
reparations suffers from two major shortcomings. First, impecunious defendants, and, secondly, 
scarcity of resources. 
To palliate what appears to be chronic shortcomings of its reparation system, it has been argued 
that the ICC should disentangle itself from the inherently limited defendant-focused reparations 
by encouraging the participation of territorial states and organisations in the provision of 
reparations to the victims.  In chapter two, a case is made for reparative complementarity that 
presupposes an active role for states in redressing the victims. It has been submitted that the 
concept of reparative complementarity is not novel. The ICC Statute, under Articles 25(4) and 
75(6) recognises that individual criminal responsibility does not absolve states of their 
responsibilities under international law. 
Furthermore, chapter two provides an account to the fact that reparative complementarity is also 
applicable to the ICC through a five-pronged state participation regime in the reparation 
proceedings. For clarity, it has been noted that states could participate in the reparation proceedings 
by commenting on expert reports on reparations; in the implementation of reparation decisions 
(the ICC can order an implementation of reparations through inter-governmental organisations); 
in the enforcement of reparation decisions; in informational reparations and publicity of reparation 
proceedings and decisions; and in the provision of reparation resources through the Trust Fund. 
It has further been demonstrated that reparative complementarity is critical for reparations in 
atrocity crime environments for a number of reasons. 
1. The selective nature of international prosecutions brings about limited reparations due to 
limited charges.  
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2. Violations of certain socio-economic and cultural rights cannot be redressed through case-
based reparations.  
3. Certain categories of reparations such as preventative redress measures that guarantee non-
repetition of the violations and non-economic reparations such as satisfaction cannot possibly 
be ordered through defendant-focused criminal reparations.  
4. The concept of ‘no conviction no reparation’ is against a human rights principle that recognises 
victimhood in the absence of prosecutions or convictions. Consequently, reparative 
complementarity, which is not necessarily judicial-based, could extend reparations to victims 
who have been left out in the cold due to acquittals or mistrials.  
5. The difficulty with victim identification systems in criminal trials makes it near impossible to 
identify all eligible victims. Thus, the unidentified but existing victims could be able to receive 
reparations outside of the judicial framework, for example, through state administrative 
reparations. 
To enforce reparative complementarity through the ICC reparation system, the thesis, in chapter 
five, presents a state-defendant reparative co-responsibility as an enforcement mechanism under 
Article 75(3) of the ICC Statute to mitigate limitations of conviction-based reparations as 
discussed. The author understands that the ICC Statute creates the ICC as an institution to end 
impunity for egregious violations of human rights. The Court may never achieve this goal if 
victims of core crimes are not redressed adequately, effectively, and promptly as required under 
international human rights law. 
It has been argued that the formal recognition of the right to reparation for the victims of 
international crimes may not mean anything to the victims if they do not receive meaningful 
redress. Meaningful redress calls for reparation orders that are enforceable. To achieve the object 
and purpose of the ICC Statute of ending impunity for atrocity crimes through prosecutions and 
reparations, it has been submitted that the ICC needs to quickly move away from its formalistic 
approach to interpreting Article 75 by inventing an alternative reparation’s implementation 
mechanism that involves states and organisations. 
The quickest way to fix the limitations of the ICC reparation system would have been through 
statutory amendments aimed at expanding the jurisdictional mandate of the Court on reparations. 
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However, that approach may not be feasible as history shows that substantive parts of international 
instruments cannot be amended easily.1186  
The proposed state-defendant reparative co-responsibility can still be implemented without 
amending the ICC Statute. As noted in chapter five, contemporary international law recognises the 
existence of duality of responsibility between states and individuals in mass crime violations. As 
per conventional international law, the only consequence for violations of international law by 
states is the obligation to provide reparations. For the individuals, they may be subjected to both 
criminal sanctions such as imprisonment and reparations. 
Since state responsibility for reparations is not criminal, it has been demonstrated that the ICC 
could deal with that issue in the context of its powers under the ICC Statute and through the 
application of customary international law and international human rights law. State responsibility 
for reparations could result, not only from breaches of international law attributable to a state, but 
also from the failure to prevent or protect people from the violations. The proposed implementation 
mechanism is neither inconsistent with the ICC Statute nor international law. 
Since Article 75 of the ICC Statute is not a provision dealing with substantive criminal law issues 
(definitions of crimes and modes of responsibility), it should be interpreted progressively as a 
human rights provision. Reading the living instrument doctrine into Article 75 of the ICC Statute, 
the author argues that the said provision should be interpreted in a manner that appreciates the 
attendant obstacles to enforcing reparations through impecunious defendants. Therefore, present 
day circumstances of the unenforceability of reparations through defendants should necessitate the 
Court to look beyond the convicted persons, by also extending reparative liability to complicity 
states and organisations. 
Chapter five has demonstrated that co-responsibility can be triggered as ‘voluntary acceptance of 
reparative jurisdiction of the ICC’ when a state accepts reparative responsibility and participates 
in the reparation proceedings pursuant to Article 75(3) of the ICC Statute and Rule 98(4) of the 
 
1186 Klabbers J ‘Treaties, Amendment, and Revision’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2006), 
para 20, available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1483 
(accessed 3 September 2018). 
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Acceptance of jurisdiction by consent is a standard practice by 
states in their various legal engagements in international settings. 
When a state has chosen not to accept reparative responsibility through the Article 75(3) statutory 
avenue, the Court could still apply international human rights law and customary international law 
by issuing semi-binding recommendatory reparative orders to territorial states. I refer to them as 
‘semi-binding orders’ because they are made at the behest of customary international law as 
opposed to positive international law. When the duty to protect and prevent is breached especially 
with respect to gross human rights violations reaching the threshold of crimes under international 
law, territorial states cannot escape the responsibility to redress the victims. 
In the alternative, it has also been argued that such reparative orders directed at territorial states 
could also be issued by the ICC on the basis of the obligation to cooperate provision under Article 
86 of the ICC Statute. Since the main objective of such a provision is to enable the Court to 
discharge its mandate effectively, the ICC can establish, through reparation principles under 
Article 75, that reparations in a certain case cannot possibly be implemented through the 
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